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Biannual **No. 85** **Winter 2019**

1. Peace in Afghanistan: Role of Regional Countries and United States — 1-23
   Mohammad Khan & Shabir Ahmad Khan

2. Energy Security of a Rentier State: A Case Study of Kazakhstan — 25-40
   Uzma Siraj & Manzoor Khan Afridi

3. Afghan Third Ulasi Jirga Election (October 20-21, 2018): A Promoter of State Building or an Instigator of Fragility: An Analysis — 41-55
   Muhammad Shafi & Noor Ul Amin

4. China Pakistan Economic Corridor: Interdependence to Regional Integration — 57-78
   Saima Parveen & Syed Akhtar Ali Shah

5. Pakistan's Role in the Social Reconstruction of Afghanistan in the Post 9/11 Era — 79-93
   Alamgir Khan & Muhammad Hanif

6. Swat State and Bolshevik Movement — 95-117
   Muhammad Ali Dinakhel

7. Determinant of Productivity Growth: Evidence from Emerging Asian Countries — 119-131
   Muhammad Asim Afridi & Sohail Farooq

8. The 19th and Early 20th-Century U.S. Women's Rights Struggle: Implications for Contemporary Afghani and Pakistani Pashtun Women — 133-160
   Imran Ali & Bahramand Shah

Cover Photo Information
Blue Mosque (Mazar-i-Sharif)

Considered by Afghan Shi'a to be the final resting place of fourth caliph 'Ali bin Abi Talib (d. 661 A.H.), son-in-law of the Prophet Mohammad. Legend contends that the caliph's body was moved from Najaf to a secret tomb near Balkh, which was "re-discovered" by a *mullah* in the village of Khwaja Khayran in early twelfth century. Seljuk sultan Sanjar erected a shrine on this site in 1136. Timurid sultan Husain Baiqara (1469-1506) built the shrine in 1480-81/885 A.H.

Present shrine built from 30000 handmade tiles, took 70 years to complete, never been damaged during the country's long periods of wars. It is visited by thousands of pilgrims throughout the year and particularly on *Nawroze* (21st March) to celebrate the new year. The mosque has the capacity of 3000 people to accommodate, open for men, women and children throughout the day but on Wednesday open to ladies only.

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1. Nacy Hatch Dupree. *An Historical Guide to Afghanistan.* Kabul: Afghanistan Tourist Organization, 1977, p.p. 391-393
2. https://www.britannica.com/place/Mazar-e-Sharif
2. http://archnet.org/sites/3939
3. ISAF. NATO Mission in Afghanistan: Assisting Democracy Poised for Expansion. ISAF Mirror, October 2006, page no. 6

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PEACE IN AFGHANISTAN: ROLE OF REGIONAL COUNTRIES AND UNITED STATES

Muhammad Khan[*] and Shabir Ahmad Khan[**]

Abstract

The year-2019, marked the 40 years of instability and chaos in Afghanistan, ever since it was invaded by former Soviet Union in December 1979. In the last forty years, the Afghan instability and conflict has been so transmissible that any peace plan, initiated even with sincerity got entombed into viscid domestic ambiguities, undesired regional rivalries and geopolitical interests of great powers. Owing to internal instability and frequent foreign invasions, there could not develop a cohesive national character within Afghanistan. Besides, there has been no institutional build-up and development which could have provided a strong base for the establishment of good governance system. In the absence of domestic peace and a unanimously acceptable leadership, the invaders and regional players have been exploiting Afghan geopolitics and its diverse societal makeup. Above all, the poor economic system, lack of needed resource base and massive unemployment constrained the flexibility, the Kabul regimes could have utilized for the minimum economic management at the domestic level. Furthermore, the post 2014 drawdown of US and NATO forces did not provide conducive environment where Afghans could have taken independent decisions to determine their future course of action for the larger national interest of the state and masses. The paper takes a critical analysis of the above-mentioned factors, which impeded peace process from taking firm roots in Afghanistan. The paper also puts into debate the US strategic interests in and around Afghanistan and diverging interests of regional countries which further impede peace process in Afghanistan.

Keywords: Afghanistan, peace process, CBMs, United States, Russia, China, stakeholders, Taliban and negotiations.

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Introduction

In the historical context, Afghan geopolitics has been exploited by major powers and regional countries alike. In its modern history, the Afghan masses have not known peace in their motherland ever since the former Soviet Union stepped into Afghan soil in 1979. Thereafter, neither there has been an effective central government in Kabul nor could the fragile administrations harmonize the masses into a national cohesive power. Despite deployment of 150,000 troops at one time, United States could not establish peace in Afghanistan since October 2001.[1] Despite its heavy military deployment in last 18 years US could not shrink the influence of Taliban in Afghanistan. Failure to achieve this goal, US had to accept reality of Taliban in Afghanistan and undertook rounds of talks with them from a position of equality.

Domestically, there existed an absence of any serious efforts for peace between Kabul regime and Taliban. Indeed, there existed an unending cycle of internal conflicts among various Afghan groups, based on; tribal rivalries, ethnic differences, political divide and above all the Taliban domination over major parts of the country. Practically it has been beyond the competence of the Afghan Government to establish the writ of state all over the Afghan territory. Taliban is a reality in Afghanistan, a fact denied by US for quite some time. Underestimating the power of Taliban had led US to face a perpetual setback in its longest deployment in Afghanistan. "Between 60% and 70% of Afghanistan is now contested or under the control of the Taliban."[2]

Indeed, peace in Afghanistan would remain a distant dream without engaging the Taliban. From 2014 onwards, Taliban leadership has been talking to officials from neighbouring states as well as great powers including United States. Besides several rounds of formal talks with US in Qatar and UAE, Taliban delegation has been to Moscow on a number of occasions.[3] During February 2019 talks in Moscow, Taliban had the

[1] Violence mars Afghanistan peace meeting in Kabul, BBC South Asia, (June 2, 2010). Accessed at; https://www.bbc.com/news/10211026.

[2] By Clarissa Ward, Chief International Correspondent, Najibullah Quraishi and Salma Abdelaziz, 36 Hours with Taliban; CNN goes exclusively behind Taliban lines as the US prepares to pull its troops after 17 years of war in Afghanistan, *CNN*, (February 2019). Accessed at; https://edition.cnn.com/interactive/2019/02/middleeast/36-hours-with-the-taliban-intl/

[3] Extended US-Taliban peace talks in Qatar raise Afghan hopes; Talks in Qatar have now gone on for four days with analysts hoping they 'open a way for an intra-Afghan

opportunity to engage with Russia and other neighbouring states like; China, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. It is worth mentioning that, Russia, China and Pakistan have made serious efforts for bringing peace in Afghanistan through their tri-partite talks in last few years. These talks were sabotaged by rival powers at a critical stage by provoking Ashraf Ghani Government.[4] Taliban also believe that, "Most countries have acknowledged our status"[5] This is true, since many countries have invited Talban for negotiations which gave them a sort of legitimacy for their existence as a political entity.

The neo-realist theoretical perspective gives the most pertinent description of the contemporary situation in Afghanistan. In the realm of power politics, each state is vying to protect its interest at regional and global level in an anarchic international system. Though US is still a super power but practically there emerged multiple power centres at the global level, influencing various regions and countries surround them. Afghanistan is a case study where rising China and resurgent Russia challenge the very authority of US and its long-term presence. On its part, U.S is seeking a unilateral negotiation with Taliban as a bargaining chip for its long-term stay in the region for attainment of its strategic objectives. In September 2019, the last minute arrangement for signing of an agreement between US and Taliban failed, since US establishment (US Deep State) never wanted complete pull out of its troops from Afghanistan for the obvious reasons of its long term strategic objectives.

In fact, Taliban were adamant for a phased pull-out of US troops, since it was the basic theme of their struggle against US presence in Afghanistan, after losing power in 2001. As a pretext, President Trump had to take a cover-up of one of US soldiers, killed in Taliban attack in Afghanistan. President Trump said, "Unfortunately, in order to build false leverage, [the Taliban] admitted to an attack in Kabul that killed one of our great soldiers. I

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dialogue', *Al-Jazeera*, (January 24, 2019). Accessed at; https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/01/extended-taliban-peace-talks-qatar-raise-afghan-hopes-190124144710617.html.

[4] Afghan government frozen out of Moscow peace talks with the Taliban, *The Washington Post*, (February 4, 2019), Accessed at; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/afghan-government-frozen-out-of-moscow-peace-talks-with-the-taliban/2019/02/04/b9670c46-286a-11e9-8eef-0d74f4bf0295_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.5d8320c23752

[5] Russia reaches out to Afghan Leaders for Taliban Talks, Angering Kabul, *The Moscow Times (Reuters)*, (November 2' 2018). Accessed at; https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2018/11/02/russia-reaches-out-to-afghan-leaders-for-taliban-talks-angering-kabul-a63395.

immediately cancelled the meeting and called off peace negotiations."[6] Apart from the neorealist framing the international structure, the states engaged in and around Afghanistan have made the region, a security complex, fits into the 'Regional Security Complex Theory' (RSCT), theorized by scholars like Barry Buzan and Ole Waever. The theory establishes a linkage between regional security and international security where apart from states; non-state actors also play a dominant role in this security complex. Afghanistan is located in region where it makes a junction between South and Central Asia, logically attracting the attention of major powers like China and Russia, both having convergence of security interests against presence of external power in this regional security complex.

The struggle for the attainment of power is a perpetual and unique feature of international politics. This power politics give way to security competitions among states and major powers. In order to understand the dynamics of peace and war, the alliance system and the balance, it is important to understand the relative distribution of power in the international system. Kenneth Waltz, a structural realist argues that all state, particularly the major powers are always concerned about the potentials of other states. The US-Taliban talks have resumed once again, nevertheless in case of a future deal, there may be a possibility of accommodating US forces by Taliban, which would irk its peer competitors; Russia and China.

Afghanistan is a pivotal state in the Eurasian region having proximity with Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which U.S views critically. In such a case, the ultimate concern of these states will be their security vulnerabilities, which enhances while US military remain at their door step. U.S presence in this region with security maximization may ultimate leads towards power maximization; an offensive form of realism as explained by Mearsheimer. Indeed, the international structure compels states to maximize their security which ultimately contributes towards power maximization, giving way to conflicts like Afghanistan. At global level, there neither exist supra-state concept nor the satisfied or status quo state(s). In the contemporary system, states are constantly searching for prospects to gain power at the expense of other states. At the global level, U.S finds it extremely difficult to continue with its hegemonic stature which Mearsheimer consider as, "the world is destined to perpetual great power

[6] Trump cancels secret US meeting with Afghan Taliban, *BBC*, (September 8, 2019). Accessed at; https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-49624132

competition,"[7] and Afghanistan has become the ground of this great power competition.

The Geopolitical Interests of China in Afghanistan

In the Chinese strategic calculus, Afghanistan has a unique significance from the perspective of geopolitics and geo-economics. China desires a deeper and a closer cooperation with Afghanistan. All regional countries, surrounding Afghanistan would like peace and stability in the region and Afghanistan is the linchpin for this peace. China would always like to have a constructive engagement with Afghanistan. A constructive Chinese engagement in Afghanistan will serve its economic, strategic and security interests. In case China decides to remain indifferent to what is happening in Afghanistan, there will be no stability and extra regional powers will continue exploiting it for their vested interests. Indeed, an unstable and anarchic Afghanistan with active militancy stands contrary to Chinese interest. Its interests and interests of regional countries would only be served by maintaining stability and defying the on-going chaotic socioeconomic and socio-political situation in Afghanistan which will also contribute towards peace in its autonomous region, Xinjiang.

China unveiled its policy towards Afghanistan in 2012, once former Chinese President Mr Hu Jintao clearly hinted from the SCO forum that, "We will continue to manage regional affairs by ourselves".[8] He indeed referred towards protecting against the extra regional involvement in Afghanistan causing; 'shocks and turmoil' under the cover of reconstruction. President Xi Jinping later reiterated Chinese commitment for the peace, stability and economic prosperity of Afghanistan. He emphatically said, "A new era of cooperation in China-Afghanistan relations to take development to a new depth and breadth".[9] Afghanistan also reciprocated positively, backing Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) while realizing the geopolitical

[7] Derek Drinkwater, Sir Harold Nicolson and International Relations: the Practitioner as Theorist, Oxford University Press, New York-2005, P52.

[8] Shuja Nawaz, Exiting Afghanistan: A Regional Approach, Atlantic Council, June 19, 2012. Accessed at; http://shujanawaz.com/2012/06/exiting-afghanistan-a-regional-approach/

[9] Ankit Panda, Afghanistan and China Open a New Chapter; Afghan President Ashraf Ghani is in China for his first trip abroad as president, The Diplomat, October 29, 2014. Accessed at; https://thediplomat.com/2014/10/afghanistan-and-china-open-a-new-chapter/

realities which makes Afghanistan as a hub for the regional and global "trade, transit, and peace."[10]

Envisaging a constructive Chinese role in Afghanistan, President Ashraf Ghani, visited China in his first overseas visit in October 2014. His first official trip to China explicitly explains the desire for bilateral relations on both sides. There is reciprocity since then, Afghans look towards China for its active engagement towards Afghan economic development and stabilization, the Chinese side is eager to be forthcoming to play the desired role and benefit its own Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) on long-term basis. China has already invested in the mineral sector of Afghanistan with local adequacy. Dozens of Chinese companies are working in various parts of the country, after signing the oil, gas and minerals exploration deals of over $7 billion for next 25 years.[11] China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and its Afghan partner, Watan Oil and Gas, secured the rights to three oil blocks in the provinces of Sari-i-Pul and Faryab in north-western Afghanistan in 2011.[12]

Apart from exploration of oil and gas, China has invested $4.1 billion, to develop 5 million-ton copper deposits in next 2-3 decades.[13] Two Chinese state-owned companies, the China Metallurgical Group Corporation (MCC) and the Jiangxi Copper Company Limited won the projects and since then has made a lot of progress in the development of the projects. The consortium later called itself MCC-JCL Aynak Minerals (MJAM) formally runs the project. As per estimates, Mes Aynak mine is world's second largest copper deposits with 5.5 million metric tons of high-grade copper ore. Metrological survey reveals that, Afghanistan has huge deposits of Lithium, like Saudi Arabia has oil reserves. Lithium is rare metal, being used in cell phones apart from its usage in electric car batteries. Chinese investment is expected to ensure local socioeconomic development.

In last few years, China is approaching its neighbours, seeking to consolidate good neighbourly and friendly relations for the promotion of regionalism through a partnership and cooperation on security matters. The visionary Chinese leader Mr Xi Jinping is an advocate of good neighbourly relationship, which would subsequently contribute towards Chinese ascendancy. In fact, China is pursing the long term objectives of achieving the status of dominant global power by 2049, the year of Diamond Jubilee of

[10] Ibid.
[11] Raja Muhammad Khan, China's Economic and Strategic Interests in Afghanistan, FWU Journal of Social Sciences, Special Issue no. 1(1), (Summer 2015)
[12] Ibid.
[13] Ibid.

the People's Republic of China. The Chinese expert, Andrew Small, view China as the only country in the region to play a part in the economic development of Afghanistan and the region surrounding it. "If you look across Central Asia that is what has already happened. … China is the only actor which can foot the level of investment needed in Afghanistan to make it succeed and stick it out".[14] Taking into account the economic potentials of Afghanistan and level of investment, China can made in this war-ridden country, there will be mutuality of economic development, prosperity and up gradation of their bilateral relations in the days to come.

Russian Perspective of Peace in Afghanistan

In February 2019, a group of Afghan notables and officials was invited by Russian Federation for having negotiations with Taliban in Moscow. This group included the people like former Afghan President Hamid Karazai and some others, those who formed part of Mujahidin against Soviet invasion. Nevertheless, incumbent President Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive, Abdullah Abdullah was not called to participate in the talks. Later, President Ghani had shown his concern over the invitation to selected few politicians and former war lords. Moscow talks were held immediately after there was a meeting between Taliban and US representative in Doha, capital of Qatar. Upon failure of an agreement between Taliban and US in September 2019, Taliban visited Moscow once again.

Though, US is talking to Taliban at its own, without taking President Ghani on board, yet the incumbent President seems happy with the negotiations between US and Taliban. President Ashraf Ghani however seems unhappy over the Russian invitation to a selected group of politicians and war lord for talks at Moscow. President Ghani feels that, talks at multiple level would 'muddle the US-backed peace process'. This would mean that President Ghani is exultant with US talks with Taliban and not interested in Russian sponsored talks with Taliban.

It is pertinent to mention that, Russia has invited the representatives of almost all neighbouring countries of Afghanistan, United States and President Ghani for a debate on Afghan peace in August 2018 at Moscow. U.S and President Ghani refused this offer which obliged the Moscow to invite other politicians for this revised schedule of talks. President Ghani has shown displeasure over the talks in Moscow. As per a statement of an

[14] Wajih Ullah, China's Maneuvering In Afghanistan: Political And Economic Interest – OpEd, *Eurasia Review*, (December 2018). Accessed at; Accessed at; https://www.eurasiareview.com/01122018-chinas-maneuvering-in-afghanistan-political-and-economic-interest-oped/

Afghan official "We requested Russia to cancel the summit". [15] President Ghani perceived that, such high level multiple meetings would raise the status of Taliban and make the peace process a complex phenomenon.

In reality, a repeated engagement between US and Taliban and Russia and Taliban really elevated the stature of Taliban. This is a direct recognition of Taliban as a reality in Afghanistan. Moreover, this is also an acknowledgment that, without reconciliation with Taliban, there would remain uncertainty in Afghanistan and volatility in the region. Pakistan has long been emphasizing the US and other power centres to accept Taliban as a reality and talk to them for the durable peace. Whereas the U.S led talks with Taliban are in isolation without involving even the Afghan Government. However, the Russian led talks include all neighbours of Afghanistan and the Taliban, thus attaining a broad-based consensus, essentially needed for regional peace and stability.

In fact, U.S has been secretly engaged with Taliban since 2010/11, once it had over 150,000 troops present on Afghan soil. Moreover, US engagement with Taliban may aims at its national interests; getting the Taliban's consent for long-term stay of its forces in Afghanistan or else for the strategic usage of Taliban in a future scenario. The Russian engagement with Taliban is conversely encompasses all neighbouring countries and Afghanistan. In the process, Russia and China will be the major beneficiary by relegating US in the regional politics. In a way, it's a global power politics, where all power centres would like to have their linkages with Taliban.

Russia and Pakistan have transformed their bilateral relationship in last two decades. According to dominant view, this development is part of new strategic alignment, shaping internationally where China and Russia are trying to undo the status quo (unipolar global system) in which Pakistan is being viewed as a linchpin. Another class of international relations scholars feels that, cordiality in Pakistan-Russia relationship is primarily because of unstable situation in Afghanistan, where US presence is being seen by Russia as a challenge for the regional security. According to Petr Topychkanov, a South Asian expert of Russian Federation, "Russia is

[15] Russian bid for Taliban talks angers Kabul, *The News International (Reuter)*, (November 3, 2018). Retrieved from https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/388977-russian-bid-for-taliban-talks-angers-kabul.

concerned about the long-term presence of the US and its allies in Afghanistan." [16]

A senior Professor of John's Hopkins University, Mr Daniel Markey, view progress in Pak-Russia relationship for attainment of two key concerns; first; 'to minimize the hazards of militancy from Afghanistan and second; to curtail the US influence in Afghanistan'. He said, "The point is that Russia and Pakistan perhaps have more in common with respect to the war in Afghanistan than U.S has with either of these.[17] This fact has been deduced from the previous history of the region and these countries. Prospect of Pakistan becoming the future energy corridor from Central Asia to South Asia is yet another aspect of this growing relationship between Pakistan-Russia. Russian oil and gas companies will explore the opportunities of pipelines for oil and gas from Central Asia through Afghanistan to Pakistan and rest of South Asian region. Indeed, at regional and global level, Pakistan and Russia have many commonalities and convergence of interests which can best be attained through a regional solution of Afghan problem.

US Strategic Objectives and Peace in Afghanistan

In order to negotiate with Taliban, US has sought Pakistani assistance in 2018. This is despite US neglected Pakistan and stopped its military and economic assistance after President Trump took over the power at Whitehouse. Many analysts viewed this selective re-engagement policy of US with Pakistan as very significant development from the perspective of its political and strategic interests in this region. Daniel Markey, a long-time observer of Pak-US relations, wrote in his book, 'No exit from Pakistan: America's tortured relationship with Islamabad' that despite all the problems and trust deficit that the US had with Pakistan and its military, 'the answer lay in managing the problems rather than finding a solution'. Why managing problems and why not a permanent solution? It's because the US civilian leadership thinks differently from Pentagon. The damage control by Pentagon of Trump's anti-Pakistan tweet of January 1, 2018 is illustration of the same complexity. US establishment understands that for gaining headway in South Asia and Afghanistan, Pakistani support is essentially required.

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[16] Shifting alliances as Pakistan manages relationship with US, *Daily Times*,(February 28, 2018). Accessed at; https://dailytimes.com.pk/208331/shifting-alliances-pakistan-manages-relationship-us/

[17] Dr Abdul Ruff, Will A Reset Be Possible In Russia-Pakistan Relationship? – OpEd, *Eurasia Review*, (March 18, 2018). Accessed at; https://www.eurasiareview.com/18032018-will-a-reset-be-possible-in-russia-pakistan-relationship-oped/

Pentagon has been advising the President Trump that, such discriminatory acts would harm the US interests in Asia, particularly in Afghanistan. It was in the same context that, President Trump wrote a letter to Prime Minister Imran Khan for assistance in brokering a deal with Taliban. Besides, there has been a desire at the level of State Department as well as at Pentagon for a re-engagement with Pakistan. Restoring training courses for the military officers of Pakistan in US military institutions is step towards re-engaging Pakistan. Re-engagement with Pakistan is indeed, aims at attainment of U.S strategic objectives, while being in Afghanistan. Apart from what US claim for rebuilding Afghanistan, it has five major objectives in the region.[18]

These strategic objectives are: One, to have a check on the rising power of China, which US consider as its peer competitor in the international politics. While being in Afghanistan, US can conveniently engage China on multiple grounds; strategic, economic and political. Two; countering resurgent Russia, where President Putin is openly challenging the United States and its eastwards military expansion. Russian efforts for the stabilization of Afghanistan, while involving Taliban and other regional actors is indeed aims at countering US presence in Afghanistan. Three: to have a close watch on Iran, its expanding power in the Middle East and particularly its nuclear programme. Iran has hinted to restart Uranium enrichment after US pull-out from Nuclear Deal-2015. Killing of top Iranian General Qaseem Suleimani on January 3, 2020 by US was a clear message for Islamic Republic that, Washington will not tolerate Iran's influence in Middle East, which runs counter to US interests.

Fourth: to keep pressure on nuclear Pakistan and contest Pak-China relationship. US may not like a militarily strong Pakistan having strategic alliance with China and undertaking projects like China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Rather, it would be interested in a Pakistan, which accepts its dictates in the politics of Asia. Fifth: to have an influence in the Central Asian region, this entails two aspects; denying Russian and Chinese involvement and paving ground for its own influence there. Indeed, as a super power, US would always like to counter any effort by rising China and resurgent Russia. Therefore, the geopolitics of Pakistan and Afghanistan is significant in this regard, which US would never like to lose. The above mentioned US strategic objectives can be achieved only if US is able to prolong its military stay in Afghanistan which warrants reconciliation with Taliban and a friendly Pakistan. It is in the same context that, there has been re-engagement between Taliban and US in October 2019, after cancellation of agreement in September 2019.

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[18] ED Corcoran, John Feffer , *Why Afghanistan requires a long-term U.S. commitment, not as a military occupier but rather as a development partner*, Institute for Policy Studies, (October 1, 2009). Retrieved from https://ips-dc.org/why_afghanistan/

The recent change in US attitude and its attempt to re-engage with Pakistan is indicative of the fact that, the super power has once again realized the significance of Pakistan towards implementation of its strategic objective. In this regard, the two statements of President Trump need careful analysis. Trump's New Year tweet of January 1, 2018, seriously criticised Pakistan with dire consequences. However, in his New Year statement of January 2, 2019, he seems pacifying and appreciating Pakistan. He said in his statement that, he looks forward to meet the new Pakistani leadership with the desire to "have a great relationship with Pakistan." Indeed, US consider Pakistan as linchpin for the attainment of its strategic objectives. In the same context, Prime Minister Imran Khan along with Army Chief had a significant visit of Washington in July, 2019. Peace process in Afghanistan was one of the main agenda of this meeting. Both sides agreed for a long-term cooperation for bringing peace and stability in Afghanistan.[19]

The South Asia policy, announced by President Trump on August 21, 2017, was more of rhetoric and blame game against Pakistan and regional countries. Rather taking the ownership and responsibilities for bringing peace in Afghanistan, Trump said, "It is up to the people of Afghanistan to take ownership of their future, to govern their society, and to achieve an ever-lasting peace."[20] Contrary to ground realities, President Trump declared Afghanistan as friend and a partner which will not be dictated by US since the people of Afghanistan are well aware of living in the complex Afghan society.' A realistic analysis of US actions on grounds in Afghanistan and its policies about Pakistan give an impression that, US may not be very eager to bring stability in Afghanistan and the region, surrounding it. India very rigidly follows the US policy guidelines in Afghanistan and the broader region. Such an approach has created distrust among the regional stakeholders, having geographical proximity with Afghanistan about presence and role of extra-regional powers. Whereas, these regional countries would like a peaceful and stable Afghanistan, the vested interests of extra-regional forces are quite opposite.

[19] Imran Khan: Pakistan PM meets Trump in bid to mend ties, *BBC News*, (July 23, 2019). Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-49032495.

[20] Nora Kelly, Full Transcript: Donald Trump Announces His Afghanistan Policy, *Atlantic*, (August 21, 2017). Retrieved from https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/08/full-transcript-donald-trump-announces-his-afghanistan-policy/537552/

The Afghan Geo-economics

Besides, its strategic objectives, United States is also eyeing at the natural resources of Afghanistan. As per US Geological Survey Afghan mineral deposits are having worth of trillions of US Dollars.[21] Survey also includes that, Afghan soil is home to many costly and rare metals like; Uranium, bauxite, tantalum, gold, platinum, copper, iron ore and zinc, besides huge reserves of hydrocarbon. The heavy Chinese investment in Afghanistan is a cause of great concern for US and its allies, since they considered themselves as the one who brought normalcy in Afghanistan while China did not pay any attention.

With the consent of US, India has made huge investment in mineral exploration and other sectors of Afghanistan in last one decade. Indian investments cover larger sectors like; mining, education, Information Technology (IT), reconstruction, agriculture, livestock, communication and many other sectors. Dozens of Indian companies are operating in Afghanistan in almost all fields. While being appreciative of Indian investment and its role in Afghanistan, U.S is critical about the Chinese role in Afghanistan. Afghan Government however, welcomes Chinese investment. President Ghani said in a statement that, "We look at China as a strategic partner in the short term, medium term, long term and very long term."[22] There was a matching response from President Mr Xi Jinping of China. Both neighbouring states had already signed strategic partnership agreement in 2012, covering cooperation in multiple fields. China is providing economic assistance to Afghanistan for development of various projects. The major areas include; professional training for 3,000 Afghan security personnel for next five years, $330 million in grants, $5 million humanitarian assistance and scholarship program for 500 Afghan students.[23]

Failing to bring peace and stability in Afghanistan, the Trump Administration is seriously weighing the options for the privatization of war in Afghanistan. [24] Otherwise, there are thousands of US civil contractors,

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[21] Tamim Asey, Are Afghanistan's Mineral Deposits the Answer to the Country's Economic Woes?, *Global Security Review*, (December 31, 2018). Accessed at; https://globalsecurityreview.com/afghan-mineral-deposits-answer-economic-woes/

[22] *BBC*, Afghanistan's new president starts landmark China visit, October 28, 2014. Retrieved from; https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-29803768

[23] Peter Ford. Afghanistan: out with NATO, in with China? *The Christian Science Monitor*, (October 28, 2014). Accessed at; https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2014/1028/Afghanistan-Out-with-NATO-in-with-China

[24] Mariam Amini, Privatizing War in Afghanistan Endangers Civilians US Security Contractors, Afghan Forces Have Long Eluded Accountability, (Human Rights Watch,

already working in Afghanistan, alongside its military since 2011, pursuing the objectives as envisioned by Pentagon. With a failure of a deal with Taliban at the critical moment, U.S is left with only option of privatizing the war, as masses are objecting to its active military involvement in the so far longest US war in its history. However, US would never leave Afghanistan, since it has a number of strategic and economic interests there. Its six major military bases in Afghanistan are situated in the areas having costly and rare metals besides their strategic locations.

Indeed, US deep state feels that, it has right over these resources as war reparation, where it spent billions of USD in last two decades. Besides political and strategic goals, all wars have economic objectives and Afghanistan cannot be an exception. Apart from Afghan geo-economic, US is also eying at the vast Central Asian resources, for which it has to remain stick to Afghan geopolitics. US military presence in Afghanistan is indeed a great concern for China and Russia; an aspect of international power play, a mix of geo-economics and geopolitics. Whereas, the great powers play their power politics, the region would remain in turmoil without lasting peace and stability, which in turn minimize the possibility of economic prosperity for the huge masses of this region.

Indo-US Collaboration in Afghanistan

Former US Defence Secretary, Leon Panetta had a clear vision of the Pentagon, the US Defence Headquarters, that India must assume a military and political role in Afghanistan, following US and NATO pull-out from Afghan soil. He once disclosed that, "India to take a more active role in Afghanistan as most foreign combat troops leave in 2014." [25] India already enjoyed an enhanced role in Afghanistan, beginning with US invasion in 2001. Under the military cover of US, India has deeply entrenched itself into Afghanistan, controlling all aspects either in collaboration with United States or with the total consent of Afghan Government. India too has its political, economic and military objectives to pursue, while being in Afghanistan. General McChrystal, being a critic of Indian role in Afghanistan was later removed from Command and forcibly retired from the service.

October 2, 2018). Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/10/03/privatizing-war-afghanistan-endangers-civilians

[25] Sanjeev Miglani, Taliban praise India for resisting Afghan entanglement, *Reuters*, (June 17, 2012). Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/afghanistan-taliban-india-idUSL3E8HG01G20120617

A former Indian Army Chief, General Shankar Roy Chowdhury, once gave his assessment about Indian role in Afghanistan as a necessity. This former Indian General emphasized on training of Afghan National Army (ANA) by Indian Army. He said, this indeed, is the main focus, which India must pursue for its "long-term interests." With Indian trained ANA, it will always be an adversary to Pakistan all along its western frontiers, relieving pressure from Indian Army on Pakistani eastern frontiers. From Afghan soil, India is promoting militancy in Pakistan; Balochistan province and along Pak-Afghan border in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province. Besides, creating instability in Pakistan, India is overseeing the educational system of Afghanistan, thus creating sentiments of hate among Afghan youth against the state and people of Pakistan.

India is also training the Afghan security forces and its spying network (NDS), which always create problem for Pakistan. In fact, this Indian involvement alongside Indo-US collaboration is the biggest hurdle in establishing peace and stability in Afghanistan. This was clearly indicated by General McChrystal, the former commander of US and NATO forces in Afghanistan in 2009. Besides, Indo-US collaboration has undermined the role of Pakistan which has acted as the front line state against the US led war on terror. General McChrystal very clearly indicated in his operational assessment report-2009 that, peace in Afghanistan cannot be attained unless, Indian role and its growing influence is minimised.

Indeed, the General made some recommendations, for improving the security situation in Afghanistan and also to gain some space for bringing peace in Afghanistan. This all was possible, had US and Afghan Government could have minimized the role of India. This ill-fated General had to face the anger of US deep state and President Obama, while giving a realistic assessment. General McChrystal was later removed from Command and forcibly retired from the service.[26] Late Senator John McCain also advised President Obama to be careful in promoting Indian interests in Afghanistan. He believed that, if US will criticise Pakistan and encourage India to take a more active role in Afghanistan, it will frustrate Pakistan. A cooperative Pakistan can be instrumental in bring peace in Afghanistan.

The Daesh Factor

'The Washington Post' in its editorial page, October 13, 2015 described the terror of Daesh in Afghanistan in the wordings; "When the Islamic State

[26] Matthew C. Brand, General McChrystal's Strategic Assessment Evaluating the Operating Environment in Afghanistan in the Summer of 2009, *Research Paper 2011-1* (Air University Press Air Force Research Institute Maxwell Air Force Base).

fighters seized the Mahmand Valley; they poured pepper into the wounds of their enemies."[27] Subsequently, these criminals burnt their hands in containers of boiling oil. People are blindfolded, tortured and blown apart with explosives buried underneath them.[28] A victim of their brutalities explained that, these cruel people pulled out teeth of my brother before he was made to sit on the bomb.[29]

Apart from violently killing the people, Daesh is involved in massive rapes in various parts of Afghanistan. The newspaper quoted evidences from Sheberghan, Afghanistan that, women folk of all ages are under threat of rapes by Daesh terrorists. [30] According to locals, Daesh people would enter into any house and rape the women on gun point. In many cases, they would take the women in their camps and rape them for months and months.

Indeed, the rise of non-state actors like ISIS (Daesh) should not be treated as an isolated event. Such non state actors provide excuse to major powers for furthering their agendas. In this regard, many western writers and scholars have written a lot. The Book, Ghost Wars written by Steve Coll, relates to events and operations conducted by CIA in the pre and post environment of USSR invasion of Afghanistan. An analysis of the book indicates that, amount of access to information granted to author and the contents of the book indicate that the book has been written with purpose of forwarding US and CIA centric Narratives as an agenda. Indeed, for maintaining its power at the global level, United Sates needs such narrateves, and excuses in the form of non-state actors.[31]

U.S has been financing the Afghan Jihad when it suited it and left the region in haste for another round, the Post 9/11 Phase. Infact, CIA has been involved in creating, training, equipping and guiding Afghan Mujahideen for fighting against former USSR on the pretext of Jihad. Later, it used various

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[27] Sudarsan Raghava, The Islamic State is making these Afghans long for the Taliban, *The Washington Post*, (October 13, 2015). Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/

[28] Ibid.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Abdul Matin Sahak, 'Horrors that can't be told': Afghan women report Islamic State rapes *Reuters-World News* July 30, 2018. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-islamic-state-rape/horrors-that-cant-be-told-afghan-women-report-islamic-state-rapes-idUSKBN1KK0WG

[31] *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001*, (Wilson Center, February 24, 2004). Retrieved form https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/ghost-wars-the-secret-history-the-cia-afghanistan-and-bin-laden-the-soviet-invasion-to

Afghan war lords against the interests of each other thus resulting into a civil war.[32]

According to former President Hamid Karazai, Daesh entry and expansion in Afghanistan is directly controlled by US. It has been a US strategy to exploit the vulnerability of countries (where its interests lies) through organizations, individuals and communities. Later, it would abandon them once no longer required, thus, putting them at risk. As per Afghan officials, ISIS (Daesh) has been quite active in various parts of the country. The rise and indeed rapid expansion of Daesh in Afghanistan has put everyone in Afghanistan and Pakistan at quandary.

The Regional Perspective of Peace in Afghanistan

Peace in Afghanistan is considered as central for the peace in Asian Continent. This realization is felt equally in all regional countries of Asia, particularly; China, Russia, Iran and Pakistan. For establishing peace in Afghanistan, Pakistan has been seeking a regional solution, where all important stakeholders should be taken on board. Indeed, apart from their direct or indirect involvement, these states have been seriously affected by the instability in neighbouring Afghanistan. In the same context Shah Mehmood Qureshi, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan visited four regional capitals; Kabul, Tehran, Beijing and Moscow from December 23-26, 2018. As an outcome of this visit, Foreign Minister was quite optimistic for brokering a peace process between Taliban and Afghan Government.

Pakistan also brokered a direct talk between United States Taliban in Doha, Qatar and Abu Dhabi (UAE). The Abu Dhabi round of talks was conducted under the speculation that, President Trump has ordered a drawdown of US forces from Afghanistan to 50% (7000 troops out of 14000) which is still ambiguous, since Pentagon is differing with such an option.

Mark Landler, the former White House correspondent writes in his analysis that, "So chaotic was Mr. Trump's decision-making process; so transparent his appeal to his political base; and so lacking in a cogent explanation to allies or the public that the president's move short-circuited what many say is a much-needed national debate about the future of America's wars."[33] A clear annoyance of Pentagon where Defence Secretary

[32] Ibid.
[33] Trump Unites Left and Right Against Troop Plans, but Puts Off Debate on War Aims, *The New York Times*, (December 27, 2018). Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/27/us/politics/trump-syria-afghanistan-withdraw.html.

decided to depart, President Trump seems to be reconciling to his earlier decision.

Some in Washington believe that, it was an enticing strategy of White House to engage Taliban, since they have primary demand of pull-out of foreign forces from Afghanistan for any meaningful peace talk. Whatever have been the motives of this news, pulling out from Afghanistan is not in the strategic interests of United States. US policies are always debated well at the appropriate level before taking a final decision. Pakistan has an intimate concern for bringing peace in Afghanistan, which compelled it to take an initiative and a lead role for the success of Afghan peace talks. The Government of Pakistan and its establishment strongly realize that, Peace in Pakistan is directly related to peace in Afghanistan. In fact, there is a direct and indirect flow of militancy into Pakistan from Afghan soil. Then, in the absence of peace in Afghanistan, the 2.6 million Afghan refugees cannot go back to their homeland. In the garb of these refugees, at time the militants' carryout militancy in various parts of Pakistan.

Pakistan is an advocate of the fact that, there should be reconciliation between Afghan Taliban and the Government of Afghanistan through negotiations. For the success of these talks, there is need that, regional countries should provide guarantees. The regional assurances are necessary on three aspects; assistance needed for the economic uplift of Afghanistan, non-involvement in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and sureties about the security of Afghanistan against any aggression. Pakistan and China strongly realize that, Afghan problem cannot be resolved by military means. It necessitates a political solution through reconciliation process.

Iran also agreed to Pakistani proposal of intra-Afghan dialogue, supported by regional countries. In Moscow there was concord of opinion between two foreign ministers about the talks, which essentially should be led and owned by Afghan Government and Taliban. Moscow indeed, lauded Pakistani efforts for bringing a political settlement in Afghanistan. Russian Foreign Minister offered his country's full support for establishing peace in Afghanistan and the broader region of South and Central Asia.

Sincerity of Afghan Government is considered central for engaging Taliban and bringing them at negotiating table for a durable peace in this war-ridden country. In this regard, the Kabul regime will have to take independent decisions, rather dictates from elsewhere. Any negotiations between Afghan Government and Taliban should be focused towards larger benefit of Afghan masses; peace, stability and economic prosperity of the country. The regional countries can maximum give assurances for their whole hearted support and security guarantees. Pakistan has already assured Afghan

Government for its full support to end the current state of uncertainty in Afghanistan.

A Workable Way Forward for Regional Peace

Owing to internal strife and major power's involvement, Afghanistan has suffered since last four decades. Towards the beginning of each year, the people of this country hope for peace and stability, but each time, it ends up with more conflicts and human losses. United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) took a strong note of civilian casualties in Afghanistan, took place in the first half of 2018. The report indicates that, 1700 civilians have been killed in Afghanistan in internal strife in first six months of year-2018, "the highest number recorded at any comparable time over the last decade."[34]

The report also indicates that, there is an incessant rise in the rate of casualties, which are being inflicted on the civil population of Afghanistan by the warring factions. Apart from Afghan National Security forces and US Special Forces, a number of warring factions and militant organizations have been found directly or indirectly involved in human losses. Daesh (Islamic State-Khorasan Chapter), Afghan Taliban and host of splinter groups have been part of these conflicts. A report reveals that, 52% killings in Afghanistan have been caused by Daesh, followed by Taliban, who killed 40% people in 2017/18. There have been high numbers of human and material losses as collateral damages during the counter actions from Afghan and U.S forces.

As a credible way forward, the domestic conflicting situation in Afghanistan has to be contested by all stakeholders within the country. With the new mandate for next five years, the Afghan Government under Ashraf Ghani will have to take serious and sincere initiatives for bringing an end to chaotic domestic order which started from Soviet invasion-1979 deepened with US invasion in 2001 and complicated with the involvement multiple stakeholders. The past efforts for the establishment of peace in Afghanistan may be taken as antecedent and basis while initiating the new CBMs. While encouraging the US-Taliban peace talks, the Afghan Government must engage Taliban directly for cessation of attacks on each other. In this regard, both sides must take new CBMs to bridge the existing trust deficit.

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[34] Afghan war inflicts record civilian deaths: UNAMA, *The Financial Daily* (16 Jul 2018).

Both parties (Government and Taliban) must understand that the ultimate losers of the domestic conflict are the state and society of Afghanistan. Afghans must understand that; external forces could not have invaded their motherland and exploited them, had there been no internal split among Afghans. Unless domestic rift among various Afghan factions come to an end, there will be no let-up in external interference and exploitation. From 1979, it is 4th generation of Afghanistan, facing a war like situation with no stability insight. There is a need that, all Afghan factions should come forward with sincerity for establishing peace, political stability and economic prosperity in Afghanistan. As a pomposity, United States is also working for peace, but, the factual position is quite different. It is pursuing its own strategic interests in this region.

While playing a constructive role towards peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan, Pakistan even assisted US in the Doha peace process throughout from 2018 to 2019. Even after breakdown of talks in September 2019, US Special Envoy for Afghan Reconciliation Ambassador, Mr Khalilzad visited Islamabad and had in-depth discussion with civilian and military leadership of Pakistan for carrying forward the peace process with Taliban.[35] Pakistan whole heartedly facilitates a peace process, which is owned by Afghans, led by Afghans and implemented by all stakeholders of Afghanistan in a harmonious way.

Conclusion

The regional countries, especially; Pakistan, China and Russia visualize peace in Afghanistan as the most preferred and needed aspect for the regional peace. China visualizes that, peace and stability in Afghanistan would act as a booster and a precursor for peace in its Xinjiang autonomous region. Russia considers peace in Afghanistan as a contributor for peace in Central Asian region which is still under Russian influence. Iran is apprehensive of continued militancy and civil war in Afghanistan, thus fully support a negotiation process. All landlocked Central Asian states have shown a great resolve for Afghan peace. They all need an outlet through Afghanistan for their trade and commerce and export of huge reserves of hydrocarbon to energy deficient countries.

As an affected neighbour, Pakistan desires a durable peace, agreeable settlement and CBMs between Taliban and Afghan Government. It has

[35] Baqir Sajjad Syed, Khalilzad, PM discuss efforts for peace in Afghanistan. *Dawn*, (October 29, 2019). Retrieved from https://www.dawn.com/news/1513493/khalilzad-pm-discuss-efforts-for-peace-in-afghanistan

already broker reconciliation through Murree Peace Process in July 2015 and still emphasizing Taliban and Afghan Government to engage each other for reconciliation and peace. With fresh mandate, the Ghani-Abdullah Abdullah Government should show seriousness with sincerity for engaging Taliban for a durable peace in Afghanistan.

Apart from US-Taliban talks, regional states having geographical proximity with Afghanistan must play a constructive role for the peace and stability in Afghanistan. China, Russia, Iran and Pakistan need to make serious efforts for reconciliation between Kabul Regime and the Taliban through CBMs. Peace in Afghanistan will contribute towards regional peace in South and Central Asia while impacting China and Russia positively.

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ENERGY SECURITY OF A RENTIER STATE: A CASE STUDY OF KAZAKHSTAN

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Abstract

As modern world run on oil, the unprecedented rise in oil consumption during last century has generated daunting energy security challenges for the oil producing states. It is simultaneously important for energy import dependent nations and exporting nations. However, exporting nations face some captious challenges. In former Soviet Republics, Kazakhstan is one of the richest oil producing state whose over reliance on rent generated by oil exports presents daunting energy security challenges for the states at internal and external levels. On the one hand, Kazakhstan's economic development owes a great deal to the oil rent. On the other hand, it is also responsible for Kazakhstan's struggle in establishing a strong democratic political system. In addition, generating rent income face severe security challenges at external level. The involvement of external powers in Kazakh oil sector, pipeline infrastructure and threats posed by non-state actors, make the whole scenario a great challenge for Kazakhstan. The study examines the challenges rentierism has generated for Kazakhstan at internal and external levels.

Key Words: Kazakhstan, Rentier State, Oil Rents, Political Stability, Energy Security.

Introduction

The modern socio-economic development of the world is beholden to the use of energy resources especially oil. Its demand has seen an unprecedented increase since last century. There is a little evidence of its use two century ago.[1] Approximately 33% of world energy uses consists of oil. And it has constantly seen an upward trend. From 77 million barrels in 2000,

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[1] Véronique Ghetta and Dominique Gorse, *Materials Issues for Generation IV Systems: Status, Open Questions and Challenges*(Dordrecht: Springer Publishers, 2007), 1-3.

it reached 85 million barrels per day in 2006, 86.4 million barrels in 2010 and now the figure has crossed over 100 million barrels per day.[2] Thus, it is beyond doubt, how critical oil has become for producing and consuming states.

The increase in oil demand raises many challenges for importing and exporting nations alike. China's economic revolution owes a great deal to the secure supply of oil. Lacking in natural resource wealth and not having secure energy supply mechanism greatly alter the economic and social development of the states. Nonetheless, energy resources and especially oil is playing a crucial role in maintaining the economic growth, social development, military security and political stability of China.[3] Thus, energy security is central to aver all stability of a state. Similarly, after coming out of the shocks of disintegration, the biggest instrument in the hands of Russia for rebuilding its economic and strategic strength was its energy resources. China and Russia are two major example of energy security. However, there are some other states whose level of economic development is not as mighty as these two, but they faced more crucial challenges for energy security**.** Kazakhstan presents a unique case in this regard, whose political and social stability, economic growth, territorial security, regional strength and international standings all are intrinsically connected to its energy security and more specifically its oil sector.[4] The significance of oil is of unequivocal for Kazakhstan. It not only generates revenue for economic development but it's over reliance on oil rent creates an inertia that stagnates the development of other sectors of economy as well as development of political institution and democracy.[5]This phenomenon is called "rentierism" and Kazakhstan emerges as rentier state. Therefore, this study is focused on internal and external challenges caused by rentierism. It will inquire how Kazakhstan as a rentier states faces severe energy security challenges.

Due to the uneven natural distribution of energy resources, especially oil, resources are accumulated into few states.[6]It is observed that resource rich nations are more vulnerable for energy security issues because of their huge reliance on income generated through oil exports.

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[2]"*Daily Global Crude Oil Demand 2006-2019* | Statista", accessed July 3, 2019,https://www.statista.com/statistics/271823/daily-global-crude-oil-demand-since-2006/.

[3]Carlos Pascual and Jonathan Elkind, *Energy Security: Economics, Politics, Strategies, and Implications*(Washington: Brooking institute Press, 2010), 130.

[4]Indra Overland, Heidi Kjaernet and Andrea Kendall-Taylor, *Caspian Energy Politics: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan*, (Abingdon: 2010, Routledge Publishers), 21-23.

[5]Wojciech Ostrowski, *Politics and Oil in Kazakhstan.*(New York: 2010, Routledge Publishers), 105.

[6]Roman V. Sidortsov and Benjamin K. Sovacool, ed.*The Routledge Handbook of Energy Security* (London: 2011, Routledge Publishers), 21.

Oil has become paradoxical in nature. The economic, political and social development is so intricately tied with the oil production, export and rents generated through this trade that it has become lifeline. On the other hand, it has caused an inertia that has left oil producing states with limited or no choices to consider for their survival. In this scenario, oil producing, and oil rent dependent states face extra ordinary challenges at domestic and external level.

By looking deeply into the oil sector, this study will first highlight the importance of oil and gas for Kazakhstan. The rentier state theory provides a perfect backdrop to understand its peculiarity for Kazakh economy and politics. It also analyzes the threats and challenges pertaining to its energy security by categorizing it at both internal and external levels.

The academic literature on theory of rentier state came to the fore during 1970's, when Hossein Mahdavy first used it in his work. Later, the term was widely used in academic circles. The most important application of the term appeared in the work of Giacomo Luciani and Hazem Beblawi. Their contribution to the concept of rentier states becomes very important because of two reasons, First, the theoretical development and second, they applied the term very successfully to discuss the case of Middle East the most important region for oil production in the world.[7]Even most of the academic writings of the subsequent period appeared especially in the "Middle East Economic Analysis" regularly discussed the oil-dependent economies of the Middle East region especially Arab states in the context of rentier states.[8] Similarly, Kjetil and Olva in their study on oil rich Middle Easter associate the oil rent with the political instability and over all security challenges to the states individually and to the whole region collectively.[9] Another important region that appeared to be gaining importance in the rentier state discussion during 1990's was the oil rich states of Africa. Douglas Andrew in his book specifically discusses the case of oil rich state of Gabon. He highlights the international Petroleum companies in the African Oil business. Considering the case of Gabon in particular he analyzes the conditions of all oil rich states of Africa in general. His main concern depicted in his work is how the exploitation of oil wealth of Africa has hampered the development of every aspect of the oil rich society at the hands of external actors. They have not only emerged as rentier states, but the tragic fact is that their rent income has not produced even some parallels

[7] Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani.,*The Rentier state.*(New York: 2016, Routledge Publishers), 27

[8] Donald Losman, "The Rentier State and National Oil Companies: An Economic and Political Perspective,"*The Middle East Journal* 64 no.3 (Summer 2010): 427-445.

[9]KjetilSelvik and Bjørn Olav Utvik,*Oil States in the New Middle East* (New York: 2016, Routledge Publishers), 182.

with the other rentier states. And the role of International petroleum companies has emerged as another form of colonization.[10]

The post-Soviet region is a late entry in the discussion of rentier state theory. Therefore, most of the work on the theory is devoted to the classic example of Middle East and to some extent Africa. Sally Cumming's has done some important contribution in this regard. His earlier work published in 2004, argues that neo-patrimonialism in authoritative regimes of Central Asia is different from the authoritarianism in Arab states.[11]Robert Jackson defines the emergence of neopatrimonialism in the African states owes to the European colonizers, but it has much similarity with the Central Asian republics who emerged from the rubric of the Soviet Union. Sally Cumming considers oil producing states of the Middle East as the classical example of rentier states. Therefore, the importance of oil producing Central Asian states like Kazakhstan gets eclipsed. However, in his work published in 2012, Ostrowski places the Central Asian states in the list of most important rentier states.[12]He also categories the Central Asian states according to the relative source of rent. Most of these works strictly observed the impact of rent on the socio-political development. The impact of rent cannot be disassociated form the external forces. Infact, rent income which is earned from the external sources makes the external forces very much relevant in this regard. Secondly, when rents are originated from the energy resources like oil, the energy security of the rentier states might get jeopardized. These important aspect needs to be considered in the debates of rentier states. Kazakhstan's example might be an important addition in this regard. The rentier states face more critical energy security issues because of their overwhelming dependence on energy sector.

This part of the study will elaborate the rentier states theory linking it with Kazakhstan. Another aspect seems to be missing from the contemporary literature relates to the impact of rentiernism with the overall energy security of a state. Rent income in resource rich particularly in oil rich states comes from the oil exports. The export mechanism is therefore the most important element in securing rent. Hence bringing into the discussions the entire external factor which might cause threat to the oil exports and ultimately to the rent income. This will take the discussion further to investigate how energy resources become a more critical issue for a rentier state.

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[10]Douglas Andrew Yates,*The Rentier State in Africa: Oil Rent Dependency and Neocolonialism in the Republic of Gabon*(Asmara: 1996, Africa World Press), 205.

[11]Sally Cummings, *Power and Change in Central Asia*(London: 2001, Routledge Publishers), 43

[12]WojciechOstrowski, "Rentierism, Dependency and Sovereignty in Central Asia," in Sovereignty After Empire, ed.Sally N. Cumming, & R. Hinnerbusch (Edinburgh: 2011, Edinburgh University Press), 282-303.

Oil, Rentierism, and Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan is the largest oil producing state among five Central Asian states. During 1960's Kazakhstan's oil wells were producing approximately 40,000 barrels oil per day. With the discovery of Tengiz oil field in 1979, its share increased tremendously during the last decade of USSR.[13] Despite this, lack of financial resources and technological backwardness hampered the exploration and development of offshore reserves.[14] During Post independence era, oil sector remained the most important sector of the economy. Almost entire development process was dependent on this one sector creating multidimensional challenges at domestic, regional and international levels. Hence, maintaining a stable production pattern and securing demand emerges as essential elements of energy security for Kazakhstan and its rent income. This led the country to adopt the strategy of increasing oil rent at domestic level, improve the pipeline infrastructure with neighboring states at regional level and formulate a multi-vectoral foreign policy to acquire financial assistance and advance technology from international powers.[15] Eliminating these three elements will be synonymous to obliterating the energy security of the country.

The arrival of the major US and European firms increased its competitiveness of Kazakh oil sector. Therefore, it is hard to escape the impact of oil rent on any sector of a state especially the foreign factors.Almost every aspect of Kazakhstan is related and affected by the rent income generated by theoil sector. Too much dependence on oil income have gross implications for economic, political and social security and development of a state. Therefore, it is pertinent to analyze the crucial impact of energy sector over a resource dependent state like Kazakhstan. And the theory of rentier state perhaps provides a perfect framework to study this phenomenon.

Many experts have made some valuable contribution to the rentier state theory by examining the patterns and implications of resource dependency in rentier states. However, Hussein Mahdavy and HazimBeblavi's contribution have been phenomenal in this regard. Mahdavy

[13]Katherine Hardin, (2012, January 27) "Kazakhstan's Energy Sector Since Independence: Two Decades of Growth and Challenges Ahead?," Atlantic Council, January 27, 2012, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/files/publication_pdfs/403/012712_ACUS_Eurasia_Hardin.pdf, (Retrieved November 9, 2018).

[14]Gal Luft and Anne Korin, *Energy Security Challenges for the 21st Century* (California: 2009, Greenwood Publishing Group), 31-34.

[15]Jacopo Maria Pepe, *Beyond Energy: Trade and Transport in a Reconnecting Eurasia*(Berlin: 2016, Springer Publishers), 421-422.

highlighted the case of Persian Gulf states especially the case of Iran.[16] Similarly, Rebekka Schliephave, discussed the case of Middle East and North African rentier states. She raises questions about the political process in the Middle Eastern and North African oil rich states and tries to find the answer by analyzing the theoretical concept of Hazim Beblawi and Luciani.[17]Her work is an important contribution to the rentier state concept, but it undertakes the theory to generalize an oil producing region rather than focusing on a particular state

Before examining the case of Kazakhstan as a rentier state, it is important to look at the main features of rentier state theory. While looking at the theory at first hand, one might look into the concept of rent as given by Beblawito understand the implications of rentierism in Kazakhstan. He views "rents" generated by natural resources as a reward of owning resources. He believes that such ownerships are found in almost every state. However, when rent is categorized as earned and occurred rent, the main difference emerges between different kinds of rents as well as the definition of rentier state becomes clearer.[18] As earned income is generated through efforts put into utilization of resources, while occurred rent is an effortless income. This study will focus on the theoretical explanation presented by Beblawi for the rentier states. The natural resources rich states are more incumbent to rentierism which presents a perfect explanation to establish Kazakhstan's case as a rentier state. Beblawi's explanation of rentier state provides following attributes of rentier states.

(i) Rent as a predominant income in the state's economy,
(ii) Rent as a substantial amount earned externally, and only few hands are involved in earning those external rents.
(iii) The states government assumes the role of those "few" involved in earning rents.
(iv) It is hard to survive for the economy without the rent income.[19]

The income generated by rent if involves majority of society in earning process, then the Beblawi's definition is not applicable. He views the role of few in earning and role of many in consuming that income as an important feature of his theoretical explanation of Rentierism. Thus, it provides the best suitable explanation of rentierism for the states that predominantly rely on natural resources rents like Kazakhstan. The above-mentioned features of

[16]Beblawi and Luciani, *The Rentier state*, 211-220.
[17]Rebekka Schliep, *The implications of the rentier state theory regarding the major oil-producing states of the Middle East* (Norderstedt: 2017, Grin Publishing Company), 86-89.
[18]Kjetil Bjorvatna and Alireza Naghavi, "Rent seeking and regime stability in rentier states," *European Journal of Political Economy*27 no. 4 (December 2009), 740-748, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2011.05.007 (Accessed July 2, 2019).
[19]Beblawi and Luciani, *The Rentier State*, 114-116.

the rentier states will lead to the second part of the study to the analysis of the implications of rentierism on energy security issues.

Implications of Oil Rent for Kazakhstan

The theoretical explanation clearly exhibit that Kazakhstan fits into the category of rentier states. First, because it derives most of its national income from the extraction and exports of oil. In addition, the economic elites especially attached with the oil business depends greatly on the oil rents acquired through the export of oil.[20] The share of taxes in national income is very limited. In such circumstances, Kazakhstan's too much reliance on energy resources like oil industry creates security concern for the country.[21] As it is the major source of domestic stability at political, economic and social levels.

Securing oil sector requires attention of the state at regional level issues too, which involves transit routes and oil trade facilities, any threat to these might directly affect the domestic stability. Third, it has great repercussions for the state at international levels too. Kazakhstan's energy trade relations with states at regional and international level also influence its energy security scenario. Thus, too much dependence on rent income greatly alter the capability of the state to ensure its energy security. The threats emanating from the energy sector creates security issue at domestic regional and international level. The following second part of the paper will analyze these threats of a rentier state at three levels.

Significance of Oil for Kazakhstan

The revenues generated through oil sector are extremely important for Kazakhstan's economic and political stability. Its oil and gas exports comprise 63 % of the total national exports. This fact alone is enough to reveal how energy security is important for Kazakhstan.[22] The boom in oil prices in the international market contributed in rapid economic growth of the country during last two decades. The GDP per Capita witness a sharp increase from US$1647 in early days of independence to US $ 13,172 in 2013. However, the sagging oil prices in global market reduced the oil rent of the country. Consequently, per capita income fell below US$ 10,000

[20]Anja Franke, Andrea Gawrich & Gurban Alakbarov, "Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan as Post-Soviet Rentier States: Resource Incomes and Autocracy as a Double 'Curse' in Post-Soviet Regimes,"*Europe-Asia Studies* 61 no,1 (December, 2010) 109-140, https://doi.org/10.1080/09668130802532977 (Retrieved July 18, 2019).

[21]IliasBantekas, et al.,*Oil and Gas Law in Kazakhstan: National and International Perspectives*, (London: 2004, Kluwer Law International) 15.

[22] Daniel Workman, *Kazakhstan's top 10 exports*, (World Top Export, June 2019), Retrieved December 22, 2018,http://www.worldstopexports.com/kazakhstans-top-10-exports/

during last 5 years and reached US$ 9,462 at the end of 2018.[23]However, Kazakhstan had to reassess its growth target in the wake of falling oil prices and it fell from 4.8 % to 1.5 % during previous years.[24]Energy Sector especially oil and gas alone comprise of one fourth of the National GDP. Another important aspect of profuse attention on oil sector results in negligence to other sectors of the economy. Despite announcing ambitious plans for economic diversification, Kazakhstan still needs to pay more attention to the diversification of the economy. As a result, the share of manufacturing and agriculture sector remained stagnated at 11% and 5% respectively making both of them inefficient.[25] A report by World Bank throws light at the plight of the agricultural sector which says that a Kazakh farmer produce only $3000 worth of crops per year which is approximately, 20 times less than the output of a farmer in developed countries.

Oil rents comprise more than 35 % of Kazakh GDP and 75% of its total exports revenues exhibits the severity of the situation. Although, oil rents helped the country maintain 3.7%growth rate in 2015 when oil exports were experiencing sharp decline due to falling oil prices.[26] Kazakhstan, who maintained the double-digit economic growth in the first decade of the new century and a decent rate of around 6 to 7% in early years of second decade could not sustain the lowering prices of petroleum products.[27]International Monetary fund has predicted a modest economic growth of 3.1 to 3.2% during next few years given the situation of global oil market. This elaborates how a rentier state faces severe economic security issues. The financial crisis of the 2008 had disastrous effect on Kazakh economy.

Looking at the external sources of economic activity reveals there is a subtle negligence from the foreign investors to invest in other sectors of economy. The Foreign investment is directed mostly in oil sector. The services sector and other areas provide less attraction to the foreign investors.[28]It is not the government only unobtrusive to the development of non-oil sector. Therefore, rentierism in oil rich states is not only the result of domestic policies. But it also shows the structural weakness and the role of

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[23]*Kazakhstan GDP per Capita*, (CEIC, 2018), Retrieved July 4, 2019,https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/kazakhstan/gdp-per-capita.

[24]Asian Development Bank, *KazakhstanEconomyandADB*, (ADB, 2019), Retrieved June 25,2019, https://www.adb.org/countries/kazakhstan/economy.

[25]World Bank, *World Bank Group – Kazakhstan*, (World Bank, April 2015), Retrieved June 28, 2019, https://www.worldbank.org: https://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/Kazakhstan-Snapshot.pdf.

[26]Nordea, *The Economic Context of Kazakhstan*,(March 2019), Retrieved June 30, 2019, https://www.nordeatrade.com/fi/explore-new-market/kazakhstan/economical-context)

[27]*Kazakhstan's top 10 exports*, World Top Exports. (2018), Retrieved December 22, 2018,http://www.worldstopexports.com/kazakhstans-top-10-exports/

[28]Kenneth Omeje, *Extractive Economies and Conflicts in the Global South: Multi-Regional Perspective on Rentier State*,(Hampshire: 2008, Ashgate Publishers), 173.

international actors who prefer economic gains more than social sector development.

Domestic Implications

As far as Kazakhstan's domestic political scenario is concerned, it is an established fact that political and economic powers are synonymous to each other in Kazakhstan. Its political system encourages the rentierism. Neopatrimonialism is evident in its structure where patrons use natural resources of the state to secure political loyalties.[29] Political power and authority in rentier states lies in the hands of those controlling economic power. It is the government of the states which runs the economic system and undertakes all economic activities. Their major economic activities revolve around resource exploration, extraction and their exports. And whatever income is generated through this process, is distributed among two categories of citizens. First the economic elite, who owns such resources or run their business and closely associated with the political leadership and ruling elite. In Kazakhstan case, a small group has earned huge profits thanks to soaring oil prices and booming oil business of the country. This creates a strong bond between them, and their support becomes essential for the stability of the regime.[30] However, it has some negative repercussions for the development of democracy. Secondly, receiver group which is public extends their support to the government mainly due to two major reasons. First, they get share in "occurred income" without contributing much efforts. Secondly, without paying taxes, rent income is utilized in state provisions to the public, greatly decreasing public's ability and willingness to demand more benevolence.

Finally, another important implication which will set the stage for entering into the second part of the study is, that such states are usually unable to diversify their economy and income resources. The political and economic stability provided by the rent income prevent the government efforts to develop the other sectors of the economy.[31] This has happened in the case of many rentier states including Kazakhstan. Government spends a sizable portion of the rent income on public for raising their standard of living prevents the popular discontent against the autocratic rule. Increased spending on social sector ensures acceptability and stability of government's

[29]Margarete Klein, Hans-Henning Schröder and Susan Stewart, *Presidents, Oligarchs and Bureaucrats: Forms of Rule in the Post-Soviet Space*,(Surrey: 2012, Ashgate Publishers).
[30]Rico Isaacs, *Party System Formation in Kazakhstan: Between Formal and Informal* Politics (London: 2011, Routledge Publishers), 155-157.
[31]Beblawi and Luciani, *The Rentier State*, 10.

social development models.[32]This also becomes a tool in the hands of the regimes to curb the demand for democracy. Diversification of economy not only requires imposition of more taxes on public for spending on other sectors of the economy it also increases the threats to regime stability and demand for political reforms.[33]The overall situation presented above creates serious issues for the rentier states. As the whole political social and economic structure depends on oil rents. And government has to maintain focus on oil sector for maintaining stability. Consequently, other sectors are neglected, and government fails to diversify economy which is essential to reduce reliance on rent income and combat the threats posed by reliance on one sector.

The overall situation in a rentier state like Kazakhstan increase the challenges for energy security of the states at regional and global level too. As discussed in the previous section that diversification of economy has become an essential component to reduce the vulnerabilities of rentierism**.** However, rentier states find it hard to diversify their economies and face serious challenges at regional and global level too.

Energy Security of Rentier State: External Levels of Threat

Kazakhstan, as a "Rentier state" not only faces security issues at domestic level, its external relations and foreign policy is not immune to the insecurity created by rentierism. Rentier states face multi-dimensional security threats. Their energy sector not only integrates their political economic and social sectors at domestic levels. But their energy exports are also integrated beyond their territorial boundaries. The oil trade in the land locked region is mostly carried out through pipeline. The integrated nature of oil pipeline infrastructure creates some more security threats for Kazakhstan. In Friedberg's views states feel more threatened from the policies of their neighbors and countries geographically adjacent.[34] In a region, where economic interests of the whole region (consisting of rentier state) are integrated through a system of oil trade via pipeline system, energy sector presents major security threat. The energy security of a state cannot be understood without linking it to the energy security issues of other states. This becomes a more complicated phenomenon in the case of Kazakhstan.

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[32]Gyene PálIstván. (2016). "Rentier States, or the Relationship between Regime Stability and Exercising Power in Post-Soviet Central Asia,"*Society & Economy*, 38, no. 2, (May, 2016), 171-191, https://doi.org/10.1556/204.2016.38.2.3.

[33]Richard Pomfret, "Constructing Market-based Economies in Central Asia: A Natural Experiment?" *The European Journal of Comparative Economics*, 7, no. 2, (December, 2010), 449-467. Retrieved June 2, 2019, http://ejce.liuc.it/Default.asp?tipo=articles&identifier=ejce:18242979/2010/02/10.

[34]Aaron L. Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia,"*International Security*18, no.3, (Winter, 1993) 5-33, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2539204?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents.

Therefore, energy related security threats range from pipelines, transit issues, regional rivalries to security threat to energy infrastructure from non-state actors.

Kazakhstan's peculiar geography as a landlocked state integrates it into a regional infrastructural web for the energy trade. Before, 1991, it was part of an integrated Soviet energy trade.[35] During post-independence era, periodic transit issues, and unresolved disputes of offshore resources in the Caspian Sea involving Kazakhstan and other littoral states have endangered the energy security and integrity of states dependent of oil rents.

Similarly, the role of non-state actors and terrorist organizations in the region has occurred as a big threat for rentier states. The geographic juxtaposition of Kazakhstan and whole Central Asia region to Afghanistan, Iran and Middle East creates serious security threats to oil trade infrastructure and major pipelines of the region.[36] The presence of Al Qaeda and penetrating ISIS in the region make the security of thousands of km long pipelines susceptible. Thus, endangering the rent income of the rentier states. This has emerged as one of the biggest concerns of Kazakhstan especially, in the post 9/11 era.[37] Furthermore, the relations of regional and global powers with Kazakhstan creates an environment of power rivalry in the energy sector of the states. Independence from Soviet Union created challenges for the rentier states at every step. First of all, increase in rent income could not be possible without developing the energy sector. The foreign investment emerges as the pre requisite for this issue. Hence, involving the external powers in the region. Russia as the predecessor state of the former USSR inherited the whole infrastructure of oil and gas pipelines, which was inevitable for the regional states like Kazakhstan. Later the involvement of the US and EU complicated the competition. This generated severe conflict over new pipelines route between Russia and the EU. Trans Caspian, and Nabucco pipeline are opposed by Russia but essential for oil trade diversification of Kazakhstan. On the other hand, the construction of BTC Baku Tbilisi, Ceyhan pipeline and BTS Baku Tbilisi Supsa have caused a severe blow to the Russian monopoly.[38] The regional states face a tough choice in this scenario, when it comes to the selection of new route.

The emergence of China in the initial years of the new century has added to the severity of the situation. Its growing influence in regional

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[35]Ostrowski, *Politics and Oil in Kazakhstan*, 82-84.

[36]Bantekas, et al., Oil and Gas Law in Kazakhstan: National and International Perspectives, 313.

[37]Lydia M. Buyers, *Central Asia in Focus: Political and Economic Issues*(New York: 2003, Nova Science Publishers), 239.

[38]Richard Morningstar, "The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline: A Retrospective and A Look At The Future." The *Central Asia and Caucasus Analyst*, August, 2006, https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/11010-analytical-articles-caci-analyst-2006-8-23-art-11010.html, (Retrieved, July 2, 2019).

affairs and increasing oil trade with Kazakhstan, might create challenges for diversification policy of the state. At the moment, share of Chinese oil companies in Kazakhstan's oil sector is 24% as the biggest buyers of Kazakh oil.[39] This share is constantly rising. Too much reliance on one export destination also cause demand side security problems for a rentier state. It hampers economic development when demand in the major export destination falls. Therefore, diversification of supply routes is considered very important. For a rentier state, like Kazakhstan.

Kazakhstan's position in this scenario becomes very important. So far Kazakhstan has maintained a successful and balanced approach in its foreign energy relations, but with the passage of time, it is becoming even more strenuous to maintain a balanced policy. Moreover, the US takes interest in the energy market of the region for its strategic purpose of incapacitating the Russian influence in the region through its petroleum companies like Exxon Mobil and Chevron who are two of the biggest investors in the petroleum sector of Kazakhstan.[40]

Kazakhstan is located in a region where, territorial disputes, legal status of the Caspian Sea and dependency on Russian pipeline infrastructure create so much havoc.[41]Located at the crossroads of Eurasia sandwiched between two giant neighbors China and Russia. It's energy trade with China was the first major step towards diversification and increasing the rent income. Kazakhstan is very much keen to explore more trading opportunities with the European nations. However, it must cross the huge Russian territory before reaching Europe. And that too while using Russian pipelines. This fact puts Kazakhstan at a disadvantageous position. Hence, diversification has become a paradox. Essential for increasing rent income but difficult to achieve in the given geo political scenario. In addition, the existing pipelines stretching on thousands of kilometers face a major security threat from the terrorist organizations active in neighboring Afghanistan and Middle East. Therefore, energy security and rentierism both are irrevocably cinched to each other.

Conclusion

Energy Security has become a crucial issue in contemporary global politics. This is especially true for those states who are compellingly dependent on income generated by the export of energy resources especially

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[39]Share of China's companies in Kazakhstan's oil production estimated at 24%, *Tengri News*, https://en.tengrinews.kz: https://en.tengrinews.kz/markets/Share-of-Chinas-companies-in-Kazakhstans-oil-production-24323/, accessed June 30, 2019).

[40]ZP Kazakhstan. *Oil and gas companies of Kazakhstan*, http://zp.kz/en/25/29.html, accessed June 30, 2019).

[41]Kuralai I. Baizakova, Energy Security Issues in the Foreign Policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan. American *Foreign Policy Interests*32, no. 2(April, 2010), 103-109, https://doi.org/10.1080/10803921003697674, accessed July , 2019).

oil. This resource income called rent income in its entirety generate a conundrum. This enigma is very well defined as rentierism by Hazim Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani. Kazakhstan presents an interesting case study as a rentier state where oil rents critically influence the whole social fabric of a state. Kazakhstan is the 9th largest oil exporting state in the world. Oil sector contribute more than 40 % of the total GDP of the country. Therefore, oil rent is the predominant income of the country.

Government is the main recipient of rent and its substantial amount is earned from external resources, and only few hands are involved in earning those external rents. The government assumes the role of those "few" involved in earning rents. Government use this rent income for gaining political support by redistributing it among few individuals involved in oil business. At social level. Rent income is used to provide subsidies to the masses. In this scenario, government do not levy taxes on public which helps in diluting demand for political reforms and democracy. Thus, strengthening the regime. Thereupon, creating critical dependence on rent income at political level. Now in order to secure this rent income, it is highly crucial to ensure security of the oil sector at external levels too. As the theory explains that most of the rent is generated through external sources, Kazakhstan's oil rent which is earned externally, poses severe challenges. The land locked nature of the state makes it fully dependent on pipeline. Any effort to diversify its trade through EU's supported pipeline routes have met with severe opposition from Russia. Secondly, the involvement of external powers has provoked a severe energy politics in the region which ultimately threatens the interests of rentier state. Third, regional disputes, like legal status of Caspian Sea, and other territorial disputes are major obstacles in enhancing the rent income. Finally, Kazakhstan's geographic proximity to Afghanistan, Middle East, and South Asia, and the presence of terrorist organizations and threats from ISIS have generated severe pitfall for the energy security and overall stability of rentier states especially Kazakhstan. In a nutshell, Kazakhstan as a rentier state faces enormous energy security challenges which threatens the internal and external stability of the rentier states in general and Kazakhstan in particular.

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AFGHAN THIRD *ULASI JIRGA* ELECTION (OCTOBER 20-21, 2018: A PROMOTER OF STATE BUILDING OR AN INSTIGATOR OF FRAGILITY: AN ANALYSIS

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Abstract

The research paper describes and analyzes Afghanistan's third Ulasi Jirga election in light of 'State's fragility' concept, initially theorized in the Western world in 1990s. State's fragility, is a situation where risks and vulnerabilities overwhelms a state's or a society's capacity to overcome these risks. In order to avoid fragility, risks and vulnerabilities are quantified in a number of dimensions, such as, political, economic, justice, security and functioning of core services performed by the State. Election, as a sub part of political dimension of fragility, is assessed and analyzed in this paper to determine how far it add or flout state's fragility, in terms of addressing level of violence, response of state's institutions and how far electoral practice contribute to socio-political climate to lessen state fragility as perceived in a liberal model.

Key Words: Transparency, OECD, Registered Voters, Independence Election Commission, IECC (Independent Electoral Complaint Cell), Afghan Constitution 2004

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Methodology

The purpose of research is descriptive and analytical; it makes sense of *Ulasi Jiriga* (lower house of legislature) election held in 2018, by employing 'state fragility' framework as a mode of analysis. It is an inductive effort using research strategy, a case study of Third *Ulasi Jirga* election, in 2018, ground its data in public media discourse, such as, newspapers, journals, online sources on the subject, relevant websites, and input of research think tanks, such as, ANN (Afghan Analyst Network)

Introduction

The concept of 'State's fragility, is yet to take a final and agreed-upon-definition because it is associated with a number of socio-cultural, economic and political drivers. However, among the epistemic community there is a growing consensus that major determinants of fragility are context specific.[1]The liberal institutions, such as, OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development)[2] and World Bank draws state's fragility on various socio-political and economic drivers that ultimately brings in conflict and violence. Both OECD and World Bank argue that fragility and conflict are mutually reinforcing and recently conflicts in fragile states are on rise.[3] According to one survey, "*in 2016 more countries experienced violent conflicts than any time in 30 years'*"[4]Furthermore, there is growing belief that if conflicts in fragile States could not confine to national borders, the negative spillover can engulf the neighboring States

[1] Shahida Aman, *State Failure and State Building in Post Conflict Societies: A Case Study Of Afghanistan*, Unpublished Ph.D dissertation, (Peshawar: Area Study Centre University of Peshawar, 2013), P. 25

[2] OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) established in 1947 where 34 democracies with market economies work with each other as well as with more than 70 nonmember economies to promote economic growth, prosperity and sustainable development . It is a forum where governments work together and seek solution to common problems. The OECD set international standards on a wide range of things from agriculture to tax to the safety of chemicals. Roots of the organization go back to the rubble of Europe after World War II. It determine to avoid the mistakes of its predecessors in the wake of World War I, European realized that the best way to ensure lasting peace was to encourage cooperation and reconstruction rather than punish the defeated . OECD was established in order to run the U.S- financed Marshal Plan for reconstruction of the continent ravaged by war. By making individual governments recognize the interdependence of their economies. It paved the way for a new era of cooperation that was to change the face of Europe. online available at : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_YF51mpd0AI

[3] Lahai Idriss John, Strokirch Von Karin, Brasted Howard & Ware Hallen, *Governance and Political Adaptation in Fragile States*, (Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), P. 85

[4] World Bank Group, *Pathway for Peace*, (Library of Congress , 2018), P. xvii

and finally can pose a threat to international security.[5] The realization that fragility does not confine itself to its epicenter developed after the 9/11 terrorist attack in U.S. (United States). In wake of this growing concern, the concept of state's fragility and its various dimensions has been the focus of conceptualization.

The academics and policy makers measures fragility in a variety of ways and understand through a number of arbitrary correlations between various variables. First, fragility was associated with underdevelopment (poverty), it was later equated to State's capacity-deficit to undertake core functions (justice, security, health and education) including failure of its institutions. Currently, a more standardized fragility index under CPIA[6] (Country Policy and Institutional Assessment) developed by World Bank, utilized by practitioners. CPIA uses sixteen criteria, grouped in four equally weighted clusters: Economic Management, Structural Policies, Policies for Social Inclusion and Equity, Public Sector Management and Institutions of States. OECD instead, look at fragility as a matrix of risks and vulnerabilities which is reflected in five dimensions, (1)violence (peaceful societies), (2) access to justice for all, (3) effective, accountable and inclusive institutions,(4) economic foundations and (5) capacity to adapt to social, economic and environmental shock and disasters.[7] However, despite such a calibrated and sophisticated fragility framework, when applied in fragile States' fall short of achieving State building that also evoke academic attention. A section of scholarship blame the framework for introduction of institutions alien to local culture, geography and politics. In case of Afghanistan, the critics of

[5] Lahai Idriss John, Strokirch Von Karin, Brasted Howard & Ware Hallen, *Governance and Political Adaptation in Fragile States*, (Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan,2019), P. 86

[6] The CPIA consists of 16 criteria grouped in four equally weighted clusters: Economic Management, Structural Policies, Policies for Social Inclusion and Equity, and Public Sector Management and Institutions. For each of the 16 criteria, countries are rated on a scale of 1 (low) to 6 (high). The scores depend on the level of performance in a given year assessed against the criteria. The ratings depend on actual policies and performance, rather than on promises or intentions. In some cases, measures such as the passage of specific legislation can represent an important action that deserves consideration. However, in the end it is the implementation of legislation that determines the extent of its impact and overall, CPIA score for a country. The 16 items, assessed, are grouped into four clusters. Each of the four clusters has a 25 percent weight in the overall rating. Within each cluster, all criteria receive equal weight, although components within a criterion may be weighted differently. Reference, online available at: *http://datatopics.worldbank.org/cpia/cluster/overall-cpia-score*, retrieved on June 22, 2019,

[7] Lahai Idriss John, Strokirch Von Karin, Brasted Howard & Ware Hallen, (2019)

development package, under the fragility frame, for example, lambast the practice of imposing centralized state institutions, in a historically decentralized State. Another section criticize the project of promoting democracy, in the country, in absence of low performing State structures and absence of institutional framework for resolving disputes.[8]

In index of fragility, modern liberal election based on the principle of one-man-one-vote, is a core function of liberal-State-building activity. It is a source of government legitimacy and a peaceful device of transfer of power. OECD looks at fragility, as mentioned above, as a matrix of risks and vulnerabilities, in five dimensions. This study on election of the third *Ulasi Jirga*, 2018, assesses the state's fragility framework, in the election, specifically in two areas, containment of violence and accountable institutions as prescribed by OECD. The paper test the two areas at three levels of electoral process, registration, campaign and polling day. It is hypothesized that if there is less violence in the election and institutions perform accountably then there is a chance of mitigation of state fragility.

Background and Significance of Election in Afghanistan

The historical and cultural matrix of the Afghan State embedded in socio-political hierarchies based on patriarchy, tribe, clan and religion, all stifling the liberal political socialization including modern elections. King Amanullah (r. 1919-1929) was charge sheeted through 19-column religious edict (*Fatwa)* issued by *mullahs* (religious leaders) of Kabul, termed him a *Kafir* (infidel).[9] The violent reaction against king Amanullah liberal reforms cost the kingdom one-year budget. Arnold Toynbee considered Amanullah's attempt to westernize Afghans was the crowing folly that cost him the throne.[10] A more pragmatic, indigenous solution was adopted by king Amanullah's successors, Nadir dynasty (r. 1929-1978), framing 1931 Constitution within Islamic flavor to avoid violence. It was a cultural turn, democracy of Afghan type. The ruling family manipulated elections in such a way that only pro-ruling family tribal and religious leaders could return to *Ulasi Jirga.*[11] With the exception of one election, the *7th Ulasi Jirga*[12]in

[8] Shahida Aman, *State Failure and State Building in Post Conflict Societies: A Case Study of Afghanistan*, Unpublished Ph.D dissertation, (Peshawar: Area Study Centre (Russia, China & Central Asia, University of Peshawar, 2013), P. 20

[9] Ataee Ibrahim (*Da Afghanistan Per Mauser Tarikh Yao landa Katana* (Pushto).(A short history of Afghanistan).(Banga Intisharat Miwand Saba Kutab Khana, 1380/2001), P. 205

[10] Toynbee Arnold. *A Study of History*, Vol., VI. (Oxford Press), p. 103. See Arnold Fletcher. (1965). *Afghanistan*: *A Highway of Conquest*. (New York: Cornell University Press, 1939). p. 222

[11] Louis Dupree. Comparative Profiles of Recent Parliament s in Afghanistan: Emphasis on twelfth and thirteenth. *South Asia Series: Vol. XV. No. 4*, the American Universities

1949, held impartially, brought much anti-government liberal educated class to assembly that deterred the monarch. Successive Afghan governments, ranging from monarchy, communists and Islamists, practiced superficial modern elections, if there were any, and eliminated public voice in national policies. State fragility suffered as violence increased with more suppression of political opponents. The flaw was not in democratic electoral process but the subjective way of conducting it.

The period under coalition government of Islamic parties (r.1989-1992), followed by Taliban rule (r.1996-2001), the political system remained authoritarian, without elections, resulted in more violence and political exclusion. Authoritarianism invited a complex of risks and vulnerabilities, especially crises of legitimacy that pushed the country losing control over sub national groups and non-state actors, such as, Al-Qaeda. The spill over impacts of fragility resonated in the neighboring states and finally turned into 9/11 terrorist attack. The fragile context created space and justification for neoliberal world, led by US, to go for humanitarian intervention.
U.S and its coalition partners ousted Taliban's in 2001and put Afghanistan under the liberal model, the Bon Process and the Constitution of 2004.[13] The new liberal model attempted to address problem of fragility, apart from ensuring delivery of core services, such as, security to individuals, access to justice, human rights, free market competition, guaranteed people's franchise to elect their representative.

Elections in Post Conflict Period

Since 2004, successive governments organized elections both presidential and parliamentary, until now total six by Independent Election Commission (IEC). The liberal world idealized electoral exercises as panacea for tackling state fragility, lessening violence and creating a climate for political change. The current seventh election and the third *Ulasi Jirga*, under 2004 Constitution, is analyzed in order to assess how far it addressed

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Field Staff: Afghanistan,. An analysis of the 12th and 13th *Shuras* (Parliaments). July 1971

[12] The House of the People or *Ulasi Jirga* is the lower house of parliament and directly elected through the principle of SNTV (Single Non Transferable Vote). Total strength of the house is 250 and the Constitution guarantees 64 members of the house to be female. Nomads (*Kuchis*) elect 10 representatives to *Ulasi Jirga* through a Single National Constituency. *Ulasi Jirga* main responsibility is to make and ratify laws and approve the actions of the President.

[13] Tim Young's, *Afghanistan: the culmination of the Bonn process*, Research Paper, International Affairs & Defense Section, (House of Commons Library), available online at : *file:///C:/Users/Shafi/Downloads/RP05-72%20(2).pdf*, (October 26, 2015), retrieved on June 18, 2019

fragility of Afghan State, focusing two dimensions, violence and institutional performance.

Registration Process (April to June 2018)

In April IEC announced voter registration (VR), in all 34 provincial capitals of the country in three phases over a period from April 14 to June 12, 2018.[14] The commission advised the voters to register vote in the center where one desires to cast vote.[15] ACCRA (Afghanistan Central Civil Registration Authority) did a better job by issuing all *Tazkera* (identity cards), registered more than nine million (9,072,208) voters, five million male (63.7 %) and more than three million (34.3 %) female.[16] However, one main issue, observed in many registration centers, was insurgent's threat to attack registration centers. Consequently, if insurgents effectively disenfranchised voters in a given district it could questions effectiveness of institutions to ensure security. Paradoxically, even in several provinces with higher threat-level, the registered voter's data was found implausibly higher than the total local population. In the most insecure provinces, such as, Paktia, Nimruz, Nangarhar, Nuristan, Baghlan, Kandahar, Khost and Kunduz, higher registration rate, raises questions regarding transparency of the electoral process. Failure of security, a dilemma, it led to disenfranchisement of voters on one and on other it resulted in unbridle fake registration. In some provinces, the voter registration was even higher than in Kabul, the most developed province and with less threat of insurgents.[17]Paktia has registered an implausible 141 per cent of its estimated eligible population. In the previous elections of 2014, 2010 and 2009, audits of ballot boxes in most of these provinces also revealed high rates of fraudulent voting. Thus, there is a clear nexus between security, disenfranchisement of voters, fake registration, put question mark on the institutional accountability, whether IEC, EEC or national security apparatus to hold fair elections. Institutional accountability a hallmark of State fragility index under OECD, if compared to the underperformance of IEC and others

[14] First phase, from April 14 to May 13, Second phase at capitals of districts from May 15 to May 28 and the third one at villages from May 30 to June 12, .as reported on online at: *http://www.iec.org.af/media-section/press-releases/1039-vr-commencement-2018*, retrieved on November 12, 2018.

[15] Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan, online available at *http://www.iec.org.af/prs.* Retrieved on April 22, 2019.

[16] Ali Yawar Adili and Thomas Ruttig (May 27, 2018), *Afghanistan Election Conundrum (8): Controversies over voter registration*. Afghan Analyst Network, available at: *https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/*, retrieved on June 22, 2019.

[17] Worden Scott (*Afghanistan Election Conundrum: New voter registry too good to be true* Afghan Analyst Network, available at *https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/*, (August 28, 2018), retrieved on June 22, 2019.

during election, is seriously lacking in performance. The poor performance has significant effect on drivers of fragility, violence and legitimacy.

Woman Participation

Fake registration or less registration is a challenge and questions credibility, capacity of the specialized institutions, especially IEC and national institutions responsible for security. Some patriarchal families in remote areas of Nangarhar province did not allow their women to register as voter. In Achin, a district in Nangarhar province, voter registration center was far away from villages and local people dislike sending their female to take their voter cards. IEC head for Nangarhar confirmed IEC poor performance in public awareness but cited cultural reason to limited turn out of female to register as voters though. Taking security issue as a single variable and paying less attention to institutional performance is to obfuscate issue of voter registration to avoid a deeper understanding of the problem, especially performance of institutions. Despite, all these logistic and security issues, women participation was encouraging as out of total 2565 candidates for Ulasi Jirga, 417 are women, a one-fifth.[18] When registration process was closed, the total national registration, both male and female, stood at 40 per cent. If half of them cast vote it would confine turn out to 20 per cent, rising questions over how many people the elected members would actually represent their provincial constituencies. If the elected government is representative of 20% people, it is harmful to its legitimacy and monopoly over power. If registration of voter is low and violence is not controlled, elections may not be effective tools of addressing fragility. Here again, surfaces the role of effective accountable institutions to ensure transparent electoral process.

Violence and Registration

In the initial phase of voter registration, in month of April 31 a suicide bomber killed 31 people in an attack on a registration center at Kabul.[19] Similarly, a district police chief in the northern Balkh province died of his wounds when shot dead by insurgents during a gun battle against them. Taliban claimed responsibility for the killing.[20] Thus, registration

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[18] The daily, The Frontier Post, Peshawar quoting Pajhwok, (Afghan News Agency, September 29, 2018)

[19] Tolba Ahmed, Islamic State claims responsibility for Kabul blast: group's AMAQ news agency, available on line at: *https://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-blast-claim/islamic-state-claims-responsibility-for-kabul-blast-groups-amaq-news-agency-idUSKBN1HT099?il=0*. (April 22, 2018), Retrieved on April 28, 2019.

[20] Faiez Rahim, *Islamic State suicide bomber kills 57 in Afghan capital*, (April 23, 2018),

started in an organized manner but marred fear of attacks. The threat and fear environment haunted the electoral process resulting in flawed registration, low turnout and ultimately under representation of people**.** The report released by UNAMA (United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan) on May 10, 2018, verified total 23 election related security incidents resulting in death of 85 deaths and 185 injured, including abduction of 26 civilians. Taliban did not claim all these attacks, is thought provoking.[21]Defense Minister and Interior Minister informed the Ulasi Jirga in early May (media report) that they considered 216 districts to be insecure and that security forces would launch clearing operations there before the start of the second phase of voter registration.[22]If institutions fail and fall short of their responsibility to ensure what is expected of it especially security, when it is known important, next comes the question of their accountability.

Election Campaign

After much bloodletting during registration, the election campaign started on September 29, 2018 and dully closed on October 18, two days ahead of polls, October 20, 2018.[23] Total 2500 candidates (including 400 women) were contesting election from 32 provinces except Kandahar and Ghazni. (Election in Kandahar held after a week). The IEC directed the public sector employees and security officials to remain neutral and assist in fair and timely election. It also punished a few candidates with fine for starting election campaign before time, first time demonstrated presence of institutional accountability.[24]

Main Patterns of Election Campaign

Main roads and other public places at Kabul and other main urban centers were decorated with a variety of colorful posters, banners and pictures of candidates. The campaign could equally reflect a struggle of current political actors, occupying important government positions to retain their share in political system. A patrimonial streak could also be observed as **b**rothers of ministers, daughters of MPs and relatives of heads of politico-religious groups were contesting election. Close relatives of First Vice President, second Vice President, chief Executive office, some ministers,

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https://www.apnews.com/2f09c88c00e0411c80ada0a15817cbeb, retrieved on April25, 2019.

[21] Ruttig Thomas and Adili Yawar, *The Afghanistan Election Conundrum (8): Controversies over voter registration,* (May 27, 2018) https://www.stabilityjournal.org/articles/10.5334/sta.dk/print/, Retrieved on June 7, 2018

[22] Ibid.

[23] *Daily, The Frontier Post*, (Peshawar, September 29, 2018)

[24] *The daily Pashto newspaper, Wahdat*, (Peshawar, September 29, 2018)

governors, police chiefs, High Peace Council, Deputy head of national security council, deputy Head of national directorate of Security (NDS), the Presidential Administrative office, special representative of the President, members of *Ulasi Jirga*, *Mushrano Jirga* (Upper House) and political leaders were contesting elections. [25]

Violence during Campaign

Throughout election campaign insurgents tried to intimidate and discourage both the candidates and people through terrorist attacks and threats. Some thirty attacks against candidates were registered. [26]Haji Hayat, a candidate for *Ulasi Jirga* from Nangarhar killed by militants on July 31 while coming to Jalal Abad from Kot. Haji Hayat was active against militants in the region and a believer in peace.[27] Total 10 candidates lost their lives since beginning of the electoral process in July.[28] After much killing, attacks and threats the poll day drew near.

Polls Day October 20, 2018

Taliban a few days before election tried to interrupt the election by calling on people to remain at home rather head to polls. [29]The central government deployed some 70000-security force to safeguard polls. Some twenty thousand accrediting letters issued by IEC to national and international election observers. Prominent Afghan election watch dogs, such as, Free and Fair Election Foundation of Afghanistan (FEFA), Transparent Election Foundation of Afghanistan (TEFA) and Election Watch Afghanistan (EWA), were also active and part of election observers. Total Polling Centers created in 33 provinces, were 5100, when polling started only 4900 could be operationalized.[30]

There was **c**onfusion in IEC estimates on total number of polling centers, opened and those remained closed, on poll day. Nothing was said about the number of centers opened late and it was only after media report that forced the IEC for an impromptu decision to keep the polling on next day. However, it was not indicated how many polling centers will open in addition to 370 centers.[31]

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[25] *Daily, The Frontier Post*, (Peshawar, September 29, 2018)
[26] AIHRC (Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission), available online at: *https://www.refworld.org/publisher,AIHRC,5b1a7f7a4,0.html*. Accessed on April2, 2019
[27] *Daily Wahda*t Pashto Newspaper, (Peshawar, August 1, 2018)

[29] *Daily, The Frontier Post*, (Peshawar, October 21, 2018)
[30] Ibid
[31] Clarke Kate, Ruttig Thomas (October 21, 2018). *Voter Determination and Technical Shambles* available online at:

Poor Institutional Performance

Against the previous election of *Ulasi Jirga* in 2010, Afghan government beefed up security this time intensively. However, the poor logistic and technical support by IEC to the far flung election offices, polling centers blemished the electoral exercise. Issues includes lack of correct voter lists, appointment of trained election staff to operate new biometric machines, weak liaison between the central office and regional offices, were some manifestation of poor performance of institutions. A daily in Pakistan presented the following picture of polls day:

In a large number of Polling Centers and stations, polling have not been resumed and activated yet. In a number of Polling Centre's, the necessary electoral materials, totally or partially, were not provided to the IEC staff on time. In some Polling Centers, the biometric system encountered problems and was not activated on time. In some Polling Centers, observers were prevented or faced threats. Reports received of boxes containing sensitive electoral materials not being intact. In some Polling Centers, representatives of the ECC were not provided with the opportunity to be present. [32]

Slow working of biometric machine, in many cases did not work at all, forcing voters to wait in long ques. However, the technical and logistical problems were not evident at every polling center in the country, but they were widespread enough to call IEC preparations poor and in shambles.

Violence on Poll Day

Both government and private sources confirmed reports of attacks on polling centers. Wais Barmak, Minister of Interior, reported total 192 attacks that killed 17 and wounded 83 civilians. More violent attack was made by insurgents in Baghlan province on a polling station killing 12 and injuring 100, followed by another suicide attack in *Sar-e Kotal area, a* part of Kabul province, killing 15 people including 5 policemen and injured 25. The daily frontier Post, Peshawar reported the death on poll day as total killed 21 while another Peshawar based Pashto daily, *Wahdat* put the death at 42.[33] AFP, French news agency, quoting officials reported 170 civilians killed and injured. [34]

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https://www.stabilityjournal.org/articles/10.5334/sta.dk/print/, Accessed on November 7, 2018

[32] The Daily, The Frontier Post, Peshawar, October 21, 2018

[33] The daily, the Frontier Post, Peshawar and Pashto daily, *Wahdat*, (Peshawar, October 21, 2018)

[34] Clarke Kate, Ruttig Thomas *Voter determination and technical shambles,* Afghan Analyst Network, available at: *https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/*, (October 21, 2018),

After Polls Complaints and Institutional response

The IEC representative confirmed receiving almost 11000 complaints related to fraud and rigging. A well know news agency, *Tolo News*, alone, received almost 10,000 complaints across the country via WhatsApp and Facebook, related to a wide range of electoral issues. The same news agency reported practices, such as, ballot stuffing for a few candidates, voter's intimidation, use of bribe and force in the province of Logar. In the province, in total 100,000 registered voters only 11000 could poll votes. After much wrangling and differences over the issues of fraud, both the IECC and the IEC agreed on a formula to solve complaint related to fraud, fake votes through eight-point agenda solution.[35] This time, some 137 criminal cases, related to election, were registered by AGO (attorney general office). AGO handles election related crimes under Electoral laws in Chapter 6, Articles, 224 and Article 534. While election complaints are handled by ECC. Election crimes, such as, offering bribe, intimidating election staff or contestants or manipulating voters, inducing observes, watchdogs and media have punishment of five years in jail. Similarly, there are laws to punish government servants found involved in violating electoral rules in terms of fines. Despite all problems and challenges, finally the polls completed. However, the results delayed due to multiplicity of complaints. [36]

Results of Election Delayed

Election was held in the month on October 20-21, 2018 but the new parliament was inaugurated on April 26, 2019, almost after a delay of six months even though without presence of representatives of two provinces, Kabul and Ghazni. It was only on May 14, 2019, the IEC published the results of the Kabul vote, thereby concluding the 2018 parliamentary elections. Even now, Afghanistan does not have a completely newly-elected *Ulasi Jirga* as Ghazni's elections have yet to take place, planned for 28 September, 2019 (together with the presidential and provincial council elections).[37]If these elections were faulty, it was not because of a lack of

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[35] It was agreed that voter vote through manual method but under biometric system would be matched with database and would be validated if found matched. Ballot boxes of polling stations would be declared trustworthy with the approval of head of the Polling Station, observes and other staff. No biometric votes, without voter list , manually registered without observers, election staff would be invalidated, the daily, The Frontier Post, Peshawar, November 1, 2018

[36] Retrieved From, https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/publication/aan-thematic-dossier/thematic-dossier-xxi-parliamentary-elections-2018/,

[37] Available on line at: webteam@rferl.org, May 15, 2019 06:28 GMT, Radio Free Afghanistan

commitment shown by Afghan citizens. Hundreds of thousands of Afghans went to vote, showing commitment and bravery in the face of Taliban threats, and patience in the face of an often shoddily run election**.** President Ashraf Ghani had a scathing criticism over the performance of IEC and EEC and dubbed the seven-month-long election a catastrophe. He associated the inefficacy to the former election commissions, Independent election Commission and Electoral Complaint Cell. [38]

Findings

The pattern of poor institutional performance especially IEC and EEC, which has continued during various elections, resulted in many technical and logistic shambles. Lack of institutional accountability was writ large in various electoral exercises, first time, pointed by President Ashraf Ghani. During the current election, more serious were technical issues, such as, shortage of trained staff, malfunctioning of newly introduced biometric machines for verification of voters' identity, long queues of voters to cast their vote and defective voter list. The introduction of biometric verification at last minute was a mistake.

The IEC and EEC were heavily criticized for delay in announcing parliamentary result. The inefficiency of IEC also marred the election due to absence of electoral staff and issing voting materials. In the same vain, the poor performance of institution like ACRA, supposed to verify the true voters but failed to do so. Violence prevailed during all the three phases of electoral process: registration of voters, election campaign and polling day. The IEC announced the preliminary election results in January 2019. Almost 30% votes were missing in Kabul province while finalizing results. President Ashraf Ghani fired the staff of IEC for allegedly abusing their authority. A culture of violence, fraud and corruption in election prevailed.

Conclusion

The OECD's fragility framework on State's fragility comprises of five dimensions. This paper has picked two dimensions, violence and accountable institutions. The first dimension, violence (peaceful societies), was assessed through two indicators, the dead and the injured in the three phases of election. During the election, total 144 were killed and 268 injured. The highest casualty and attacks occurred during initial phase of voter's registration. When registration process was closed, the total national registration, both male and female, stood at 40 per cent. If half of them cast vote it would bring down turn out to 20 per cent, raising questions over how many people the elected members would actually represent in their provincial constituencies. If the elected government is representative of 20%

[38] Adili Yawar Ali *Political Landscape*, (Afghan Analyst Network,17 May 2019), available at: *https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/*,

people, it is detrimental to its legitimacy and monopoly over power. Prevalence of violence inversely affected overall electoral exercise which has resulted in a weak democratic practice. Further, intimidation of voters and candidates marginalized the voice of public to participate freely in election. Frustration and distrust over the legitimacy of government is another outcome of such practices that results in increasing fragility of Afghan State rather than reducing it. Fragility of State is associated with prevalence of violence in a society, electoral practice also a part of society. Therefore, if violence could exist in the election, the same could also be said about the Afghan Sate at large. Appraising the second dimension of fragility, the accountable institutions, the IEC failed to plan effective security measures during the three phases of electoral process. The performance of EEC and ACRA was equally poor. Poor institutional response haunted the electoral process right in its initial phase of voter registration that resulted in flawed registration. During election campaign and polling day, national institutions could not put a matching response to insurgents. The poorest institutional response was glaring in IEC coordination with field offices. On poll day, there was confusion in IEC estimates on total number of polling centers opened and those, which remained closed. Tempted by media report the IEC went for an impromptu decision to keep the polling on next day. Issues, such as, lack of correct voter lists, appointment of trained election staff to operate new biometric machines, weak liaison between the central office and regional offices, were some manifestations of poor institutional. Institutional accountability, a dimension of State Fragility under OECD framework, deemed vital for mitigating state fragility is poorly reflected in the current election. Election was a test case of measuring the strength and worth of the institutions to deliver services. Failure of the institutions and the government to hold transparent elections results in further political crisis. The small increase in satisfaction with democracy may not be sustainable as portrayed in Asia foundation survey report 2018. Thus, the hypothesis that if there is less violence in the election and institutions perform accountably then there is a chance of mitigation of state fragility is probably true.

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CHINA PAKISTAN ECONOMIC CORRIDOR: INTERDEPENDENCE TO REGIONAL INTEGRATION

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Abstract

In the changing regional geo-political scenario China, Pakistan and other regional countries are set to play a vital role in the emerging regional economic corridor. China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) as part of "One Belt, One Road" grand strategy connect countries with China through economic collaboration extending from South East Asia to the Europe through maritime and land routes comprised of emerging markets of Africa and Middle East energy resources.

This paper has investigated the significance of CPEC in parlance of theoretical framework of complex interdependence because the phenomenon of interdependence has tied state and non-state entities in economic and strategic dimensions. Regional connectivity results from systematic, upgraded and need-based interaction in perspective of CPEC for socio-economic, industrial, energy and trade development.

CPEC is important not only for Pakistan and China but also for the other regional countries such as Afghanistan, Central Asian Republics, Iran and India. As international and regional politics follows interest's game hence CPEC has also become matter of concerns for both regional and international players which has been amply illustrated by this research. These concerns are followed by arguments that CPEC may be seen in a broader perspective of interdependency with emphasis on strategic and economic dimensions guaranteeing regional connectivity and integration.

CPEC can serve as a main trade avenue not only for China and Pakistan but for Central Asian Republics, Afghanistan, Iran and India as well. This study has argued that CPEChas the potential of becoming an energy transit corridor for growing economies. It has advantagesfor India also in form of improved infrastructure, communication and access to CARs market. Simultaneously it imparts an opportunity of flourishing and trade to

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the Afghanistan's industries. Iran can also have benefit by ensuring Chabahar port outstretched to CPEC.

CPEC has potential geopolitical risks as hostile environment of South Asia and the respective power rivalry and policy shift of world powers towards this region as manifested by the US pivot to Asia and the former concern over Chinese presence in the Arabian Sea in Asian region, Gulf states considering of Gwadar Port as rival port, Indian opposition of CPEC by arguing that it passes through Pakistan's held Kashmir on which India has also claim.

China and Pakistan in order to escape proxy tussle in Baluchistan need to settle Indian apprehension about the project, Confidence Building Measures (CBM) must be incorporated in order to promote closer ties with Afghanistan, Pakistan must attempt for having stable relations with Iran in order to overcome impediments to the CPEC success. By making CPEC a reality the benefits will be reaped by whole region and the very enmity of India with Pakistan and China can be turned into mutual beneficial economic relations. If India becomes a partner in the project then certainly the concerns of India will be settled down.

Key Words: Geo-political, Economic Integration, Gwadar port, One Belt, One Road.

Introduction

Regional connectivity is a crucial part of the Vision 2025 of Pakistan.(Pakistan 2025: One Nation, One Vision) The Pak-China Economic Corridor (CPEC) is integral part of Belt Road Initiative (BRI) for having benefits of regional connectivity and trade with various associations such as the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC),South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC),Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO).[1] President of China, Xi Jinping proposed an enduring "China-Pakistan Community of Shared Destiny" during his meeting with Mamnoon Hussain on 19th February 2014.[2] CPEC is a component of Chinese grand economic vision of inter- and intra-regional connectivity.

The project would connect Kashgar in China northwest with Pakistan's Gwadar Port, in the Arabian Sea. The initiative is Chinese struggle for approaching warm water. The comparatively under-developed

[1]Pakistan 2025: One Nation, One Vision, Ministry of Planning, *Development, and Reform; Government of Pakistan. Regional connectivity is mentioned as one of the seven elements of the vision alongside: People First, Inclusive Growth, Governance, Water Energy Food, Private Sector, and Knowledge Economy*, 88-89.

[2] Zhou, Gang. Former Chinese ambassador to Pakistan, at the Think Tank seminar on *"Building 'China-Pakistan Community of Shared Destiny' in the New Era*", 2014.

western part of China being hub of Uyghur movement is needed to prosper and developed like western provinces amidst concern of China to stabilize Xinjiang. The need for securing Chinese access to warm waters in the Arabian Sea through Gwadar is important because it provides shortest and cheapest route to markets all over the world.

CPEC is a land based part of One Belt One Road (OBOR) encompassed both land and sea projects. It was launched by Xi Jinping, the head of state (China) in the month April of 2015 with a worldwide applause by analysts and strategists.

OBOR links South Asia with South East Asia and Africa through both land and maritime routes such as railway lines, roads and energy infrastructures along with sea routes. According to HSBC research report an amount of 29 % of the world GDP along with 64 % of world population came from countries situated along OBOR. In 2013, China made two major announcement for developing sea routes and international land which led to Belt Road Initiative (BRI). The Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) not only ties Pakistan and China but also the whole region guarantying huge economic benefit. Besides economic benefits, the BRI has impacted the changing geo-politics of the region. The regions under BRI comprised seventy percent of energy resources and a major chunk of the Muslim countries lies there.[3] The plan will have impact on foreign image of the US and the latter stance on the BRI will shape the China relations with the US.

The vision of establishing a Silk Road economic belt and Maritime Silk Road was established by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and National Development. It comprised five tiers for connectivity such as physical, economic, financial, human and policy giving impetus to the ancient Silk Route. This will tie civilizations of Europe, Asia and Africa. BRI was put forward by President Xi Jinping in 2013 for achieving development, cooperation, mutual gains and peace. Main motives of the OBOR are: firstly, securing coordination of policy in Asian continent, secondly, economic integration of the region, thirdly, free trade and liberalization of trade and lastly, ensure regional connectivity.[4] Recently, Xinjiang which is perturbed due to presence of fissiparous elements of Uyghur provides Chinese access to Eurasia. It has a long history of cultural exchange and trade with parts of Asia as South and Central Asia to its west. The Silk routes pass through Xinjiang to inner China which provides chances of its becoming progenitor of cultural exchange and trade for the countries next to its western part. Considering the

[3] Gal Luft. *It takes a road.* (USA: Institute Analysis, Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, 2016).

[4] Shayam Saran, *"What China's One Belt and One Road Strategy Means for India, Asia and the World"* (The Wire (India), 10th September, 2015).

Silk Road, China has established the initiative of land and sea routes for commercially connecting it with the world through trade in efficient ways.

China's goals in launching OBOR and initiating CPEC revolves around its pursuit for new markets, having contracts of ports, power station and rails, securing markets for Chinese companies of Infrastructure development, future offshore facilities, approaching Middle East energy resources through roads, pipelines and power stations, development of backward western provinces as Xinjiang, and flourishing connections with Central Asian Republics for enhancing trade and commerce, to internationalize Chinese currency and to have good relations in the region.

In 2014, Chinese export amounted services and goods of worth dollar 2.37 trillion made it greatest exporter having a great chunk of retail space worldwide. Due to its location and export potential along with its routes for growth of export drives China to establish trade routes with regional countries.

Time duration of CPEC spans over almost one and half decade plan comprising four phases; short-term projects, medium-term projects, long-term projects and Early Harvest Projects (EHPs). There are 21 larger projects with capacity of producing 34.5 billion dollar and 16,400 megawatts of electricity. By the end of 2018 14 projects are expected to be completed with addition of 10,400 megawatts of electricity to national grid of Pakistan. Not only it will cover recent shortage of 4500 megawatts of electricity but will also generate an additional 5900 megawatts of electricity.

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor has taken into account the new trends and dimensions of world politics by creating a developed organized and systematic interaction for industrial, energy and trade, and socio-economic progress and development. It provides a chance of improving relations of Pakistan and China with Central Asia, Europe and Middle East. Both Pakistan and China foresee enormous gains from connectivity via railways, sea lanes, pipelines of energy and highways. Not only Pakistan and China but other regional countries joining this project will accrue socio-economic dividends too.

Moreover, the CPEC will cover trade of distance 16,000 km between the South China Sea and Arabian Sea to approximate distance of 2,500 km. An oil pipeline of 2500 km from Gwadar to Kashghar for exporting oil from Middle East is also planned.[5] The CPEC is also

[5] Aarish U. Khan, *"Bringing Gwadar back to life" in The Spokesman,* (Islamabad: February 20, 2013), 93-95.; See also Raja Muhammad Khan, "*Pak-China Strategic Relations: Regional and Global Impacts*" in *Regional Studies. XXXI(1),* p.45.

contemplated integral for China's trade with Afghanistan along with its projection into Africa and west Asia.[6]
Providing connection of Gwadar with Kashgar and then with CARs is a way to enhance trade of Pakistan not only with China but also with CARs. Similarly the Iran Pakistan Gas Pipeline is expected to include China too. Gwadar Seaport as trade route between western part of China and the Persian Gulf is significant as it took only two weeks in transporting goods to that part of China.[7]

This paper is divided into three main section whereas section one deals with significance of CPEC for Pakistan, China, Afghanistan, Central Asian Republics and Iran while section two illustrates role of CPEC in regional connectivity and integration through interdependency theory and then section three describes potential irritants to CPEC in form of major and regional powers concerns and how it can be addressed through highlighting grounds of complex interdependence. Finally, policy options are presented for overcoming geopolitical challenges in order to accrue maximum benefits of CPEC for the whole region.

Regional Interests and Connectivity through China Pakistan Economic Corridor

The fulfillment of the Chinese ambition of becoming a global power rests on the most crucial requirement of ensuring regional connectivity. President Xi said in the National People's Congress (NPC), foreign affairs committee that China will keep neighbors on priority in Chinese diplomacy[8]. It redefines the China's foreign policy because previously the fear of China-US rift had abstained her from developing ties with neighbors.[9]For achieving regional integration, CPEC is pre-requisite which will lessen Pakistan dependence on other western powers especially the US and will connect regional countries through interdependence. Regional integration is crucial because without regional integration Japan lost the chance of getting status of world second largest economy hence eventually powers will come to the point of regional integration. CPEC will accrue advantages to Iran, India,

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[6] Christopher Ernest Barber, The Pakistan-China Corridor: A new project will give Pakistan the tools of globalization. Will it use them?", *The Diplomat*. (27th February, 2014U. http://thediplomat.com/2014/02/the-pakistan-china-corridor/

[7] Aarish, U. Khan, *"Bringing Gwadar back to life" in The Spokesma*n, (Islamabad,20th February, 2013).

[8] Shakeel Ahmad Ramay, *CPEC: A Chinese dream being materialized through Pakistan*. (Islamabad: Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Pakistan, 2016).

[9] Yan Xuetong, *Silk Road Economic Belt Shows China's New Strategic Direction: Promoting Integration with its Neighbors.* (The Carnegie Tsingua Center for Global Policy, 2014).

Afghanistan and other SAARC countries by exporting oil, gas from Iran, Gulf countries and CARs. CPEC is destined to integrate and connect the region by ameliorating infrastructure which will take all the regional countries as Pakistan, China, Afghanistan, Iran, CARs into the same orbit by having a market of two billion people which eventually will facilitate, strengthen and stabilize the region.[10]

Similarly Pakistan will get connected with not only Iran but also with other neighbors as Afghanistan, India and extended neighbors like CARs through West-East connection. Through the route the future trade with CARs and energy import from Gulf countries and Iran via cheapest route passing through Pakistan will be visualized.

Pakistan will become economic focal point for not only regional countries but also Middle East and Central Asia although many strategic challenges are looming large at this stage. By making CPEC a reality the benefits will be reaped by whole region and the very enmity of India with Pakistan and China can be turned into mutual beneficial economic relations because if India becomes a partner in the project then certainly the concerns of India will be settled down. As such India will be greater benefactor of CPEC as it will be a cheaper and shorter trade route with CARs as compared to trade through Chabahar port of Iran. Secondly, it will help in resolution of Indian and Pakistan conflicts because both as economic partners in the region will be tied together under the phenomena of interdependence.
This grand project will benefit whole region with long lasting impact on global trade dimensions and trends.

At the very outset its prospects to China are to be taken in to account. China is likely to accrue great benefits from CPEC through longest trade supply route by escaping the Malacca Straits dilemma. With this route ten days will be taken for Chinese transportation to various regions of the world. Moreover, it will develop the backward western part of China. At the same time Kashghar will become focal point for the trading purpose of all regional countries. Hence keeping the prospects of Kashghar through CPEC Chinese companies are planning of opening in this part of China.

China is dependent on 10,000 kilometer long maritime route connecting its eastern part with the Middle East region passing through Indian Ocean for its export and import with the Middle East. Hence the distance will be reduced to 2500 kilometers only due to this corridor by providing a safe and short route. As already stated China's main aim is development of its relatively backward region in particular Xinjiang which is perturbed with fissiparous elements too. The forty years export based economic development has widen economic gap between eastern and

[10] Lin Wang, *Opportunities and Challenges of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and Implications for US Policy and Pakistan. Asia Pacific Bulletin*.no. 395, 2017.

western provinces as coastal cities of eastern part was more industrialized with major industries set there. According to 2013 report, the per capita income difference among western provinces of Xinjiang, Qinghai and Guizhou, and Gansu per capita income was one third to the half of the Fujian Guangdong, and Zhejiang, the eastern provinces. Accordingly in 2015, three to five decades were required for western provinces to come on equality with the rest.[11]Eventually, China in its thirteenth five year plan carved China mission of making Xinjiang a channel to be connected with central, southeastern and west Asia. It can be focal commercial point for Middle East and South Asia supplies. Hence the corridor will bring stability and peace in the region and will ensure more trade and energy trade with natural resources rich Central Asia.

Xinjiang through corridor will yield in enormous growth by the export of finished goods and machinery to the markets of Central Asia and South Asia will import the raw material required for economic growth and development. Goods imported through first consignment of Sea food coming to Xinjiang from Indian Ocean through corridor were ten times cheaper.[12] Moreover, CPEC is best possible alternate to the Malacca Straits which will be giving safe side to China in case of South China or Asia Pacific dispute.

Alternative Energy Source

The uninterrupted supply of energy is important to sustain its fast growing economy. Recently sixty percent of Chinese energy is produced from coal which is having grave environmental dangers. Hence for future energy sake China will depend on oil reservoirs of Middle East and the project is providing the best possible oil route for the import. Oil refinery construction at Gwadar by China is one of the steps towards fulfillment of its oil requirement. Plan of 2500 kilometer pipeline to be laid inside Pakistan is under progress thus to avoid long and unsafe maritime routes. China through Pakistan will approach warm water of Indian Ocean as best alternate to SLOCs of East China Sea which is hindered by Indian factor.

CPEC providing strategic advantages to Pakistan by having more consolidated partnership with China and increasing its strategic significance as a bridge between Asian, European and African regions of the world. Moreover the economic benefits will come in form of greater opportunities of jobs, overcoming energy crisis, advanced agricultural ways for yielding greater production. It will generate national income due to more production

[11] Peter Ferdinand, Westward ho-the China dream and 'one belt, one road: Chinese foreign policy under Xi Jinping. *International Affairs, no. 92,* (2016), 941-957.

[12] Ma Jingjing, China-Pakistan economic corridor aims to boost trade between two countries. *The Global Times,*(2017).

from Special Economic Zones along with CPEC, boost in trade and more transit charges will be source of income.

CPEC is imparting an opportunity of economic development to Pakistan whereas as already mentioned that Pakistan will become economic hub for not only the region but the US and China economic and security interests will also converge here.

Pakistan China Economic Corridor can play more significant role and can become a blessing for the economic development of Pakistan when Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has sharply fallen due to security situation in Pakistan. This economic corridor will play an important role in the revival of Pakistan economy because of its strategic potential. Due to the development of trade routes and industrialization astride the corridor, the immediate and adjoining area will have prosperity and social uplift.

The corridor will yield in billion dollars from transit revenue for having maximum maritime dividends which require building shipping industry. Enhance and strong economy will resultantly improve basic infrastructure of Pakistan, basic facilities will be within reach to the people of Pakistan. The people will have more job opportunities' and better life, which will play a major role in improvement of internal security situation.

Pakistan Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs), starting from the Persian Gulf, are vulnerable to threat emerging from Indian/ USA Navy. After the establishment of Gwadar port, Pakistan will be able to counter the Indian Blue water navy aspiration along with American fleet. Pakistan–China naval joint venture will also be a counter balance force in Indian Ocean to deny maneuver space to Indian Navy and will make maritime correspondences more secure for business shipping of both countries.

With the development of this corridor Balochistan province will attract investment not only local but also foreign. Few benefits for this province are:-

This corridor will generate job opportunities for local. The people of Gwadar, Makran and other districts will have ample employment and job incentives which will surely raise their living standards.

Afghanistan's Interests

Gwadar provides Afghanistan with the shortest and economic entry to the Indian Ocean. Afghanistan will have all the port related services, warehouse, transit conveniences and import opportunities.

Afghanistan will get more chances of flourishing its economy and regional integration. Both exports and domestic consumption based industries should be main objective of Afghanistan which can be visualized through CPEC.

Afghanistan abounds in natural resources as coal, oil and gas but unfortunately it is short of working economy at the moment. For this sake Pakistani port, infrastructure, roads coming under CPEC will assist in

economic reconstruction of Afghanistan. Hence the accomplishment of the project will guarantee peace and stability in Afghanistan.

BRI give Afghanistan a chance to flourish its economy and economic development. However, the required is that Afghanistan is avail the chance and become a regional trade and transit hub. It needs internal infrastructure development and external connectivity and benifiting from projects like China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Russia, India, and Iran's International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) that have emerged recently. [13]

China is linked to northern Afghanistan through the launch of the Sino-Afghanistan Special Railway Transportation Project and the Five Nations Railway Project. China is eager to connect itself to southern Afghanistan through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). But Afghanistan has hesitation as its caught in the middle of a dispute between Pakistan and India over CPEC passing through disputed territory. China and Afghanistan have already undertaken a fiber optic link through the Wakhan corridor. They are up to link the BRI to various energy projects and extractive sectors. Kabul-Urumqi flights restarted in 2016.[14]

Central Asian Republics Interests

Central Asia is an active engagement with Afghanistan on several fronts, an imperative for Afghanistan to be treated by its neighbors as a "normal country". But projects have to be launched in organized manner and not like the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline. Those have generated political maneuvering but no gas since 1995. Afghanistan linkage to Central Asia will not only bring northern route to Afghanistan for CARs but also over the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan and Europe. Pakistan and Iran have to work for development of infrastructure, safeguard the territory and eradicate corruption in order to avail the exports of $ 3 trillion worth minerals of Afghanistan.

Central Asians Republics are multi-ethnic, secular Muslim societies, middle income, and having industry but also infused with religious extremism, criminality and tribalism. It is not the same for local. For regional observer, Dr. S. Frederick Starr, Afghanistan is part of CARs as both are multi-ethnic. Afghanistan abides by Turkmen, Kyrgyz, Tajiks and Uzbek whereby Uzbek is one of the official languages in Afghan's constitution. The culture and language linkages integrate Afghanistan into Central Asia. In the regional economic context Uzbekistan (having borders with all of others) and

[13] Mariam Safi and Bismellah Alizada, *Afghanistan: Prospects and Challenges to Regional Connectivity*, (April 19, 2019). https://thediplomat.com/2019/04/afghanistan-prospects-and-challenges-to-regional-connectivity/

[14] Ibid.

Kazakistan with huge economy and population will lead. China's BRI will be channelized by the Uzbekistan's openness. Moreover, Uzbekistan is capable of industrial development, young labor force.[15]The direct positive impact will encourage China and other regional countries for investment in Central Asia transport infrastructure, oil, railways, gas, dry ports, elecrtricity sector and agriculture.[16]

Figure 1

CHINA-CENTRAL ASIA INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT



Since Karimov's death, Mirziyoyev has done his best to hedge against China's economic clout, reportedly reaching investment deals worth $12 billion and trade deals worth $3.8 billion in April of last year.[17]

[15] Indra Overland and Roman Vakulchuk, *China's Belt and Road Gets a Central Asian Boost Uzbekistan's transformation will fast-track the new Silk Road*, (May 03, 2018).
[16] Ibid.
[17] Nicholas Trickett, What a US-Iran War Means for Afghanistan and Uzbekistan. *The Diplomat*, (December, 13, 2018).

Figure 2:Regional Connectivity through Land and Sea Routes



CPEC provides a chance to CAR to have an access to the Indian Ocean. The region needs to redefine their political stance in world politics. They have to focus on their own identity and tackle for their economic growth and development. The latter demands a protected and trusted transit for their exports because all other routes are costly and not safe. However, with building infrastructure tillKashgar, the transit through Gwadar port is more beneficial for Central Asian Republics.

Dividends to Asian Countries

Establishment of Gwadar port will have a positive impact on Asian countries specially Iran and India. Iran can take benefits of oil refinery, while India can take advantages of being third country exploiting competition between Iran and Pakistan.

Iran Interests

Iran wants to export oil/gas pipelines of its oil reserves to the region and various parts of the world. In its pipeline with India, Bangladesh and China are also offered to be included in. Besides 900 km portion of Pakistan Iran gas pipeline is completed by Iran and the portion by Pakistan is waited. Pakistan contracted agreement in June 2016 whereby China will connect gas pipelines from Gwadar port to Iran border and then to Nawabshah of Pakistan. Pakistan finalized an agreement where China would proceed to lay the gas pipeline from Gwadar Port, from the Iran border, to the Nawabshah. It being component of CPEC provide Iran connection with Pakistan's gas

market along with chance of extending gas pipeline to China which will compel Iran to have share in CPEC.

Chabahar can become extension of CPEC by having role in CPEC economic activities. Cargo discharged at Chabahar will conveniently shipped through the economic corridor. Gwadar as deep sea port has capacity to deal with heavy cargo ships hence cargo handlers of both the ports will maintain working terms. All this will tie Pakistan and Iran together for serving mutual interests. Chabahar will yield in more benefits if it is connected with CPEC.

In order to broaden its economy from oil and gas dependence Iran needs to have economic integration with regional economies and Pakistan provides good chance in this perspective. Here the business exposure is significant development providing a ground whereby international business dynamics will be provided to the business of Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan and enabling them for competing in global market.

Considering Iran's economic integration with China then back in 2016 both China and Iran made trade deal of a 600 billion dollar and to enhance bilateral trade extending multifaceted ties in coming decades. Both countries agreed on strengthening strategic relations. However security and economic relations will be visualized by Iran entry in CPEC because the entry will yield in traffic, economic flow, markets besides other commercial and economic opportunities. Moreover, economic zones will drive Chinese entrepreneurs desiring Iranian markets and partnerships for having approach to the labor of Pakistan. It will have healthy competing environment for both Iranian and Pakistani entrepreneurs. Hence it is win-win situation for all regional countries. China will apply diplomacy and capital in connecting and involving sixty countries in this grand project. The USA is uncomfortable over the project due to possible Indian hostility for the project. Chinese watchers present in USA have termed Chinese posture of showing itself as benign power and addition of validity to the Xi's legacy.

Theory of Complex Interdependence

Robert O Keohane and Joseph Nye the pioneers of the Theory of Interdependence developed the model as response to the traditional approach of classical and structural realism emphasizing on economic and military potentials for describing state behavior. Dependency is a conditioned indicated by external determinants and dependence on each others. Interdependence is interconnectedness among states or among actors of other states.[18] Reciprocity is key factor here emphasized on complicated ways where transnational actors are interdependent and responsive to each other requirements. Complex Interdependence illustrates that states are not

[18] Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*. (Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1977), 10.

only the deciding actors, and besides security affairs the social welfare matters also remain on global agenda and cooperation and conflicts also determine international politics.[19]

Complex interdependence embodied both cooperation and competition in relations of state and non-state entities whereas the policies and actions of each entity have impact on all the actors involved hence mutuality of interests matter the most. Interdependence comprised cooperation and dependence, cooperation and interaction in many crucial fields and conflicts also. "The politics of economic and ecological interdependence involve competition even when large net benefits can be expected from cooperation."

Conflict and war can be managed by cultivating cooperation in socioeconomic and technical areas of mutual interest across the territorial boundaries of states. With the cultivation of an inter-state cooperation economic dividends can be earned in case of the powerful elite and politically relevant segment of the population learn from the experience of cooperation within a region and beyond.[20]The principle of regional or sub-regional economic groups and cooperation is emphasized more than ever. Recently greater attention is on economy as policy instrument than relying on traditional military power.[21]European Union is a good example in this context. Similarly, the CPEC shapes the regional and world politics by flourishing updated and the required interaction for industrial, socio-economic and energy development.

Strategic Dimensions

China Pakistan Economic Corridor safeguarding mutual benefits and interests by a model of coordination and strategic communication between Pakistan and China for having more and more linkages in economy and trade with regional countries in order to overcome energy crisis besides increasing exports. Common interests and mutual benefits epitomizes a model of cooperation, coordination and strategic communication between China and Pakistan to strengthen connectivity in areas of trade and economy with states in the region to fulfill growing energy requirements and enhance exports.[22]

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[19] Marc A. Genest, Marc, *Conflict and Cooperation: Evolving Theories of International Relations,* (Belmont, CA: Thomson & Wadsworth. Gieco., 1996), 140.

[20] Hasan Askari Rizvi, *Pakistan and the Geostrategic Environment* (London: Macmillan Press),1993, 139.

[21]Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 1-32.

[22] Umbreen Javaid & Rameesha Javaid, Stregthening Geo-strategic Bond of Pakistan and China Through Geo-Economic Configuration. *Pakistan Economic and Social Review, 129(1),* (Summer 2016), 123-142.

CPEC is connected with SEZ of the Kashghar and if Northern network is ensured then it will link CPEC with Europe, Russia and CARs. Pakistan is having significant location of situated at the focal point of Persian Gulf, oil rich Middle East and resource rich Central Asia. Baluchistan will integrate the region whereas it will amalgamate Egypt in the Middle East, the European states and key global locations in Eurasia. The Land Silk routes and Maritime Silk routes would connect the states through regional trade leading to socio-economic boost. Gawadar Port is focal point of BRI.

For normalizing economic and diplomatic relations with the neighbors Pakistan should connect CPEC to the West (Iran and Afghanistan) and to the East (India); which will yield in regional integration and economic connectivity and will become a game changer for overcoming conflicts and boosting cooperation.

The corridor provides Beijing access to the Arabian Sea by enhancing its trade with regional countries and with Europe and Africa along with the Middle East.[23] Pakistan will be safeguarded presence of Chines marines. Gwadar will enable Pakistan to check SLOCs openings from Persian Gulf and Straits of Hormuz.[24]

In the wake of the new developments emerging out of US-Iran nuclear deal followed with the removal of sanctions, Iran's newly reestablished position in international relations offers new avenue for cooperation with Pakistan. Successful orientation in the direction of east will not only foster deep regional cooperation but provide ample opportunities for the CPEC in general and the Western alignment of the economic corridor in particular. Interaction in the field of energy and trade would benefit much from a rapprochement between Islamabad and Tehran. Moreover, with the launching of an Iran-Pakistan pipeline, a new vista of potential cooperation will open.

The interest of Russia lies in the project as this would provide her a chance to reach the warm waters.

China has invested heavily in oil and gas resources in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan thus bringing China and Russia to the same pedestal, having the same regional interests. Above that, the growing isolation from the West has made the Sino-Russian strategic partnership a growing reality. The rise of a more politically and militarily assertive Russia and an economically predominant China may be

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[23]Raymond Lee, *The Strategic Importance of Chinese-Pakistani Relations*. (August 3, 2016). Retrieved February 10, 2017, from Reuters: http://www.reuters.com/the-strategicimportance-of-chinese-pakistani-relations

[24]Chen Jidong, Regional Railway hub in Pakistan and China's Role. *Policy Perspectives no. 10(2)*, (2013), 117-122.

represented as the two principal forces challenging the United States in the global world order. This mutual agreement is based on dissatisfaction with a US-led world. Their alliance holds the potential to incite a historical shift in terms of the global economic structure and bring change to the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific. It is salient to note the nuances that bring these two countries together strategically go beyond a simplistic impression that they share a visionary common ground for the world order. Both states deem one another to be a source for the balance of power in their common rivalry against the United States.

Economic Dimensions

Greater economic activity, particularly in trade, technical fields and social development states provides opportunity to the states to enhance relevance of countries for each others, promote cooperation by boost to economic interaction as trade, technical cooperation and social sector development. The strategic position and CPEC provides a best chance to Pakistan to emerge as trading centre. It is also an opportunity for both countries to enhance cooperation with Middle East, Europe, West Asia and Central Asia.

With the theory of interdependence in international and regional politics and positive connectivity with immediate neighbors in back ground, it is imperative for Pakistan to inculcate more active relations with the immediate neighbors for sharing energy and pursuing economic development and trade rather than putting the focus on security only. Such overtures will give a impetus to Pakistan's economy. All the areas contiguous to the Corridor are likely reap the fruits of major economic uplift.

The project has equal benefits for China providing a road and sea link to the Xinjiang region, connecting it with the Middle East and the Arabian Sea and the rest of the world. In the case of the functioning of those roads, pipelines and sea ports the economy of the Xinjiang region will observe a tremendous boast. China will get ingress to a sea free of conflict not like the South China Sea outlet. This will also ensure its reduced dependence on the Strait of Malacca. Such a development will lower the chances of the threat of a blockade of Chinese oil supplies through the Strait of Malacca by the USA and allied navies in the wake of a future war in Asia.

This also places China in a new role which includes cooperation with Pakistan for countering terrorism in the region. China has embarked upon with a mission with Afghanistan to ensure the internal political stabilization and economic development in Afghanistan.

CPEC along will transform Pakistan as an emergent of trade and commerce focal point in Central and South Asia. The Gwadar port as an economic center of Pakistan will be important port in Arabian Sea. It will link Pakistan with Central Asia via 1300Kilometer-long Optic Fibre Project.

When Gwadar port will working the all trade of Central Asia will channelize through the shortest route which will be beneficial for Pakistan also.

It provides alternate route to China's trade and is capable to attract investment, enhance trade and facilitate commercial transportation. Pakistan will gain from revenues in transit fees in addition to the Gawadar sea port being located at the cross roads of the three commercially important regions namely- West Asia, Central Asia and South Asia.

Through Gwadar International and regional trade will impart new shareholders in Afghanistan who will certainly work for normalization in Afghanistan. With Chinese scheme of building more than one billion US$ road infrastructure including a six lane 1,240 km long expressway between Karachi and Lahore to be completed in 2017, together with plan of up gradation of Karakoram Highway, and modernization of transportation in Rawalpindi, Karachi, Lahore, and three other Pakistani cities outside of the CPEC sphere a new era of mutual cooperation will usher in.

International Repercussions

The CPEC have irritants in shape of geopolitical and security factors due to prevailing regional geopolitical unease and policy parameters of world powers towards the region. Moreover, extremist factors of international, national nature are also causing disruption to the project.

USA Factor

In post Second World War the United States has emerged as a significant actor in South Asian politics. With enhanced US investment in crucial areas the leverage will increase. China's presence in the Arabian Sea may be apprehensive to the USA hegemony in Asian region because China can be counter force to the US ambition of controlling oil and gas resources of the region.

The regional configuration has been changed by China's rise whereby it is US foreign policy priority to maintain its role. The US and China security interests are getting similar on peace, counter terrorism and economic cooperation in the region. Whereas the divergence of interests is on geo-political competition and counter-terrorism goals and the risk will be enhanced if the US takes China as competitor.

The complexity of China and US relation is obvious but the project is significant for the US market hence in the US some official and scholars have taken it a great opportunity especially private and corporate sectors have been keen in BRI. But on the other hand the potential of CPEC is paid no attention when it is taken as an element of mere strategic competition between the two countries. China is anticipated with short term interests of forging an illiberal economic order in place of liberal international order

which will weaken the influence and interests of the United States.[25] According to Pakistan standpoint, the US is uneasy about Pakistan becoming economic hub.[26] Israeli analyst Ian Price has stated that CPEC does not suit to the US and by having no direct way to interrupt it has indirectly played by scattering the militants out of Pak-Afghan border region through military operation into the area which was marked by China for CPEC.[27] Hence keeping the sensitivity in consideration both Pakistan and China needs cautious policy towards CPEC. Accordingly, Pakistan has created security force of 15000 for protection of Chinese workers and the project. This security division comprises 9000 regular army soldiers besides 6000 paramilitary forces.[28]

Indian Factor

While contemplating China relations with India, and Chinese regional diplomacy, mutual benefit and inclusiveness CPEC loom large challenge. China and Pakistan are in need of dispersing Indian threat to the project because it can cause proxy tussle in the already volatile Baluchistan. Indians would not like to see Pakistan prospering, with increasing nuisance value in the region. Development of Gwadar Port is being seen by some circles as a step towards strategic encirclement of India. Through BRI, China will attempt Indian cooperation or neutral role by India at least. However, in the context of divergence of interests Indian stand seems of active opposition by all means possible.

India will gain huge benefits if becomes part of this project whereby all stakeholders will have financial advantages from the project as improved communication infrastructure and access to CARs markets of energy along with reduction of regional disputes. India will have easy and prompt access to CARs, China, Middle East and Afghanistan. India will have opportunity to be involved in Iran-China railway project which in turn enhance bilateral trade of India with Iran. Moreover, but connecting India needs greater diplomatic efforts besides political will.

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[25] Daniel S. Markey and James West, *Behind China's Gambit in Pakistan* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2016.) http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/behind-chinas-gambit-pakistan/p37855).

[26] Sophia Siddiqui, US not Happy over Pak-China Growing Relations, CPEC, *Pakistan Observer*, (2016). ,http://pakobserver.net/us-not-happy-over-pak-china-growing-relations-cpec/).

[27] Ian Price, Is the US Trying to Sabotage the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor? *Diplomat*, (2016). http://thediplomat.com/2016/09/is-the-us-trying-to-sabotage-the-china-pakistan-econom ic-corridor/).

[28] Muhammad Asad Chaudhry, 15,000 Security Personnel to be Recruited to Protect CPEC. *Daily Times*, (2016). http://dailytimes.com.pk/islamabad/16-Jul-16/15000-security-personnel-to-be-recruited- to-protect-cpec).

India will have chance to tap consumer market of 180 million in Pakistan whereby Pakistan will have 1.2 billion buyers in hand. This will tie both the countries in mutual gain relationship. Hence GautamBambawale, Indian envoy has showed eagerness for having business with People Republic of Pakistan. India if included in CPEC will change recent Asia-EU trade dimensions by having greater chink in European economic configuration and even surpassing EU-US trade alliance. Moreover the sphere of relations of Russian-Indian will be enhanced and strengthen by this entry of the India which will benefit the whole region. As it will improve economic relations of Pakistan and India and economic dependence will hamper both countries from any further military misadventure. By any resistance to Chinese investment in regional countries, India would cause its own economic miseries. Moreover, the ground of objection that CPEC passes through disputed territory of Pakistan occupied Kashmir is inadequate for Indian aloofness from this gigantic economic opportunity. Furthermore, Chinese ingress in the region as having trade partnership with South and South East Asian countries is hard to bear with by India.

India is connected with China in trade and commerce of worth USD 80 billion US dollars which is dominated by China. Both countries have border issues hence the relations will have an opportunity of normalization if India becomes part of the project. Because CPEC is not zero-sum game rather through CPEC the infrastructure in the region encompassing Kashmir will be improved which in turn will facilitate access of India to CARs too.

The Indian has opposition to the corridor is on the ground that its route passes through Pakistan held Kashmir.(claimed by India as its part). ThereforIndia is covertly striving to destruct the corridor in order to cause havoc to both Pakistan and Chinese economies which is very apprehensive. While becoming part of BRI Indian would automatically deem to have given acceptance to Pakistan claim on Pakistan occupied Kashmir hence the India is hesitant to have entrance in the project. India is grappling to shrink space for China in the Indian Ocean because the Chinese ingress and leverage in the Indian Ocean is keeping US and India on tenterhooks. Accordingly, India is doubting the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank led by China which is sponsoring OBOR projects.

For making CPEC feasible and a success story for ensuring regional connectivity and integration there is need of ameliorating regional infrastructure and communication, enhancing transit trade and imparting more financing opportunities to the traders.

Gulf States and Iran Factor

Gwadar port can be considered as a rival port for the Gulf States, especially UAE and Iran. Sharing of benefits by Pakistan is a major worry for those countries.UAE and Iran have great concern due to close proximity

of Iran's ports Chahbahar/ Bandar Abbas and UAE port of Dubai Port World.

Regional rivalries ranging from border attacks on Iran and development of Chabahar Port invested by India, to traditional tensions between India and Pakistan, hinders the CPEC progress. Security concerns of Afghanistan and past scenarios that project favoritism in Afghan politics, from Pakistani soil such as support to Taliban, U-turns in policy to become Front Line Ally of U.S against war on Afghan soil also add to worsen regional situation. To contain China, U.S perpetuated its proxy war and also its increased influence on India is likely to impede support from regional powers for the project.

CPEC can be beneficial in reducing Indian growing projection in CARs economies while strengthening own trade relations with CARs.

Together with manipulated situation by extra regional forces and regional tensions, law and order situation in Pakistan and political consensus between federal and provincial government demonstrate more doubts about success of project. There has been a series of target killings of educationist, doctors, professionals and foreign investors. Such an impression of terror stricken region results in cautious foreign direct investments. The strategy of the violence, target killings especially skilled and educated, hatred for foreign investors, disruption of development projects and killings of workers, abduction of foreigners dim the prospects of the Kashgar-Gwadar Economic Corridor and gas pipeline projects. In near term, the situation has less chances of significant improvement and will cause negative consequences for Balochistan under umbrella of Baloch nationalism. The cross border trade between China and Pakistan would require an affable policy that encourages business community. Security situation in Pakistan, in the wake of threats from the BLA and ETIM supported by their sympathizers in Pakistan and rising Chinese concerns over security of its nationals in Pakistan are affecting projects executed by Chinese companies in Pakistan.

Only secure and developed region can ensure the active participation of investors and improving import / export of goods. China has been heavily investing in infrastructural projects and has agreed to invest around $ 52 billion in next 5 years.

Recommendations

The prime objective of Pakistan's foreign policy should be to develop promising relations with all major powers and maintain warm political and economic ties with its neighbors. The ultimate success of the CPEC hinges on peaceful regional conditions. Following policy options will work as;

1. Peace full co-existence should be the hall mark of the policy

2. Pakistan, China and other regional countries through interdependency have to converge on mutual interests in order to ensure regional connectivity and integration.
3 Zero tolerance against militancy and terrorism in all its forms is required.
4. The impediments between Pakistan and Afghanistan trade relations must be removed. Pakistan needs to revisit its policy of favoring segments in Afghan power politics and assure its noninvolvement in internal politics of the country. Confidence Building Measures (CBM) must be incorporated to promote closer ties with Afghanistan government. To boost ties, projects like CASA-1000 must be operational which will develop the Central Asia South Asia regional electricity market, (CASAREM) – which is regional energy trade based long term project.
5**.** For accomplishment of un-hindered completion of CPECPakistan should develop stable relations with Iran. The hurdles in relations with Iran happen when Pakistan have pro- Saudi Arabia stance and policies hence the wise course for Pakistan is to adopt a balanced approach towards both Iran and Saudi Arabia. The government of Pakistan must grapple for securing border, to have remedy for sectarian tussle and to address uneasy relations of both the neighbors.
6. Indo-Pak relations have not been on with smooth trajectory since independence. The two countries can be mutually benefited if they start implementing policy of issue resolving. China is one of the India's top trading partner and also investing in India despite the border disputes. Pakistan can use China's influence to incorporate India into the project on later stages. Indian alignment with the project will also reduce the militancy and security concerns in Pakistan.

Conclusion

To conclude, CPEC provides both China and Pakistan with tremendous opportunities for not only improving the trade cooperation between them, but to gain easy access to the resource rich countries of the region and beyond. The accessibility to CARs offers both Pak-China a large market for export of their goods and services and also for CARs to have access to the Chinese eastern ports and Gwadar. The oil and gas pipelines originating from CARs will surely fulfill the demand of energy starved China and energy deficient Pakistan. Pakistan can become regional hub of power if utilises this golden opportunity. Stability in Afghanistan is directly proportional to the success of the project

Moreover, development of the corridor will enhance regional cooperation, public interaction, cultural exchange and tourism. In addition, the establishment of transport network and special economic zones will help eradicate poverty and create economic activities in the rural and deprived areas. Due to the development of trade routes and industrialization astride

the corridor, the immediate and adjoining area will have prosperity and social uplift.

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PAKISTAN'S ROLE IN THE SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION OF AFGHANISTAN IN THE POST 9/11 ERA

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Abstract

Afghanistan has been under a state of war for the past few decades. Wars and the ensuing destruction in the region have badly affected the socio-economic and security environment of the country. The situation in Afghanistan has been equally alarming to the neighboring states, particularly for Pakistan which shares its longest porous border with this war torn country. Cognizant to this fact Pakistan not only fully supported the NATO forces to stem the looming threat of Al -Qaeda and Taliban but have also taken serious interest in the social reconstruction of Afghanistan. The primary focus of this paper is to highlight the role of Pakistan with respect to the social reconstruction of Afghanistan. Here the term "social" broadly employs to some important social sectors of Afghanistan such as communication, health, education, and the hosting of Afghan refugees as well as the nurturing of Afghan businessmen in Pakistan and their contribution to the Afghan socio-economic development. The paper at hand argues that Pakistan, due to its geographical proximity and ethnic similarity with Afghan Pashtun can play significant role in the social reconstruction of Afghanistan. Pakistan's performance in this regard can become more effective if her own security concerns regarding the involvement of hostile countries in Afghanistan are properly addressed by the international community.

Key Words: Social Reconstruction, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Security Environment, Regional peace and Stability.

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Introduction:

For the last about four decades, Afghanistan has been under a state of war. Apart from its human and capital losses these wars have badly affected the social infrastructure of the region. Social sectors like health, education, roads, bridges, power plants and telecommunications etc have been heavily damaged. Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan was reduced to shambles and the administrative structure of Afghanistan badly affected. Millions of Afghan refugees were forced to take shelter in the neighboring countries particularly in Pakistan which has longest porous border with Afghanistan.[1] The objective of this paper is to highlight the efforts and financial support extended by Pakistan for the social reconstruction of Afghanistan in the Post 9/11 era.

Gradually emerging from decades of war and destruction, Afghanistan needs the special attention of the big powers and the neighboring countries, particularly Pakistan to revive and rebuild what it has lost during the past decades. After the fall of Taliban government the first conference regarding the future political setup and peace process in Afghanistan took place in Bon (Germany)[2]. A joint declaration on Regional Peace and Stability was issued which articulated that a secure, stable and peaceful Afghanistan is necessary and important for establishing a secure region. It was articulated to break up the cycle of violence and to transform the highly violent society into a stable state.[3] Being an immediate neighbor of Afghanistan, Pakistan is quite cognizant of her responsibility and therefore, has undertaken various projects for the social reconstruction of Afghanistan. Although, Pakistan has great contribution in this regard, it is quite suspicious of the increasing involvement of India in Afghanistan which grinds its own axis alongside its reconstruction assistance. India's quest to get strategic access to Afghanistan via-Iran[4] has been a main cause of concerns for Pakistan. If Pakistan's concerns regarding the increasing involvement of India in Afghanistan were not properly addressed by the international community it would not only

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[1] Noam Chomsky, *Power and terror: Post 9/11 talks and interviews*, (New York: Vanguard Books, 2003), p.37

[2] Moonis Ahmar. *The Challenges of rebuilding Afghanistan*, (Islamabad: Department of international relations, University of Karachi and Hanns Seidal Foundation), p.213.

[3] Friedeich-Ebert-stiftung (FES) *"Afghanistan Region; 2014 and beyond Joint Declaration Regional Peace and Security,"* (FES, Regional Project Peace and security policy, New Dehli, 2013). Retrieved from *http=//library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez 10307-pdf*

[4] India-Iran Relations: Pragmatic Town" *Economic and Political Weekly*, (Mumbai, April 12, 2001).

affects Pak-Afghan relationship but also hinders the whole reconstruction process.

Social Reconstruction:

Owing to the perpetual war and destruction for about four decades, social sectors in Afghanistan resulted into a very dismal condition. It can be revealed from the fact that in 2003 Afghanistan spent 2.6% of its GDP on education and 0.6% on health which is the lowest allocation globally. Similarly the male and female literacy ratio was 36% and 10% respectively. In Afghanistan expenses per head is USD $1 while in South Asia it is USD $26. In Afghanistan life expectancy is 45 years and the mortality rate of infant stand at 115 per 1000 children.[5]In Afghanistan housing is a big problem and more than 5 million returnees are suffering from this issue. The international organizations should divert their attention towards this important issue, otherwise the returnees will again migrate to neighboring countries and this will cause socio-economic problems in the host countries.
Broadly speaking, the activity necessary for the maintenance and well being of the society can be included in the sphere of social reconstruction. The word "reconstruction" has been defined in several ways. The World Bank defines the post conflict reconstruction as "to try for sustainable and durable peace after the cessation of hostilities in the war affected zone and supporting socio-economic development".[6] It further says that good governance rebuilding of social infrastructure, repairing physical infrastructure and normalizing financial borrowing are the key elements for achieving post conflict reconstruction. The UN definition of reconstruction is more comprehensive which includes peace building activities such as:

> *"The disarmament of all those parties which are part of the war and the restoration of peaceful environment, doing full time effort for the destruction of all types of weapons, rehabilitation of refugees, provision of training to all security personnel, to monitor and ensuring free and fair election, all possible effort for protection of human rights, to leave no stone unturned for making the government institutions strong and their reforms, and supporting all*

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[5] Saifuddin Saihoon, *The State of Afghanistan's Economy, Mass Poverty, Underdevelopment and Legacy of War*: *the Challenge of Rebuilding Afghanistan*, Karachi: Bureau of Composition, (Karachi: University of Karachi, 2005), p. 96.

[6] Sultan Barakat, *After the conflict Reconstruction and development in the aftermath of war, Introduction: Post-war reconstruction and development coming of Age*. (London IB-Tauris and CO. LTD. 2010), P.10.

> *kinds of processes both formal and informal for the purpose of political participation*"[7]

The main difference between the two definitions is that the World Bank emphasis on assisting economic recovery and normalization, whereas the emphasis of UN is on the importance of political reform. All of them are necessary for reconstruction of war torn society and war ravaged country like Afghanistan.

Pakistan has been playing significant role in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. During the past 15 years it has been supporting multiple sectors in Afghanistan such as communication, education, health, banking etc to increase economic growth of the war torn country, and to help in the restoration peace and security in the region. Apart from physical reconstruction, Pakistan has also used soft power policy and invested in capacity building and technical training programs."Soft power means to manage conflicts peacefully and enhancement in economic cooperation." In the present age of globalization, the use of soft power over military means has been gaining ground. The major objective of Pakistan's soft power policy has been to win over the sympathies of Afghan people and to create a vibrant civil society in Afghanistan.[8] This situation will pave the way for rooting out extremism, militancy and terrorism and change the nature of Pak-Afghan relations.

The details of both accomplished as well as the ongoing projects undertaken by Pakistan for the social reconstruction of Afghanistan are as follows.

Communication:

Over the past few decades the communication system in Afghanistan has been in a dilapidated position. A major portion of the communication sector was destroyed during the decade of 1980 by the aerial bombardment of Russian forces. The somewhat remaining portion of roads and bridges were destroyed during the US-led NATO forces heavy aerial bombardment[9] and the Taliban counter attacks in the form of suicide attacks and installation of mines which inflicted great loss to the existing infrastructure. Being a landlocked country Afghanistan largely depends upon the neighboring countries not only for the development of its internal communication system but also for her access to world market. Since the US invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan has been taking keen interest both in the reconstruction of the destroyed and the building of the new communication

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[7] Ibid, p37.

[8] Tehseena Usman, "Corporation without trust : Pakistan's Role in Afghanistan Reconstruction and Future prospect". PUTAJ oriental studies, volume 20, 2013.P.4.

[9] Alamgir Khan KhattakKhattak. "US policy in Afghanistan and its impacts on FATA". *Tigah: A Journal of Peace and Development, 5*(5),(June 2014),133-149.

infrastructure in Afghanistan. Pakistan has provided different kinds of heavy machinery for the construction and maintenance of roads to enhance its trade relations with Afghanistan and to facilitate her access to the Central Asian Republics.

In this regard Pakistan has completed the 75 km long Torkham-Jalalabad road. This project was completed at a cost of $ 34.42 million in 2006 by the FWO (Frontier Works Organization) of Pakistan army.[10] The road consists of five bridges and 184 culverts. After its completion, the bus service between Torkham and Jalalabad has been revived which is a good development in term of trade as well as connecting the people of the two major Afghan cities. Earlier, the same road was repaired thrice by the cooperation of Pakistan. Moreover, in 2007 at the request of Afghan government, the construction of additional carriageway was started by Pakistan between Torkham and Jalalabad. This project also included 184 culverts and 5 bridges and the total cost of Pakistan on this project was $ 72.35 million. Some 75% work of this additional carriageway has been completed.[11]

Besides these mega projects, Pakistan has also constructed several internal roads in Jalalabad worth of $ 4 million. This has not only facilitated the free flow of traffic in Afghanistan but also helped in the connectivity of different small cities. Trade and transportation of goods has become easier. Moreover the feasibility study of Sarobi-Jabal-e-Siraj road has been completed by the National Engineering Services of Pakistan (NESPAK) and the Government of Pakistan is fully committed for its early completion and this will prove to be a back bone in the development of the whole region.

To facilitate the construction works the government of Pakistan has provided different types of road construction machinery to Nangarhar, Kandahar and various other provinces of Afghanistan. This machinery includes motor-graders, pneumatic tire rollers, vibratory road rollers, loaders and standard rollers. The total cost of this project is more than $ 1 million.[12] Pakistan has also provided fifteen weighbridges to the government of Afghanistan. The total cost of this project was $ 10 million that was met from Pakistan's bilateral assistance program. Moreover, 30 mobile hot mixers at the cost of $1.5 million have been provided to the Ministry of Public Works of Afghanistan. All these play a crucial role in the development of communication infrastructure in Afghanistan.

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[10] *The Daily Dawn.* (September14, 2006).

[11] M. Sadiq (Ambassador of Pakistan to Kabul), Journey of Friendship Pakistan's Assistance to Afghanistan, (Kabul: Wazir Akbar Khan, August 2010). p. 10.

[12] Ibid, p11.

Alongside the roads services Pakistan has also showed great interest in the development of the rail services in Afghanistan. Rail service in Afghanistan has been in very poor conditions. To develop this sector Pakistan and Afghanistan jointly approved a rail project that will connect Chaman in Pakistan to Kandahar in Afghanistan. Pakistan will construct Chaman to Spin Boldak Portion of this project at a cost of $12 million. The feasibility study of the Pakistani side of the Chama-Spin Boldak rail link has been completed and the Afghan side yet to be completed. Both the countries signed the memorandum of understanding on May 23, 2007 regarding this very important project. After resolving some relevant technical problems, the Railway Ministry of Pakistan was directed to start the work on the said project and this will be promising development in term of trade and economic relationship between the two countries.[13]

Pakistan has approved Rs 76 million to carry out feasibility studies of Peshawar--Jalalabad rail link. Besides this some other important feasibility studies are under consideration such as rail connectivity between Khost to Bannu via Miranshah and from Helmand city, Bahramcha (Afghanistan) to Gawadar via Yakmuch and Panjgur and this will be the shortest rail connectivity for the purpose of trade and transit between the two countries.[14]

Like road and rail services Pakistan has been taking keen interest in the development of the power and telecommunications sectors of Afghanistan. Pakistan has provided different equipment of more than $ 3 million in this regard. These equipments include: electric poles, electric wire and transformers.[15] By the installation of these systems, there will be greater opportunities for the people of Afghanistan to move towards more stable, peaceful and prosperous society.

Pakistan has provided Television transmitter to Kandahar Province at a cost of US $ 0.051 million.[16] In May 2004, Pakistan has established its offices for AVT Khyber in Kabul, Jalalabad, and Qandahar. Rafiq Dhehzad, who is Pukhtoon from Jalalabad is representative of AVT Khyber. This channel gives frequent coverage to trade, agriculture, defense and sports related activities. Bondage of Hearts program is also transmitted by AVT Khyber regarding Pak- Afghan. It gave special coverage to *Nauroz* (a religious festival) and Independence Day of Afghanistan".[17] Pakistan is taking keen interest in development of Afghanistan and in this regard media can play an effective role in the projection of such feelings.

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[13] Ibid,p.14.
[14] *The Daily Dawn*, (January 17, 2016).
[15] *The News*, (March 21, 2016).
[16] M. Sadiq, Op-cit, pp.36-37.
[17] Author Interview with Mubarik Ali—Controller of Khyber News Islamabad, Islamabad: May 9, 2018.

Pakistan's contribution in the reconstruction of communication infrastructure in Afghanistan will not only help to join the different cities but also pave way for a stable, peaceful and secure Afghanistan. This will make easier for the people to people contact of the two countries. The trade and economic activities in the region will be increased which will improve over-all life of the people living on both sides of the border. These communication facilities will provide better access to the Central Asian Republics (CARs). Trade opportunities with CARs will increase economic growth of both the countries and will be utilized to exploit the natural resources of CARs and to fulfill the energy requirement of Pakistan. Afghanistan and CARs will be connected through CPEC to Gawader port for trade. This will bring well-being and prosperity in the whole region and it will prove a game changer in the whole region.

Health:

Health sector is one of the most important social indicators which shows the development or under development of a society. Health facilities in Afghanistan were already in poor condition, however, for the past four decades due to the persistent crisis in the region this sector has reached to its nadir. It needed an immediate attention and huge financial support of international community. Since the past more than 15 years Pakistan has been actively participating in the development of health sector in Afghanistan so that the people of Afghanistan have all kinds of health related facilities inside their country. This will save their time and money from travelling abroad and can utilize all these resources for the improvement of their social life. According to one estimate more than 90% people from Afghanistan visit Pakistan for the purpose of medical treatment. Most of these Afghan patients get their treatment in the major hospitals at Peshawar and Quetta.[18] Pakistan has started various health related projects in metropolitan cities of Afghanistan in order to provide health facilities at their door steps.

Both the countries have agreed to work jointly for the eradication of Polio virus. For this purpose, a polio campaign was started in both countries on the same day so that all the children get polio vaccination against on both sides of the boarder. Special teams for vaccination have been formed between the two countries. The health ministries of both the countries agreed to meet on quarterly basis by video conferences and through biannual meetings in persons.[19]

[18] Tehseena Usman . Opcit. P.5
[19] *The Daily Dawn*, (January 8, 2016)

To support the health sector of Afghanistan, the Government of Pakistan laid the foundation stone of four hundred beds Jinnah Hospital at Kabul on October 10, 2007. This building has been completed at the cost of $ 20 million. Fund for this project was met by the Pakistan's bilateral assistance program. Pakistan has trained doctors, paramedics and other staff for the hospital and for this purpose a separate grant has been provided. For the construction of this hospital, 25 acres of land have been provided by the government of Afghanistan.[20]

Jinnah hospital at Kabul has been well equipped with the modern health facilities such as Thalesemia Centre, Dialysis centre, Diagnostics, OPD, Gynae ward, Emergency Unit, ICU and CCU Departments, Surgical suit, Food Services Department etc. General Support Services of the hospital include: Water Tanks, fire alarm and nurse call system, lifts and stairs, administration offices, stores, Pharmacy, laundry, pump house and septic tank, central sterile supply department, five 1000 KvA Generators, and 2 tube wells, etc.[21]

Apart from Jinnah hospital another most important health project was initiated by Pakistani government at Jalalabad. The Nishtar Kidney Center at Jalalabad has been completed by Pakistan in summer 2010 at the cost of $ 7 million.[22] Similarly the Sindh Institute of Urology and Transplantation (SIUT) Karachi has been providing training to the Afghan doctors and other staff in order to run this hospital. Some of the important health facilities provided at Nishtar Kidney Centre includes: 24 hour OPD, Operation Theatre, Emergency Unit, ICU, Dialysis unit, surgical wards, Diagnostics unit, Blood Bank, Laboratory, X-ray, Ultrasound, Transplantation unit with Operation Theater and allied facilities. Apart from these basic facilities, the hospital also provides some important general facilities which include: tube-well, administration offices, water tank, central sterile supply department, pharmacy, nurse call system, fire alarm system, three 300 Kv generators for backup power supply, pump house, kitchen, laundry and septic tank with two soakage wells etc.[23]

Similarly in November 2008 Pakistan started another project known as Naeb Aminullah Khan Hospital at Logar (Afghanistan) which was completed at the cost of $ 20 million. This hospital is well equipped with different kind of facilities such as: OPD; causality department; radiology department; pathology department; operation theatre; delivery suite; rehabilitation centre; and morgue etc. General support services in this hospital include: central sterile supply department, administration offices,

[20] M. Sadiq, Op-cit, p7.
[21] Ibid,p9.
[22] Ibid,pp.17-18.
[23] Ibid,pp. 21-22.

laundry, pharmacy, tube well, dining area, and water tank, transformers and generator etc.[24]

Pakistani government has been working on different health projects in Afghanistan such as Artificial Limb Centre at Badakh Shah, Al-Shifa eye hospitals in Kunduz and Gardez and Syed Ahmad Shaheed Hospital. All these under construction projects are fully supported by Pakistani government out of its meager resources. Pakistan has established free eye camp in Jalalabad which provides medical treatment to the Afghan citizen at their door step. Pakistan has donated 45 ambulances and 14 fully equipped medical units to the various provinces in Afghanistan. These two donations cost Pakistan $ 4-5 million and $ 1 million respectively.[25]Apart from the government donation, Edhi Foundation--the Pakistan's largest Philanthropic organization-- has donated 50 ambulances to the different hospitals in Afghanistan.

In 2008 Pakistan allocated Rs. 45 million for the construction of dispensaries in different parts of Afghanistan to provide health facilities at door step. By developing social security system of Afghanistan and investment in health and education system, Taliban insurgency in different parts of Afghanistan can either be minimized or reversed, which will help in the economic stability of the region.

The contribution of Pakistani government is not only limited to the health sector within Afghanistan, it has also been providing healthcare support to the Afghan refugees living in Pakistan. As a result of Afghan war some more than 3 million Afghan refugees migrated to Pakistan. Though there numbers have been reduced since the past few years, there is still a significant portion of Afghan refugees living in different parts of Pakistan. All of them are getting free treatment from the government hospitals throughout Pakistan. Pakistan has set up 66 Basic Health Unit in different refugee Camps for Afghan refugees. Since the USSR invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Pakistan has spent more than $ 2 billion from its own resources on the health care and treatment of the Afghan citizens living in Pakistan.[26] And this also evident from the fact that only in 2009 Pakistan Embassy in Kabul and its consulates at Kandahar, Heart, Mazar-e-Sharif and Jalalabad have given more than 130,000 visas to the people of Afghanistan.[27] Majority of them got their visa for medical treatment and have been provided free medical treatment in Pakistan. Besides this Pakistan's Philanthropic organizations also provided free medical treatment

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[24] "Burdened economy: Pakistan medical aid to Afghanistan", *The express Tribune*, (Islamanad:October 26, 2013).
[25] M. Said, Op-cit, p.23.
[26] "Burdon of Afghan refugees", *The Express Tribune.* (November 6, 2013).
[27] *The Express tribune*, (December,13, 2013).

to the people of Afghanistan. They have been provided free eye surgeries and 30,000 Afghan patients are treated every year by such an organization.

The provision of quality health services is a great challenge in the war ravaged country of Afghanistan. The basic aim behind the provision of better health facilities is to improve the health of its citizens, so that they could utilize their energies and resources for the reconstruction of Afghanistan and bring themselves to the mainstream of life. Moreover, this will also reduced the pressure of Afghan patients on Pakistani hospitals particularly those functioning in KPK, i.e. LRH, Khyber Teaching Hospitals, North West etc.

Education:

Education plays vital role in the development of a society. It is one of the key factors behind all the social changes taking place in any region. The higher the literacy ratio of the citizens the greater will be the socio-economic prosperity of that region. Pakistan has mainly focused on the basic and higher education of the Afghan children and youth. Pakistan has completed several educational projects in different parts of Afghanistan in order to impart quality education to the Afghan children.

Rehman Baba High School, Kabul:

Pakistan has completed the construction of Rehman Baba High School in Kabul and it was the first educational project by the government of Pakistan. The cost of this project was US $ 4 million and it was completed by the end of April 2008. The school is equipped with different modern facilities such as 33 class rooms, well furnished laboratories one each for the subject of biology, chemistry, physics and two computer laboratories, staff room, library, principle office, art room, clerical staff room, canteen, first aid room, tube well with pump house, 400 Kv transformer and diesel generator store, furniture for offices and class-rooms etc.[28]

There are 1200 students in Rehman Baba High School and majority of them are from Southern and Eastern parts of Afghanistan where the facilities for education are very limited. Moreover, the Government of Pakistan has also constructed Rehman Baba Hostel in Kabul which has the capacity to accommodate up to 1500 students and the total estimated cost of this project was $ 15.86 million. Furniture to the hostel has also been provided by Pakistan. The hostel provides facilities such as a seminar hall, 3 dining halls, 4 recreation halls, 4 kitchen and 3 stores.

Allama Iqbal Faculty of Humanities, Kabul University:

Pakistan has opened new faculties in different universities of Afghanistan. The Allama Iqbal faculty of humanities at Kabul University

[28] Tehseena Usman, Op-cit, p34.

was completed in summer 2009. The total estimated cost of this project was US $ 10 million.[29] Some of the major facilities provided in Iqbal faculty in Kabul University include: class rooms to accommodate up to 2400 students,4 syndicate rooms, 2 offices, 48 professors/ associate professors 'rooms, library, seminar halls – each with a seating capacity of 1753, workshops studios, tube-well along with generator and 2 computer laboratories.

Liaqat Ali Khan Engineering Faculty, Balkh University:

Engineering Faculty building was constructed in the new campus of Balkh University, Mazar-e- Sharif by the cooperation of Pakistan. The cost of this project was US $ 10 million. The students of this Engineering Faculty now play an important role in the different reconstruction projects within Afghanistan. The faculty is equipped with modern facilities such as: 58 class rooms, 32 laboratories, 8 dean offices, 24 teacher offices, tube well, 13 warehouses and technical shops, Two 250 Kv generators and 4 Tea rooms.[30]

Sir Syed Post Graduate Faculty of Sciences, Nangarhar University, Jalalabad

The faculty of sciences was completed at Nangarhar University Jalalabad by the Government of Pakistan with the cost of $ 5 million. The students of this university have been contributing to the social reconstruction of Afghanistan in different fields. This building has modern facilities such as 24 classrooms, Science Laboratories, 2 Seminar halls, 8 Staff rooms, 3 Syndicate rooms, 32 Professors/Assistant Professors Office, Library, 4 Head of Department rooms, Tube Well, 400 KvA generator and 5 Administration staff office.[31]

Besides this Pakistan has started the construction of primary schools in different districts of Afghanistan. Initially, four primary schools were constructed of the same designs in Herat, Wardak, Kandahar and Baghlan provinces. The cost of each school was US $ 200,000 and each school has been furnished with modern facilities such as: 8 classrooms, Principal's office, Play area, Staff room and 2 sets of toilets. For the development of human skills in Afghanistan, Pakistan has started construction of vocational training institutions in the different parts of Afghanistan. First such vocational training institution was established at the old Pakistan embassy

[29] Ibid,p.6.
[30] Ibid,p.8
[31] Ibid,p.9.

compound in Kart-e-Parwan area of Kabul. These vocational institutions offer different skills to the Afghan students such as basic computer literacy, stitching and blacksmithing, carpentry, electrician training etc. For improving the proficiency of Afghan students in English, special language courses have been offered in these institutions.[32]

Pakistan has donated 300,000 students' kits and 2800 advanced computer system to the different organizations in Afghanistan during 2005-2006. Moreover, Pakistan has also provided 2000 fully funded scholarship to the Afghan students for graduate and post-graduate studies in the fields of information technology, engineering, medicine, economics, natural sciences, computer sciences, agriculture, business administration, and teaching.[33]

In addition, 2800 Afghans were educated from different academic institutions in Pakistan during the last thirty years. They have been contributing to the social and economic progress of Afghanistan and are utilizing their energies and resources for the well-being and prosperity of the nation. More than 6000 Afghan students are enrolled in different educational institutions of Pakistan. Similarly, 50,000 children of Afghan refugees are getting education in various schools of Pakistan. Various NGOs of Afghanistan have been given permission to open schools for Afghan students in Pakistan. Presently, some 428 such schools both (Primary and High) are working in different cities of Pakistan with the Afghan curricula.[34] Since 1979, Pakistan has opened different types of educational institution for the students of Afghanistan. Pakistan welcomed Afghans students to their government and private schools, professional colleges and training institutions. The number of Afghan students in Pakistani universities is on the rise since the past 15 years. The different public and private sectors universities of Pakistan offering admission to the Afghan students in higher studies are for example, Peshawar University (Peshawar), University of Engineering and technology (Peshawar),Preston University (Peshawar), Agriculture University (Peshawar), Agriculture University (Faisalabad), Iqra University (Peshawar) and International Islamic University (Islamabad).[35]

In the Province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 42 technical training institutions have been opened in the refugee camps, which have enrolled 10,686 Afghan students. The courses of physiotherapy, English language, computer literacy, Para-medicine are offered in these institutions.[36]Pakistan's contribution to the Afghans in the provision of skill development and education is unmatched. Other countries have accepted Afghans in limited number while Pakistan has adopted an open door policy

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[32] Ibis,' pp.5-6
[33] *The Daily Pakistan*, August 28th, 2010.
[34] Tehseena Usman, Op-cit, p18.
[35] Ibid, p.21.
[36] M. Sadiq, Op-cit, p16.

for Afghan students at all levels. Pakistan's role in constructing educational institutions in Afghanistan and promotion of education is of great significance in order to well equip the Afghan citizens from the modern day requirement of education.

Sheltering and caring of Afghan Refugees:

The mobility of Afghans along the Pak-Afghan border was already on the way even before the communists' coup in Afghanistan. They lived with their families on one side and did their employment on the other. They considered themselves on both sides of the boarder at home.[37]These movements across the border of Pak-Afghan were never highlighted and focused on in the print and electronic media as it did not disturb the life of the people living across the Pak-Afghan border. However, after the USSR invasion of Afghanistan the flow of Afghan refugees to Pakistan considerably increased. By 1980 the number of Afghan refugees in Pakistan reached to 5.5 million. In 2002, 3.5 million refugees have been repatriated back to Afghanistan voluntarily but 37 percent have returned to Pakistan within weeks[38] because of the non availability of houses, unemployment, health and education problems. More than 3 million refugees are still living in Pakistan.[39]

A Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the Government of Pakistan and UNHCR as a result of which Afghan refugees were not only registered but also provided with PRC (Proof of Registration Cards). At the start, the requirement of refugees was fulfilled alone by the Government of Pakistan and later on UN and other donor agencies also contributed in the accommodation of refugees. In the past three decades, Pakistan has spent an average US $ 400 million from its own resources.[40] Moreover, for safeguarding the rights of Afghan refugees, Pakistan has established a commission at the federal, provincial and local level under the Ministry of States Frontier Region and Northern Areas (SAFRON). Pakistan has contributed US $ 1 million to the registration of Afghan refugees and US $ 5 million to the UNHCR supported registration programs.[41] Despite these efforts there is still uncertainty among the Afghan refugees regarding their future direction. Repatriation to the war ravaged country has taken place

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[37] Ghulam umar, "The Refuges Problem: An Over view," *Pakistan Horizon*, no. xxxviii(1), 1985. (Karachi: Pakistan institute of International Affairs). P.25.
[38]*The Express Tribune*, (October 3, 2016).
[39] Afghan Refugees in Pakistan await extension of repatriation deadline, *The Express Tribune*, (Islamabad, June 18, 2013).
[40] M. Sadiq, Op-cit, p.26.
[41] Ministry of SAFRON, *Report on Afghan refuges 2016*, Prime Minister Secretariat Islamabad.

amidst economic instability and insecurity. The donor countries particularly the US should help Afghanistan to take all necessary steps on emergency basis in order to reintegrate the returnees and prevent their movement back to Pakistan and other neighboring countries.

Conclusion

In view of the above findings, it can be concluded that Pakistan has significant role in the reconstruction project of Afghanistan initiated by US and the donor countries since 2001. Cognizant to the spill-over affects of the ongoing war in Afghanistan, Pakistan has taken every possible effort ranging from financial support of the different social sectors in Afghanistan to the full fledge military operations against the militants in the erstwhile FATA and PATA. The impacts of this policy are quite visible at mass level in Afghanistan but at governmental level its desired results have not been accrued as yet. This is largely because that the different actors involved in Afghanistan are pursuing their divergent interests alongside their financial support. In the absence of a sincere and monolithic approach among the donor countries the agenda of reconstructing Afghanistan is likely to remain incomplete. The donor countries must realize the changing phenomenon and should focus more on the interest of the war torn Afghan people than pursuing their own specific and often divergent interests.

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SWAT STATE AND BOLSHEVIK MOVEMENT[1]

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Abstract

Swat State was formally established in 1915 by the first ruler of Swat State, Syed Abdul Jabar Shah. In the month of September 1917 he was dethroned on account of his alleged attachment with Qadyani/Ahmadi sect. After his removal from rule and subsequent exile, Miangul Abdul Wadud was installed as ruler of Swat in the month of September 1917. Swat State was recognized by the British Government in 1926. The recognition was granted with the condition that the state's rulers will not act against the British Government. When in 1917 the Bolshevik Movement emerged in Russia, it also influenced Swat and surrounding areas. Some people were found here who had affiliation with Bolshevik Movement. The colonial government's confidential records also show that some people of Swat were involved in secret activities of Bolshevik Movement. This article analyzes the expansion of Bolshevik Movement from Russia and Central Asia via Afghanistan to the frontier regions including Swat State. This paper also describes the steps taken by the British Government to control the activities of this movement.

Key Words: Swat State, Bolshevism, Russian Revolution, Afghanistan, Pakhtunkhwa.

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Introduction

Two great colonial powers of the world, the British and the Russians, were trying to extend towards each other as well as to defend and protect themselves from each other. In early twentieth century, Bolshevik Revolution started in Russia in 1917 and started to spread rapidly towards Central Asia and South Asia. Three groups of the society namely peasants, workers and soldiers, started challenging the anarchy and autocracy. This revolution was not only based on the philosophy of Karal Marx but on different experiences of intellectual, political and artistic nature of literati and artists. The main protagonists of this movement want its extension especially towards the colonies. During its expansion towards South Asia, its activities have also been noted in Swat State and surrounding areas. Swat State was established in 1915 by Syed Abdul Jabar Shah and after two years, in 1917, he was dethroned and Miangul Abdul Wadud was installed as ruler of Swat. British Government recognized Swat State in 1926 with the condition that the State's rulers will not involve themselves in the activities against British Government. British Government had a fear of extension of Bolshevik Movement towards their territories.

Opposing the extension of Bolshevism towards India has its roots in the fear of the British from Russia. The first Anglo-Afghan war was also caused due to this behavior. At that time Dost Muhammad Khan has 'pro-Persian sentiments' and 'hostile attitude towards the British ally Ranjit Singh'.[2] There were Russian soldiers and advisors in the army of Muhammad Shah Qajar that also increased the British fear that 'with the fall of Herat all of western Afghanistan, including Qandahar, would come under Russian influence.'[3]

Due to these historical reasons, the British government was very closely observing the activities of the Bolshevists in the Swat State. Despite the assurance of the rulers of Swat State, the British government was always observing the suspected activities of Bolshevik Movement.

Background of Bolshevik Movement

The Bolsheviks, Bolshevists or Bolshevik literally meaning "one of the majority", were a faction of the Marxist Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (RSDLP) which got separated from the Menshevik faction at the Second Party Congress in 1903. In 1903, there was a conference of the

[2] Noelle, Christine. ***State and Tribe in Nineteenth-Century Afghanistan: The Reign of Amir Dost Muhammad Khan (1826-1863)***, Curzon Press, 1997, p. 39

[3] Noelle, Christine. P.40

United Russian Social Democratic Party in London. All of the members of this conference divided into two parts on account of the strong interference of the Lenin. In this conference Lenin was of the opinion not to extend cooperation with the moderates and wanted a violent class war. He tried his best to manage a plan to get a temporary majority of the members. That is why that after that time the followers of Lenin called themselves Bolsheviks. Bolshevik is a Russian word which means 'majority'. Those who were in opposition of the Bolsheviks were known as Mensheviks, also a Russian word for minority. Although the professional revolutionaries and more strong groups in the party of Lenin were minority but they were calling themselves Bolsheviks.[4] The Russian Social Democratic Party (RSDLP) was a revolutionary socialist political party. It was formed in 1898 in Minsk in Belarus to unite the different organizations, working for revolution in the Russian Empire, into one party. In the Second Party Congress vote, the Bolsheviks won on the majority of important issues. That is why they are called Bolsheviks. Although at that time the Bolsheviks were not in majority (despite their name as mentioned above) on the soviets' Lenin was hopeful and he has speculated that they will get the support of both the public and of the workers. He was also sure that the people of both the urban as well as of the rural areas will support them. Besides, he also made it clear that the efforts for the revolution in March were not enough and in continuation of these efforts he has started struggles for another revolution and these efforts for the second time will help them in getting the goals. In this way he created favorable circumstances for the revolution which came in November and brought them (Bolsheviks) into power.[5] At last they became the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

A Marxist revolution came into existence by the situation and circumstances of the World War first. A rural society enabled this revolution. In this overwhelmingly rustic and rural society, on a small scale, there was urban and industrial development. All these internal and external factors paved the way for sudden changes in economic management and in the pattern of government. Great Russian Revolution or October Revolution is based on the philosophy of Karl Marx who believed in classless society, equal rights and equal opportunities. But It is also said that this revolution was not only based on the idea of Karl Marx but on different experiences of intellectual, political and artistic nature of literati and artists. Karl Marx was of the opinion that work (physical and mental) should be defined and accordingly wages should be awarded. This philosophy is based on social justice and economic distribution. Marx emphasized implementing this model in colonial societies because these societies were being exploited more. With

[4] S.Reed Brett, *European History 1900-1960*. London, John Murray: 1967, p. 122
[5] S.Reed Brett, *European History 1900-1960*. London, John Murray: 1967, p. 123

emergence of this revolution in Russia, new signs, symbols, beliefs and values emerged. These new emerged signs, symbols, values and beliefs influenced the political, economic, cultural, artistic and linguistic landscape. Before the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, there was a gap between the state and intelligentsia. This revolution overthrew the Tsarist's autocracy. It was a universal communist ideology of revolution for a classless society and social justice in the world.

Before the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, there was anarchy and autocracy. Three groups of the society started challenging this anarchy and autocracy of the Tsarist state. They were peasants, workers and soldiers. Later on this idea reached everyone and thus it left deep artistic, social, spiritual and cultural influences on the mind of people. The influences of this revolution were not limited only to Russia and surrounding areas but worldwide. Finally, the three classes mentioned above, succeeded in defeating this autocracy and anarchy and achieved a classless society. Among the main protagonists of these efforts were Lenin and Tolstoy etc.

There are many phases of the Russian revolution. Among them the most significant one is that of October 1917, which brought the Bolsheviks or Reds[6] into power. Consequently in October 1917, they founded the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR). There was general discontent with the Government by the autumn of 1917. It had neither achieved success according to the wishes of the people. People wished to take Russia out of the war. The clamour of peasants for land was an important issue in which the government could not succeed to pacify and satisfy the peasants. This displeasure of the peasants and discontent of the deprived class of the society continued. There were also some groups who wanted to use these discontented people for their own purposes. In that time the instruments ready to hand were the soviets[7]. The supreme leader was Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov whose simpler pen-name was Lenin.[8] The main purpose of Bolsheviks at that time was getting peace and law and order. Peace was essential for the Bolsheviks to continue and implement their plans. At that time the Russian people also wanted peace and law and order. Lenin knew

[6] Because of the red [colour] of their uniforms, the Khudai Khidmatgars were lumped together with the Bolsheviks and adherents of Bolshevism by the British. (Sultan-i-Rome, The North-West Frontier (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) Essays on History, Karachi, Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 252). Ghafar Khan has contended that, until that time, they did not know that the Bolsheviks had red uniform and that they had adopted the red uniform accidentally: also, till then, neither had he read a book by Marx, Lenin, or Gandhi, nor did he know about them. (Sultan-i-Rome, The North-West Frontier (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) Essays on History, Karachi, Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 261)

[7] Councils for the discussion of their needs and to express their views. (S.Reed Brett, European History 1900-1960. London, John Murray: 1967, 120)

[8] S.Reed Brett, *European History 1900-1960*. London, John Murray: 1967, p. 121

the priorities and psychology of the people. He also knew that if the people were not satisfied with the Bolsheviks' process of bringing peace they would bring to an end the Bolsheviks as they had swept their predecessors.[9]

The Bolsheviks, founded by Vladimir Lenin and Alexander Bogdanov, were by 1905 a major organization consisting primarily of workers under a democratic internal hierarchy governed by the principle of democratic centralism, who considered themselves the leaders of the revolutionary working class of Russia. Their beliefs and practices were often referred to as Bolshevism. 7th November 1917 was a concluding day as this was the day on which an All Russian Congress of Soviets meeting was going to be held at Petrograd. One night before this meeting the Bolshevik, troops were sent to key places and points like railway stations, the offices of telegraph and telephone, power plants etc. The Petrograd garrison recognized the authority of the Revolutionary Committee of the Soviets. Thus the Leninists gained control of the Provincial Government persons who were seized except for Kerensky who managed to escape.[10]

Expansion of Bolshevik Movement from Central Asia to South Asia

It was such a strong movement that in a very short time it reached far and wide and left lasting impacts. The European countries started fearing from these new revolutionary ideas because these ideas were in contrast to the vested interests of capitalism. With this revolution, new ideas, theories and philosophies emerged. It was a challenge for the west to face these new theories and ideas. It was a threat not only for capitalism but for all of its institutions. To face this revolution, a counter revolution was started. A conflict started between the two ideologies and thus the world divided into two camps. These two camps continued their struggle on every point from local to regional and global. When protagonists of the Russian revolution (Bolsheviks) started spreading this movement to the other parts of the world, they faced a strong opposition from the European countries where capitalism was in vogue.

Although the anti-communists groups were very strong and they were opposing from different angles but at least the voice reached those who were being exploited by the elites in class based societies. These exploited communities also started asking different types of questions about society and economic distribution and social injustice. This revolution changed even basic perceptions related to education and peace etc.

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[9] Ibid.,p. 124
[10] S.Reed Brett, *European History 1900-1960*. London, John Murray: 1967, 123-24

Firstly the influences of this revolution reached to those countries that were near to Russia. It has also reached to Afghanistan. It left its lasting impacts on Afghanistan. All the top leadership of People Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), have observed and studied this system in Russia and they have been impressed by this new idea of communism. Its impact is more visible on Central and South Asia. This impact reached to South Asia through Central Asia because modernity was imposed on it and it was perfectly sovietised. Progressive literary and political movements, trade unions and communist parties emerged in South Asia. Now the fear of capitalists increased manifold.

This revolution changed the basic perceptions of the people. It left deep artistic, social, spiritual and cultural influences on the mind of peoples. Its impact is more visible on central and South Asia. When the west started thinking how to counter this ideology, they adopted different strategies to encounter it from various angles. The capitalists funded different propaganda organizations and started executing it from social, economic and religious fields. They also started writing and spreading propaganda literature in different languages of the world. They mainly opposed this ideology through intellectual channels. To encounter socialism or communism in Afghanistan, a centre for producing propaganda literature was established in Peshawar. The name of this organization was Writers Union for Free Afghanistan. This organization was regularly publishing a magazine, called WUFA. Animal Farm has also been translated into Pashto language and published by this organization.[11] This revolution brought positive as well as negative effects to our society.

Bolshevism in Afghanistan

Bolshevik revolution spread rapidly in Asia. This revolution "played the same role in Asia as the French Revolution in Europe."[12] Although the educated people in different countries of Asia such as the Central Asian States, Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan were not impressed by the different terms and ideologies used for this revolution as Bolshevism, Marxism, and Leninism, but they were impressed by one thing and that was revolution. [13] People were trying to interpret the ideas and concepts of this revolution according to their own concepts. They were looking into this movement

[11] It is a novella written by George Orwell, first published in England in 1945.
[12] Marwat, Fazal ur Rahim, ***The Bolshevik Revolution and Afghanistan (A Case Study of Afghan, Indian and Soviet Publication)***, in 'Pashto', Peshawar, Pashto Academy University of Peshawar, Vol. 42, No. 645 (July-December 2013), p. 6
[13] Ibid., p. 8

from anti-imperialist and general democratic positions and were not looking into it from class perspective. [14] Whatever interpretation was made of this ideology the fact is that it influenced many aspects of society.

Mainly people of the educated and intellectual class in Afghanistan were affiliated with communism and Bolshevism. Bolshevism provided to the elites an organization scheme and they started expressing their dissent through this organization scheme. They considered Bolshevism a very clear path against their masters as well as a key to the future. [15] Bolshevism reached Afghanistan through propaganda reports, Central Asian publications and individual merchants and travelers from Central Asia. Although these reports were biased, policy oriented and exaggerated.[16] About the Afghan Amir Habibullah Khan and Bolshevik Revolution he writes:

> The pro-British Amir and his corrupt officials kept silence over the upheaval in their neighborhood and the Amir still stuck to his pro-British policy in neutrality in the First World War. But the constitutionalists, the young Afghans and nationalists "greeted the revolution with enthusiasm." [17]

The Indian revolutionaries migrated to Tashkent, Kabul and other areas used this revolution for a struggle of independence from British colonial power. [18]

Bolshevists also tried to attract Afghan and Indian revolutionaries. Among the Indian revolutionaries, Barkatullah Bhopali and M.Pratap were propagating in favour of Bolshevism in Afghanistan, India and Central Asia. They wrote booklets and pamphlets against British and in support of this movement. Abdur Rab Berq Peshawari, Pratap Acharia, Barkatullah and Obaidullah Sindhi were among the prominent persons who were cultivating close relations between Bolshevik Russia and Afghanistan and spreading Bolshevism in India and Afghanistan.[19] One of the telegrams from Bravin to

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[14] Marwat, Fazal ur Rahim, ***The Bolshevik Revolution and Afghanistan (A Case Study of Afghan, Indian and Soviet Publication)***, in 'Pashto', Peshawar, Pashto Academy University of Peshawar, Vol. 42, No. 645 (July-December 2013), p.. 7

[15] Ibid., p. 8

[16] Ibid., p. 8

[17] Marwat, Fazal ur Rahim, ***The Bolshevik Revolution and Afghanistan (A Case Study of Afghan, Indian and Soviet Publication)***, in 'Pashto', Peshawar, Pashto Academy University of Peshawar, Vol. 42, No. 645 (July-December 2013), p. 8

[18] Akbar, Abdul Akbar Khan, ***Safar Nama Rusi Turkestan 1920-21*** (Urdu), pp.78,88,82,112

[19] Marwat, Fazal ur Rahim, ***The Bolshevik Revolution and Afghanistan (A Case Study of Afghan, Indian and Soviet Publication)***, in 'Pashto', Peshawar, Pashto Academy University of Peshawar, Vol. 42, No. 645 (July-December 2013), p. 11

the Eastern propaganda department On 21 May, 1919, Tashkent, intercepted by the British Agent in Tashkent, quoted by Marwat revealed:

> Barakatullah should be reminded that he promised to write a pamphlet on 'Bolshevism in Koran [Quran]', that this work be expedited and that special courier should be sent urgently with 100,000 copies printed in Arabic, Hindustani and Persian. [20]

Amanullah was an active member of Young Afghan Party. His foreign policy was supported by Indian revolutionaries based in Kabul and Young Afghans. He has three distinct aspects of his foreign policy: establishment and maintaining good relation with Bolshevik Russia, normalization of relation with Britain and solidarity with Muslim world and other free countries.[21]

Amanullah's diplomatic relations with Bolshevik Russia is evident from the following passage:

> On 7th April, 1919 the Afghan government again dispatched two letters to Moscow. One was a personal letter of Amir Amanullah and the other from Mahmud Tarzi, the Foreign Minister of Afghanistan to his Soviet counterpart G.V. Chicherin expressing a desire to develop and strengthen friendly relations between the two countries. Amir says, he "seizes the occasion of his ascending the throne of Afghanistan to announce to Russian Republic his strong adherence to the principles of equality of all men and peaceful union of all people. Hitherto Afghanistan has stood apart from all other nations but now the standard of Bolshevism has been raised by Russia." He hopes that the "honoured president of Russian Republic will not refuse to accept my friendly greetings." [22]

Due to these friendly relations with Bolshevik Russia, she recognized Amanullah's accession to the throne and independence of Afghanistan. [23]

Commenting on a Soviet-Afghan Treaty, Lenin wrote to Amanullah:

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[20] Ibid., p. 13
[21] Ibid., p. 14
[22] Marwat, Fazal ur Rahim, ***The Bolshevik Revolution and Afghanistan (A Case Study of Afghan, Indian and Soviet Publication)***, in 'Pashto', Peshawar, Pashto Academy University of Peshawar, Vol. 42, No. 645 (July-December 2013), p. 16
[23] Ibid., p. 16

> The treaty between the two states has formally consolidated the friendship and mutual sympathies which have for two years already been developing and strengthening between Afghanistan and Russia….the two states value their independence and want to see each other and all peoples of the East… there are no issues between Afghanistan and Russia that might cause disagreement and cast a shadow on Russo-Afghan friendship. The old imperialist Russia has disappeared never to return and a new Soviet Russia that has stretched a hand of friendship and fraternity to all peoples of the East and first and foremost to the Afghan people…we are happy to note that the first treaty of friendship which the Afghan people concluded was a treaty with Russia. [24]

The attitudes of the two states and their perception of development in Central Asia clouded the friendly relation[1]s between Russia and Afghanistan. It happened when the Bolshevik authorities tried to reinterpret the ideas of 'self-determination' to the Muslims of Central Asia. That is why Amanullah and his allies supported the cause of Central Asian Muslims and extended his cooperation with anti-Bolshevik Basmachis. [25] Commenting on the relations between Afghanistan and Bolshevik Russia, Marwat writes:

> The ebb and flow in the relations between Afghanistan and the Bolshevik Russia during the years 1917-1929 was the natural corollary of the internal political changes as well as global political developments. The Bolsheviks shattered the myth of the might of Tsarism in the form of Bolshevik revolution in Russia and were trying to spread their own ideology through different means. They tried to use Afghanistan as a spring board for their anti-British activities, while Afghanistan rising from strict isolation to defensive neutralism contributed a lot in promoting the Soviet objectives in the Indian subcontinent. [26]

[24] Ibid., p. 19
[25] Ibid., p. 19
[26] Marwat, Fazal ur Rahim, ***The Bolshevik Revolution and Afghanistan (A Case Study of Afghan, Indian and Soviet Publication)***, in 'Pashto', Peshawar, Pashto Academy University of Peshawar, Vol. 42, No. 645 (July-December 2013), p. 25

Impact of Bolshevik Movement on NWFP (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa)

Bolshevik movement has its impact on the peasant movements of NWFP (presently called KP), started in Ghala Dher Mardan in August 1938[27] and in Shumali Hashtnagar in 1970-78.[28] The member of the Peasents' Movement started in 1938 in Ghalla Dher Mardan also started joining Khudai Khidmatgar Movement (servants of God, formed in 1929). Although these peasants had economic hardships they participated in freedom movement during 1929-30. They were joining all these movements on account of their own economic exploitation for example high rents, taxes evictions and so on. [29] It is said that the leaders of the peasant movement have taken inspiration from different worldly movements including Marxism, Bolshevism of Russia etc. [30] In this regard Sarfraz Khan writes in the following words:

> Bolshevik Russian peasant programme of R.S.D.L.P., had a great impact upon programme of peasant movements in NWFP [now called Khyber Pakhtunkhwa]. Numerous national progressive young men from NWFP who had studied at the University of Toilers, Moscow, in 1920s and inspired by the Russian Bolshevism subsequently joined the spontaneous peasant movement of Ghalla Dher, in 1938. They collaborated with local peasant leaders and shaped list of peasant demands. The peasant movement and their leaders were much influenced by local political movements such as the KKM [Khudai Khidmatgar Movement] and the Congress Socialist Party. Their struggle has been peaceful and political in nature. Hence, the impact of these peasant movements remained limited. They advocated forbidding forced eviction, withdrawal of heavy taxes, fines and practices such as Tora and Malba taxes etc. however, impact of the Bolshevism was more explicit and profound on peasant movement launched in the North Hashtnagar in 1970s. the movement had been more organized, leadership deeply influenced by Bolshevik

[27] Khan, sarfraz and Rashid Hussain Mughal, ***Impact of Bolshevik Russian Peasent Programme on Peasents' Movement in NWFP: From Ghalla Dher to Shumali (North) Hashtnagar***, in Central Asia, Issue No. 69 (Winter 2011), Peshawar, Area Study Centre, University of Peshawar, p. 9
[28] Ibid., p. 11
[29] Ibid., p. 9
[30] Ibid., p. 16

> Marxist ideology successfully evolved more advanced peasant programme than Ghalla Dher. [31]

N,-W.F.P C.I.D report regarding an 'alleged Bolshevik agent' states on 12th June 1933:

> Information has been received that one Mirza Taj Muhammad, Safi of Ziarat, who had spent most of his time in Hoti Mardan with the Hakim of Ganderi and has now recently arrived in Pushat Salarzai via Malakand, is a news-writer of the Bolsheviks and is directly in touch with the Russian Minister at Kabul.[32]

In continuation of this inquiry, Captain W.R.Hay, Political Agent Dir, Swat and Chitral has written to The Assistant to I.G. of Police C.I.D, N.W.F. Province, Peshawar on 17th June 1933:

> I have talked to the Nawab about Mirza Taj Mohd. The Nawab says he is an informer in the pay of Afghan Government. He visited the Nawab at the beginning of May, and is now, as far as the Nawab knows, at his home in Ziarat. He is paid Rs.20/- Kabuli by the Nawab whenever he comes to see him. A Bolshevik or pro-Amanullah agent is reported to be at Pashat giving lessons to the Khan but he is someone other than Mirza Taj Muhammad.[33]

In a secret report of 29th June 1933 Political Agent, Dir, Swat and Chitral writes:

> In answer to enquiries about the suspected Bolshevik agent from Turkistan, Dilawar Khan of …has written to the Nawab of Dir that these so-called Bolshevik agents are really outlaws from Peshawar. [34]

In an Intelligence Report by W.R.Hay on 4th July 1933 states:

> The man who is teaching the Khan of Pashtat is Sahibzada Muhammad Alam of Bazid Khel Peshawar District… He is

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[31] Ibid., p. 21

[32] Tribal Research Cell Miscellaneous Files at the Directorate of Archives and Libraries, Peshawar. Bundle No. 17, Serial No. 264. Year 1932.

[33] Tribal Research Cell Miscellaneous Files at the Directorate of Archives and Libraries, Peshawar. Bundle No. 17, Serial No. 264. Year 1932.

[34] Tribal Research Cell Miscellaneous Files at the Directorate of Archives and Libraries, Peshawar. Bundle No. 17, Serial No. 264. Year 1932.

> a companion of Sanubar Hussain and his original object in Bajaur was red shirt propaganda. [35]

Bolshevik and Swat

A letter against the Wali of Swat, from the Khan of Khar on 3rd August 1932, to the Political Agent of Dir, Swat and Chitral states that a few persons:

> left India for tribal territory with a view to joining the agents of the Sovet Government of Russia, each of them has established direct connection with the Bolshevic workers whether they are in Kabul or in Teshkent, and up to this time they have not left alone this Tribal Territory but have established their centres and Departments everywhere.[36]

In this letter he further said:

> On one side is the above agitation and on the other are the personal and territorial interests of the wali of swat who to help the trouble against Dir State sends pecuniary help to well known and leading men of the tribes.[37]

In response to this letter from the Khan of Khar, the Political Agent of Dir, Swat and Chitral has written to the Chief Secretary to the Government, North-West Frontier Province on 10th August 1932;

> As far as I know the allegations made against the Wali are almost certainly false, and the statements made regarding Bolshevik intrigue may therefore well be either false or exaggerated.[38]

Swat became an independent state in 1915. On 22 May 1923, a special meeting was held in Saidu Sharif Swat. In this meeting the ceremony of *dastarbandi* of the heir apparent of Miangul Abdul Wadud was held and he was recognized by the British government. On this occasion Chief Commissioner of the North-West Frontier Provinceand political agent of

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[35] Tribal Research Cell Miscellaneous Files at the Directorate of Archives and Libraries, Peshawar. Bundle No. 17, Serial No. 264. Year 1932.
[36] Tribal Research Cell Miscellaneous Files at the Directorate of Archives and Libraries, Peshawar. Bundle No. 17, Serial No. 264. Year 1932.
[37] Tribal Research Cell Miscellaneous Files at the Directorate of Archives and Libraries, Peshawar. Bundle No. 17, Serial No. 264. Year 1932.
[38] Tribal Research Cell Miscellaneous Files at the Directorate of Archives and Libraries, Peshawar. Bundle No. 17, Serial No. 264. Year 1932.

Malakand were present. The ruler of Swat state assured the colonial government about his support against the Bolsheviks and their propaganda. He declared it as anti Islamic. A suspected agent of Bolshevism, Mulvi Abdul Aziz denied his links with Bolshevism and condemned it by stating the following words.

> What was Bolshevism and its objects (?). He said that a denial from Bolshevism is the will of God. The objects of this movement is that all kings, Amirs, Rulers and religious 'peshwas' should be destroyed from the world and that all properties etc. belonging to them and public should be taken over and to bring them in their unfair use. He [denied his links with]… the Bolsheviks and… advise[d] all others that they should abstain from having any connection with this wicked body.[39]

Mulvi Abdul Aziz belonged to the Utmanzi (Charsada). He was a sincere friend of the ruler of Swat (Miangul Abdul Wadud). When the armies of the Nawabs of Dir and Bajaur were stationed in the Shamozo area of Swat and plotting to occupy Swat. In those days Mulvi Abdul Aziz was in Bajour. When he came to know about the murder of Shahzada Sherin Jan, immediately he informed the Mullah of Babara (*da Babare Mullah*) and then both of them instigated the people against the Khan of Khaar, through their speeches. Especially they delivered their speeches to the Salarzai tribe.[40]

In March 1926, the British government recognized the Swat State.[41] Despite the assurance that the people of Swat will not support the Bolsheviks but the British government did not believe in it. The British did not trust Abdul Wadud and other important personalities in Swat because the British government considered that they were in touch with the activities of Bolsheviks, even though Abdul Wadud and his company had expressed their loyalty to British and the denunciation of Bolshevism. Political Agent of Malakand wrote to Miangul Abdul Wadud about his misgivings of Mulvi Abdul Aziz. Miangul replied to the Political Agent and strongly stressed that

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[39] Sultan-i-Rome, *Swat State (1915-1969) From Genesis to Merger*, Karachi, Oxford University Press, Second Impression 2009, p. 133.

[40] Khan, Muhammad Asaf, *Tarikh Riyasat-e-Swat wa Sawanih-e-Hayat Bani Riyasat-e-Swat Hazrat Miangul Gul Shahzada Abdul Wadud Khan Badshah Sahib*.n.p., [1958], pp. 249, 250.

[41] Ibid., p.318.

the Mulvi had no connection with the Bolsheviks.'[42] While recognizing the Swat State and heir after of Miangul Abdul Wadud it was also decided that 'he had also to show his ability to keep his hold on power, that he could consolidate the state and that he was willing to deal with anti-British elements like Sandakai Baba. He would have to show, too, that he had no sympathy for the Bolsheviks and was able to deal with them firmly, as with the Bolshevik revolution of 1917, the previous Czarist legacy now had an ideological twist on it, and Swat was strategically placed in the 'military crescent'___ the tribal belt of the NWFP, Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan around the USSR.'[43] Same apprehensions, the British had of the Khudai Khidmatgar's movement. They thought that there are some politically inflammable elements in this movement that could easily be ignited by the soviets in pursuit of revolutionary goals.

The first primary school in Swat state was opened in Saidu Sharif around March 1922. The first teacher appointed in this school was Shams-ul-Haq, a resident of Adina [present district Swabi]. The confidential Weekly Provincial Diary says that formerly he was a school teacher at Turlandi, Kota, Jabbi and Kohat and that he was dismissed from the Education Department.[44] About the opening of the first school the confidential reports has been summarized by Sultan-i-Rome in these words.

> After reading the confidential reports, one wonders why and under what programme the first school in Swat was opened. Reports of the Intelligence Bureau had alleged that it was under the Bolshevik influence and with their assistance that a new party was created, which was 'the direct representative locally of the Indo-Russian Revolutionary Organization,' and whose members were 'directly accredited to and financed by Maulvi Obedullah and Ahmad Hassan' 'alias Ahmad Ali a Lahore youth who absconded with other students of the Lahore Medical College in 1915.' [45]

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[42] Sultan-i-Rome, *Swat State (1915-1969) From Genesis to Merger*, Karachi, Oxford University Press, Second Impression 2009, pp. 133, 134.
[43] Ibid., pp. 138.
[44] Ibid., p.213
[45] Sultan-i-Rome, *Swat State (1915-1969) From Genesis to Merger*, Karachi, Oxford University Press, Second Impression 2009, p.213

The note in the confidential report has stated further that:

> The aims of the Makhfi's party are typically Bolshevik. They intend to start schools all over tribal territory__ and reports from different sources mention that three such schools, two in Bajaur and one in Swat, have already been started. In these schools everything will be free; a regular education will be given but distorted teaching of history and other subjects, on lines familiar to the student of Sinn Fein methods in Ireland[46], will inculcate in the students fanatical, communistic and anti-British ideas, to be spread by them among the tribes as a whole. Side by side with the educational programme will proceed wholesale corruption of the tribesmen with Russian gold and the organization of a system for the transport from Tashkent and distribution in Tribal Territory of the arms which the Bolsheviks have ready for the purpose [47]

The educational schemes of Abdul Ghaffar Khan (Bacha Khan) has also a link with the opening of the first school in Swat. In this regard it has been stated:

> It can be inferred from the presence of Maulwi Abdul Aziz of this party __who was associated with the educational schemes of Abdul Ghaffar Khan in the lower districts of the province ___with Abdul Wadud in Saidu Sharif, and by their close collaboration, that the first school in Swat was opened before March 1922 under the scheme of Indian revolutionary leaders linked with and financed from Tashkent. [48]

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[46] Its meaning in English is 'Ourselves or We Ourselves'. It is a left-wing Irish republican political party active in both the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. The Sinn Féin organisation was founded in 1905 by Arthur Griffith. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sinn_F%C3%A9in, retrieved on 7/9/2017.

[47] Sultan-i-Rome, *Education in the State of Swat*, in Hamdard Islamicus, Vol. 31, No. 2 (April-June 2008), Karachi, p.72

[48] List of Special Branch, List-II, , Peshawar, at the Directorate of Archives and Libraries, Peshawar. Bundle No. 83, Serial No. 1509. Year 1922.

As we know that Mulvi Abdul Aziz helped the ruler of Swat in establishing the first school and thus he was considered by the British as having contacts with the Bolsheviks. Maybe that is the reason that the British officers in Malakand started themselves inspecting the schools. Maybe they were looking into the curriculum and other activities of these schools. The Political Agent Malakand stated in December 1927 that:

> With some assistance from the (British Indian) Government he (Abdul Wadud) has constructed and opened an A.V. Middle school at Saidu, and he has opened twelve primary schools in his state, his total expenditure on education being (Rs.) 18,000 p.a. (per annum). At the Wali's (ruler) request these schools are now regularly inspected by a (British Indian) Government officer of the Education Department.[49]

After that the ruler has closed many schools in Swat State. The then Director of Education Buner Khan has written the cause of the closure of these schools as low enrolment. In this regard he states:

> The result was that all the schools were closed down for want of enrolment except one at Saidu Sharif and only one other such school survived with very small number of students. It was the primary school at Barikot.[50]

Sultan-i-Rome does not agree with the reason of low enrolment for closing these schools. He looks into other factors of closing these schools. In this regard he states:

> It, was not, however, for want of enrolment that the schools in Swat State were closed down. The reason and sinister motive behind the closure of the schools lay somewhere else. It was after the agitation in the down country that the political Agent at Malakand warned the Bacha Sahib that as he was educating the people, they would agitate against him like those who, educated by the English, were agitating against them. Hence he closed all the schools save the one at Saidu Sharif and the other at Barikot. The plea of the want of enrolment was merely an overt attempt to save the face and conceal the real factor and motive behind the closure of the schools. This can

[49] Sultan-i-Rome, *Education in the State of Swat*, in Hamdard Islamicus, Vol. 31, No. 2 (April-June 2008), Karachi, p.72
[50] Ibid., p.73

> further be endorsed by the fact that in 1930s afterwards neither new schools were opened nor the closed ones were re-opened. In 1940s Wadudia school, Saidu Sharif was upgraded to the level of high school, and new schools were opened.[51]

But it is also inferred from the matter of closing these schools that maybe the British Government was afraid of the Bolshevik movement as the Government had already expressed its premonition about the activities of the Mulvi Abdul Aziz and the establishment of new schools in the Swat State.

Wali-e-Swat was also reading books on communism and claimed that he was aware of all social upheaval.[52] The archives record verifies organized efforts of the British Government to stop Bolshevik Movements. For this purpose the Government also produced *fitwas* against this movement. Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier province has addressed a letter to all Deputy Commissioners on 15th April 1920, he states:

> 300 copies of Urdu translation of *fetwa* an 5 copies of Prsian recently issued by Shaikh-ul-Islam of Constantinople denouncing Bolshevism from the Islamic point of view, are enclosed for distribution in your district, to special educated persons, so far as local conditions will admit.[53]

[51] Sultan-i-Rome, *Education in the State of Swat*, in Hamdard Islamicus, Vol. 31, No. 2 (April-June 2008), Karachi,, p.73

[52] Barth, the Last Wali of Swat, p.111

[53] Files of the Deputy Commissioner Office, Peshawar, at the Directorate of Archives and Libraries, Peshawar. Bundle No. 51, Serial No. 1423. Year 1920.

Swat State Map, Courtesy: Dr. Urs Geiser





فتوائے آقائے شیخ الاسلام در قسطنطنیہ

در ایں ایام کہ توجہ اولیائے اُمورِ ملل بطرفِ بالشیوک جلب و معطوف گردیدہ بر اسلام کہ ہادی و آئینہ خیالاتِ جمّ غفیرے از بنی نوع بشر است فرضِ عین و عین فرض بیباشد کہ عقیدہ خودش را بایک صدائے عالم رسائے بہ افرادِ بشر عموماً و بہ مسلمانانِ دُنیا خصوصاً بفہمانند ٭

اُصول و حقیقتِ بالشیوک ہر چہ باشد باشد، ولے چوں بروز و وجود آں مُضر بحوالم انسانیت و مُوذی بہ معاشرتِ افرادِ ناس بایکدیگر و منافی حقوق فرداً فرداً بشر از ما ممالکشان است بہ ہیچ وجہ من الوجوہ با قوانین و اُصولِ شریعتِ مقدسہ اسلام جمع نہ تواند آمد ٭

از ابتدائے ظہورِ اسلام تا زمانِ ما ہذا افعالِ شنیعہ مثل قصدِ جاں و اموال، و سرقہ و قتلِ نفوس بیگناہ و نہب اموال، و زنائے محصنہ تماماً تشنیع و توبیخ، و در احکامِ مقدسہ ما ایں افعالِ قبیحہ نہ تنہا توبیخ بل برائے ہر یک سزا و عقوبتی سخت معیّن و مقرر شدہ است ٭

اسلام بہ بہبودی و ترفیہ حال و سعادت عمومی امر و از سلبِ مال و جانِ دیگراں نہی، و در رعایت حقوق ناس منفرداً و مجتمعاً باشدّ تاکید تو صیہ میفرماید بموجب قوانین مستحسنہ دینِ حنیف اسلام ہر یک از افرادِ بشر در بخشیدن مال و مکنتِ خودش کاملاً مجاز و مختار است کہ خواہ در ایامِ حیات بلا جدال مماثل بدیگرے منتقل گردد ٭

تبذیر و اسراف در مذہبِ حقۂ اسلام قطعاً جائز نیست و برائے جلوگیری مسرف و مبذر از تبذیر تمام ہمکیش در جبرانِ حالِ شکستہ حالاں نصِّ صریح است کہ باید قسمتی از ثروت با اقربا و ارحام و قسمتی دیگر بہ فقراء و ایتام بذل شود ٭

پس ہر مسلمانان لازم است کہ برائے حفظِ بیضہ اسلام تمام اقتدار و نفوذ خود را مجتمع ساختہ و با عزمی راسخ بمدافعہ بالشیوک کہ عالم تمدن و مساوات و حقوق انسان را در مخاطرہ و تزلزل انداختہ بپردازند ٭

(مطبوعہ آبزرور پریس شملہ)

Source: Files of the Deputy Commissioner Office, Peshawar, at the Directorate of Archives and Libraries, Peshawar. Bundle No. 51, Serial No. 1423. Year 1920.

An English version of the said *fitwa* is given on next page.

Fetwa denouncing Bolshevism issued by the Sheik-ul-Islam February 1920

> Bolshevism is at present engaging the attention of those who control the destinies of nations. It is the duty of Islam, which directs a great portion of humanity and reflects their sentiment to proclaim its attitude to all Mahommedans and to the world in general. Whatever may be the basic principles of Bolshevism the fact that their application is harmful to humanity, to social life and to the rights of individual property makes it quite impossible to reconcile them with the principles of Islam. Since the birth of Islam until now attacks upon life and property, theft, massacres, pillage and rape have always been condemned, and our sacred literature not only condemns but imposes penal sentences for such acts. Islam requires general progress, tranquility and happiness. It, therefore, forbids the taking of the life and property of others and ensures most emphatically the rights of property of individuals and communities. Consequently Islam rules that each individual has a complete right to bequeath his property, during his lifetime or after his death. Islam being unable to tolerate the spendthrift, and with a view to preventing the spendthrift from squandering his riches to the detriment of those who are left destitute, requires that the fortune be divided partly among the poor. It is to the interests of Islam that all its strength and influence should be concentrated to oppose the Bolsheviks, as a danger threatening civilization, justice and right.[54]

British Government also tried to stop money orders used by communist organizations. One of these reports states:

> I am directed to refer to this office Confidential Memorandum dated the 16th May, 2019, on the subject of the detention of money orders remitted to this country by

[54] Files of the Deputy Commissioner Office, Peshawar, at the Directorate of Archives and Libraries, Peshawar. Bundle No. 51, Serial No. 1423. Year 1920.

> communists or communist organizations of which a list has already been supplied.[55]

A letter from Maulvi Fazal Rabbi, alias Pakhlai Maulvi, Risaldar Rukn-Ud-din and Maulvi Makhfi through Abdul Aziz of Saidu Swat which was received by Amir Rahmatullah, head of the Samasta 'Fanatic Colony', is as under:

> Our party at Bajaur unanimously requests and advises you to send without delay at least 300 men of your party to Thakot who should encamp themselves away from the village Abadi and while doing so please inform us so that we may reach the spot to make necessary arrangements for them. This party intends to form a Bolshevik centre to carry on propaganda in the adjacent British Territory without hindrance. If you cannot undertake the expenses of these your payment, this party and the Bolshevik party promise to pay the expenses.[56]

All these secrets reports confirm the existence of activists of Bolshevik Movement in Swat and surrounding frontier and tribal regions.

Conclusion

The Bolshevik Revolution influenced psychological, linguistic, literary, cultural, political and economic aspects of life of the people of Central Asia and South Asia including Swat State. There can be seen some connections between the activists of Bolshevik Movement and some people of Swat. The establishment of first school in Swat state is also the result of this connection, as stated in the confidential reports of the colonial government. Various types of people from Swat were secretly participating in the activities of this movement.

When the British colonial government officials came to know about the suspected activities of Bolshevik Movement in Swat state, they took immediate measurements to stop the activities and tried to pressurize the activists and supporters of this movement in Swat state. Reports show that British government took the expansion of this movement seriously and they started in a systematic way to counter the ideology of this movement, which was against the vested interests of capitalism and all of its institutions. The British colonial government also tried to counter this revolution in different

[55] Files of the Deputy Commissioner Office, Peshawar, at the Directorate of Archives and Libraries, Peshawar. Bundle No. 14, Serial No. 281.

[56] Special Branch Files List-II, of Intelligence Bureau N-W.F.P province, Peshawar, at the Directorate of Archives and Libraries, Peshawar. Bundle No. 83, Serial No. 1510.

ways. They pressurized the rulers of these independent states and used various types of people against this Bolshevik philosophy. British government also produced *fitwas*[57] from various religious scholars, translated and circulated these *fitwas* in various languages like Urdu and Persian etc. As a result, this movement did not get any success in Swat State.

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[57] In response to question by an individual or an institute, a formal ruling about an issue or a point, issued by a religious scholar (mufti) is called fitwa or fatwa.

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Secial Btranch Files, List of Special Branch, List-II, , Peshawar, at the Directorate of Archives and Libraries, Peshawar. Bundle No. 83, Serial No. 1509. Year 1922.

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DETERMINANT OF PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH: EVIDENCE FROM EMERGING ASIAN COUNTRIES

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Abstract

Total factor productivity growth has played a significant role in uplifting the economic development process of nations in recent years. This paper uses the recently published data of Penn World Table (PWT, 9) for six emerging economies (China, India, South Korea, Malaysia, Thailand and Taiwan) to establish a relationship between the growth of total factor productivity and its various determinants. Panel data econometric techniques are employed and the data utilized were spanning from 1955 to 2012. We found that growth of real GDP and human capital are positively and significantly related with the growth of total factor productivity. Similarly physical capital stock is although positively impacted the growth of total factor productivity but however this relationship is not significant statistically. Lastly, an inverse and significant relationship is observed between employment level and total factor productivity growth for the selected emerging economies. The study concludes that relatively richer and highly educated economies have improved their productivity while employment level has adversely affected the growth of TFP. The results of the study imply that economies should focus on income and human capital increasing policies and further to translate the benefits the focus should be on efficiency of labor rather increasing the employment level.

Keywords: Productivity, Emerging Asian Economies, Panel Model

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1. Introduction

Total factor Productivity (TFP, hereafter) is considered as the main driver of economic growth in the economic growth literature[12]. TFP could be defined as an increase in the level of production using the same level of inputs. Economic growth which improves standard of living depends upon the growth of TFP. Improved standard life for the masses through high economic growth is the ultimate goal of all economic activities and hence policy makers both in the developing and developed world are constantly trying their best to improve it using various policies. The economic growth literature explored the determinants (macroeconomic, institutional factors, trade openness, technology and human capital etc.) explaining cross country differences in productivity growth[345]. The investigations on sources of economic growth have increased rapidly since the works of Young[6] and Krugman[7]. Krugman was of the view that capital accumulation and skilled labor are main determinants of growth in East Asian economies but the growth unsustainability was mainly associated with the absence of gains from productivity.

The growth of TFP is an essential factor for the long run sustained economic growth and development is also evident from the Solow growth model[8] where he discussed that cross-country differences in TFP might cause cross country differences in per capita income. Nonetheless, the factors that improve productivity growth need to be discussed and will add to the literature discussed in the study of Isaksson[9]. Later on Romer[10]

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[1] Robert E. Hall and Charles Jones, "Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output Per Worker than Others?," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 114, no. 1 (1999): 83–116.

[2] David N. Weil, "Accounting for the Effect Of Health on Economic Growth," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 122, no. 3 (2007): 1265–1306.

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[6] Alwyn Young, "A Tale of Two Cities: Factor Accumulation and Technical Change in Hong Kong and Singapore," in *NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1992, Volume 7* (National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, 1992), 13–64, https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberch:10990.

[7] Paul Krugman, "The Myth of Asia's Miracle," *Foreign affairs* (1994): 62–78.

[8] Robert M. Solow, "A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth," *The quarterly journal of economics* 70, no. 1 (1956): 65–94.

[9] Anders Isaksson, "Determinants of Total Factor Productivity: A Literature Review," *Research and Statistics Branch, UNIDO* (2007).

theoretically explained the role of TFP in an endogenous growth model while various empirical studies[11],[12],[13],[14] justified the significance of TFP in explaining economic growth. Hence it is very important to comprehend the sources of TFP in order to give insights to the policy makers. Besides, another perspective identified by Miller and Upadhyay[15] that certain growth determinant studied in literature e.g. Barro[16] influence economic growth via productivity channel.

The changes in technological improvements boost productivity growth is significant, indicating the significance of focusing on technology as a growth catalyst. The intuition of technological progresses captured in productivity enhancements are clearly explained in the innovation based endogenous growth models by Romer[17], Rivera-Batiz and Romer[18], Grossman and Helpman[19], and Aghion and Howitt[20] [21]. These models capture the contribution of R&D based innovations which directs economy on development path.

The productivity improvements may also be characterized to human capital. The role of human capital in explaining economic growth in endogenous growth framework was presented by Romer[22] and Lucas[23]. The influence of human capital might be either direct when it enters directly the production function or it has an indirect effect on economic growth through

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[10] Paul M. Romer, "Endogenous Technological Change," *Journal of political Economy* 98, no. 5, Part 2 (1990): S71–S102.
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[14] Jona-Lasinio, C., Schiavo, S., & Weyerstrass, K. (2019). How to revive productivity growth?. EconPol Policy Report, 3(13).
[15] Stephen M. Miller and Mukti P. Upadhyay, "The Effects of Openness, Trade Orientation, and Human Capital on Total Factor Productivity," *Journal of development economics* 63, no. 2 (2000): 399–423.
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[18] Luis A. Rivera-Batiz and Paul M. Romer, "International Trade with Endogenous Technological Change," *European economic review* 35, no. 4 (1991): 971–1001.
[19] Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman, "Quality Ladders in the Theory of Growth," *The Review of Economic Studies* 58, no. 1 (1991): 43–61.
[20] Philippe Aghion and Peter W. Howitt, "A Model of Growth Through Creative Destruction," *Econometrica* 60, no. 2 (1992): 323–351.
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[23] Robert E. Lucas, "The Industrial Revolution: Past and Future," *Lectures on economic growth* (2002): 109–188.

TFP by enhancing technical or creative skills as human capital could encourage innovative outcome and therefore adds to economic growth. Hence the growth literature also recognized the supportive nature of R&D activities and human capital in encouraging productivity growth. It is evident in the study by Jajri[24] that economic growth may be enhanced by adopting both input driven growth policies and technologies driven such as TFP growth. High level of human capital empowers the innovation capability of a nation to develop new technologies and adopt, implement, and effectively utilize existing technologies[25] [26]. It also influences the speed of technological catch up and diffusion[27] [28]. High level of human capital also induces labor productivity due to the increased capacity of workers.

The present study is mainly an attempt to see how the TFP has behaved in six emerging economies in the Asian region (China, India, South Korea, Malaysia, Thailand and Taiwan). We examine the effects of human capital which is proxied by an index which is recently developed by the Penn World Tables (Version 9.5)[29] and is based on years of schooling and returns to education), physical capital, and employment and GDP growth on TFP.

This attempt is significant in the sense that TFP differences account for most of the cross-country differences in per capita income and TFP is considered as the major sources of long run increase in well-being[30] [31] [32]. Secondly, there is abundant literature which advocates the effects of human capital on TFP. We suppose that any of the possible determinants of GDP growth considered in the literature might have a direct effect on total factor productivity. Technology driven growth has contributed a lot to the growth process of many developed and developing countries and therefore has got prime importance over the input driven growth strategies. Debacles and

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[24] Idris Jajri, "Determinants of Total Factor Productivity Growth in Malaysia," *Journal of economic Cooperation* 28, no. 3 (2007): 41–58.

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miracles on the path of economic growth could be explained largely by looking into the TFP behavior. The reason behind selecting these economies is that recently, the Penn World Tables version 9.5 has provided a comprehensive data set on TFP for the chosen economies for an extended time period. This extended database has provided an opportunity for the researchers to observe the behavior of TFP with respect to various determinants in the selected economies.

This paper is organized as following. A comprehensive overview on TFP trends in recent times has been reported in section two. Modeling for the purpose of the empirical testing is shown in third section. In the fourth section, estimating methodology is documented. Major findings are discussed in the penultimate section. In the final section, based on the findings, conclusions are drawn and policy recommendations are suggested.

2. An Overview on total factor productivity (TFP) in Emerging Asia

The developed countries have achieved remarkable improvements both in economic growth owing to higher level of TFP over the years. On the other hand, the developing countries haven't had any significant improvement in economic growth due to the low level of TFP. The major difference between the developed and developing economies is the state of TFP. Developed countries have boost up their economies remarkably owing to higher TFP, whereas due to lack of technology and hence low level of TFP, the developing world have not achieved the desired growth objectives. It is also an established fact, that TFP differences leads to differences in economic growth.

The behavior of TFP over the years has been shown in the following Figure 1 for some of the sampled emerging economies. The time period used is indeed very long spanning from 1955 to 2012 and hence a division is being made in order to do meaningful comparison over the years. The entire time period is divided into two sup-periods from 1955-1989 and from 1990 to 2012. The blue bars indicates average productivity level during the period 1955-1989 and the red bars shows an average productivity level from the period 1990-2012. The following Figure 1 depicts the behavior of TFP for the sampled countries.



In Figure1, the TFP behavior in the sampled Asian emerging countries is reported. It can be seen that all of the emerging countries located in the Asian region, have achieved a significant and sustainable improvement during the period 1990 to 2012 as compared to 1955-1989. And this could be the possible reason why these countries have secured and sustained remarkable growth rates over the years in the Asian region. Other countries in the Asian region have not had the opportunity to accelerate their growth rates due to the low level of TFP.

The Korean economy has achieved higher improvement in TFP as compared to other economies during the period 1990-2012 as compared to 1955-1989. China, Taiwan and India have also recorded impressive improvements in their TFP during the recent time period[33]. The Chinese economy did well economically during the last few decades and has attracted the attention of many policy makers and researchers. Among the list, the Malaysian and Thailand economies have marginal increases in TFP. One interesting observation from the figure is that economies having higher TFP during the period 1955-1989 have shown very marginal improvements in TFP while those having low level of TFP during the period 1955-1989 have shown remarkable improvements in TFP in recent times from 1990-2012. It could be concluded that the productivity level has improved a lot recently especially in the emerging economies. Further, it is also a fact that

[33] Chan et. al., Green total factor productivity growth and its determinants in China's industrial economy. Sustainability, 10(4), 1052. (2018)

growth in TFP has been considered as a vital factor for achieving higher economic growth. Therefore, it seems very important to investigate the behavior of TFP and its determinants for the sampled emerging economies.

3. Modeling Strategy and Data

The prime objective of the current paper is to explore the determinants of the growth of TFP in the selected emerging economies. TFP growth is indeed a complex process and hence depends upon various factors. In the literature various researchers have identified different factors in the context of different countries. However, new growth theory which is emerged from the pioneering work of Romer[34] has provided a base to potential researchers to study the growth of TFP and its multiple determinants. Human capital which is the main driver of growth in the new growth literature is directly linked with the growth of TFP. Similarly, a growth of TFP may also depend upon the level of available physical capital stock. In fact capital stock is the key factor that could explain both TFP growth and economic growth differences across countries. Similarly, domestic employment level could also be the reason behind the growth of TFP. More employment level means more labor force is there to operate physical capital stock. The following model is specified to be estimated in order to obtain results regarding the impact of various determinants and the growth of TFP.

$$GTFP_{i,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1\, emp_{i,t} + \beta_2\, hc_{i,t} + \beta_3\, gdp_{i,t} + \beta_4\, K_{i,t} + \epsilon_{i,t} \quad (1)$$

Where the dependent variable is the growth of TFP and is calculated as the log differences. TFP is measured in constant national prices. Employment level is captured through the number of people engaged in millions. This proxy seems to be better than the commonly used proxies for labor force such as population aging between 15-64 years. The reason is that economically active population (population aging between 15 to 64 years) is indeed very broad term and it is quite possible that majority of them may be involved in some odd jobs or even no jobs. The growth of real GDP is also measured in constant US Dollars. Human capital is proxied by an index which is recently developed by the Penn World Tables (Version 9.5) and is based on years of schooling and returns to education. The general form of equation can be re-written as below.

$$GTFP_{it} = b_0 + b_k(X)_{it} + U_{it} \quad (2)$$

Equation 2 is the simplified version of equation 1. The term $(X)_{it}$ consists of all explanatory variables mentioned in equation 1 already. The disturbance term (U_{it}) represents a composite disturbance term and it is the combination of cross section specific error (α_i) and idiosyncratic error term (ϵ_i). The cross section specific error term (α_i) is also known as unobserved

[34] Romer, "Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth."

heterogeneity and it remains constant, while the idiosyncratic error term (ϵ_i) is the usual disturbance term and it has the usual OLS properties.

Unlike previous literature, we have used long panel data covering time period from 1955 to 2012 for the selected emerging economies. The Penn World Tables (PWT, Version 9)[35] online available at (http://febpwt.webhosting.rug.nl/Dmn/AggregateXs/PivotShow) has provided an extended data for almost all countries in general and for some countries in particular. The selected countries for which data is provided for long time period is selected for the current academic exercise. Detailed information about the data sources and variables description is provided in the appendix Table 2.

4. Estimating Methodology

Panel or longitudinal data can be analyzed using the either random effects or fixed effects model as reported in the literature by Dewan and Hussein[36]. Both of these models have advantages as well as disadvantage. The fixed effects model which is also known as within estimator controls for the serial correlation between the disturbance term and explanatory variables. However, the fixed effects estimator is unable to estimate the impact of variables which are time invariant. On the other hand, the random effects model is appropriate if there is no correlation between the explanatory variables and the disturbance term. A study by Hill et al.,[37] and Tahir and Azid[38] stated that it is always safe to use the fixed effects estimate model instead of random effects owing to the presences of correlation between the disturbance term and independent variables. However, the exact decision can be made using the well-known test which is specifically designed for choosing between the fixed effects and the random effects model.

Next the presence of cross-sectional dimension may lead both the problem heteroscedasticity problem which affects standard errors and hence the associated test-statistic (t-test) may be misleading. Therefore models are estimated using the white robust standard errors in order to correct standard errors. Results are reported in the following Table 1.

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[35] Feenstra, Robert C., Robert Inklaar and Marcel P. Timmer (2015), "The Next Generation of the Penn World Table" American Economic Review, 105(10), 3150-3182, available for download at www.ggdc.net/pwt

[36] Edwin Dewan and Shajehan Hussein, *Determinants of Economic Growth (Panel Data Approach)* (Citeseer, 2001).

[37] R. Carter Hill, William E. Griffiths, and Guay C. Lim, *Principles of Econometrics*, 5th Edition. (The Wiley Network, 2018), https://www.wiley.com/en-pk/Principles+of+Econometrics%2C+5th+Edition-p-9781119320944.

[38] Muhammad Tahir and Toseef Azid, "The Relationship between International Trade Openness and Economic Growth in the Developing Economies: Some New Dimensions," *Journal of Chinese Economic and Foreign Trade Studies* 8, no. 2 (2015): 123–139.

Table 1: Main Regression Results

Variables	Pooled OLS	Fixed Effects
Constant	-0.095*** (0.019)	0.318 (0.044)
Employment	-.005*** (0.001)	-0.155*** (0.011)
Human Capital	-0.027*** (0.007)	0.272*** (0.026)
Physical Capital Stock	0.007 (0.002)***	0.001 (0.003)
Growth of real GDP	0.767 (0.025)***	0.817 (0.034)***
Econometric Criteria	Adj-R-Squared: 0.735 S.E: 0.020 F:234.00239***	Adj-R-Squared: 0.821 S.E: 0.017 F:175.772***

Dependent variable: The growth of total factor productivity. Where (***), (**) and (*) represents significance level at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level respectively.

5. Results and Analysis

Table 1, reports empirical results based on pooled least squares as well as panel fixed effects techniques. The second column of Table 1 includes results based on pooled least squares show that the growth of TFP is associated with the variables included in the model. According to the results, physical capital stock and growth of real per capita GDP have positively and significantly influenced the growth of TFP. On the other hand, human capital and domestic employment have played and adversely impacted the growth of TFP for the selected countries. However, the data is not poolable as confirmed by the Hausman test reported at the bottom of Table 1. Hausman test decides the econometric technique (between panel fixed effect and random effect technique) to be used for the dataset under study. Therefore, the pooled least square results are not discussed in greater detail consequently. However, it does not mean that the pooled least square results are unimportant. Infect the least squares estimation provides an initial understanding about the relationship between the dependent and independent variables as discussed by Chen and Gupta[39] and Tahir and Azid[40].

[39] Pei-Pei Chen and Rangan Gupta, "An Investigation of Openness and Economic Growth Using Panel Estimation," *Indian Journal of Economics* 89, no. 355 (2009): 483.

[40] Tahir and Azid, "The Relationship between International Trade Openness and Economic Growth in the Developing Economies."

Regression results obtained through panel fixed effects estimator are shown in the third column of Table 1. It can be seen from the Table that human capital which has attracted attention of the researcher since the introduction of new growth theory impacted significantly the growth of TFP for the sampled countries. The point estimate suggests that an increase of one unit in human capital index would contribute about 0.27 in the growth of TFP. It implies that the sampled emerging economies shall focus on educating their huge population in order to increase the stock of human capital stock and hence the growth of TFP would be influenced positively. Next, the results have revealed that employment level which is used as a proxy for labor force has adversely affected the growth of TFP. This confirm the earlier results that only human capital or skill labor force is much more beneficial from the growth perspective. Ordinary labor force in majority of the cases especially in the developing world is unskilled and therefore could not contribute the growth or development process. A positive and statistically significant relationship is observed between the growth of GDP and TFP growth. High growing economies have the opportunity and potential to speed their TFP growth by devising and implementing various policies such as in high R&D expenditures. No doubt that high R&D guarantees improved TFP growth. The results show that the impact of stock of physical capital on the growth of TFP is although positive, but however this impact is not statistically significant at standard level. Surprisingly, our results could not support the hypothesis that the stock of physical capital is deemed important for the growth of TFP. The possible reason behind the insignificant role played by physical capital in accelerating the growth of TFP is indeed very hard to pin-down as the available literature is strongly in favor of positive relationship between physical capital and TFP growth. However, one of the possible reasons could be that the available physical capital is not enough to cast a significant impact on TFP growth. Therefore, the sampled countries are suggested to pay attention and take steps in order to increase the stock of physical capital so that to make its contribution towards TFP growth visible and significant.

The overall explanatory power of the estimated model is quite strong indicating that the fitted models explain significant variation in the growth of TFP. Adjusted R-Squared ranges 0.73 and 0.82 for the pooled least squares and fixed effects models respectively. Similarly, the joint significant test (F-test) for all estimated model is significant at standard level shows that estimated models fits the data well and efficiently.

6. Conclusions and Recommendation

This paper investigates the impact of various factors on the growth of TFP. Emerging economies located in the Asian region have been selected and for searching the relationship. Panel econometric techniques are employed and the data utilized were spanning from 1955 to 2012

constituting 57 annual observation. This study can also be extended to Central Asian (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) economies as the role of the these states is expected to be more critical in the coming years as these countries are opening their economies.

The study found that the growth of TFP can be enhanced by focusing on some key determinants. Among others, the stock of human capital that comes as the most important factor which has impacted the growth of TFP not only positively but also significantly. The study also confirmed the superiority of the stock of human capital over both physical capital and labor force which are the key inputs to production the Solow growth model[41]. Physical capital and labor force are although important; however, their contribution towards the growth of TFP is unexpected in the current study. The Growth of GDP ensures a rise in TFP growth. And it is possible because high growing economies are relatively in a better position to devise and implement policies that suits the TFP growth such as R&D and other developmental programs. From policy perspective sounds efforts are needed on the part of policy makers to pay attention to different determinants of TFP growth in general and towards human capital stock in particular. No doubt focusing on these determinants would help them to grow fast in the long-run through increasing TFP.

emp	Number of persons engaged (in millions)	PWT, 9.5
hc	Index of human capital per person, based on years of schooling and returns to education	PWT, 9.5
gdp	Real GDP at constant prices (in mil. 2011US$)	PWT, 9.5
K	Capital stock at constant prices (in mil. 2011US$)	PWT, 9.5
TFP	TFP at constant national prices (2011=1)	PWT, 9.5

Appendix Table 2: Variables Description and Data Sources

[41] Solow, "A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth."

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THE 19TH-AND EARLY 20TH-CENTURY U.S. WOMEN'S RIGHTS STRUGGLE: IMPLICATIONS FOR CONTEMPORARY AFGHANI AND PAKISTANI PASHTUN WOMEN

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Abstract

Although there may be strikingly different cultural explanations, in nearly every society women have had to struggle for equal rights. This study juxtaposes the position of U.S women in the 1910s and contemporary Pashtun women in Afghanistan and Pakistan to present an authentic picture of Pashtun women in an international context. Avoiding generalizations, the author focuses on select issues important to Pashtun women living in Swat, KP, Pakistan, the homeland of Malala Yousafzai. In addition to American scholarship, for the Pashtun part, the study relies on authentic sources: personal interviews with Malala, her father as well as a few notable indigenous professors and authors; literary/social surveys (of Swat); indigenous books. The study also includes a cross-section of native Pashtun men/women living in Swat, and the author's firsthand experiences as a native of Swat. The study reviews the struggle for women's rights in the U.S to ask what from that experience can aid Pashtun women one hundred years later.

Key Words: U.S women, Afghani-Pakistani-Pashtun women, 20th-century, women's rights.

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1) Introduction

Across the globe in almost every culture, women, at some time, have been oppressed by religious extremism, cultural constraints, or social norms, etc. The difference lies only in degree of oppression. The trajectory of women's rights in the United States till the 1920s and in the Pashtun regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan in 2010s illustrates the universal problems of women's struggle for equality across time, language, culture, religion, nationality, and geography. This study argues that the 1920s women's struggle in the U.S. could influence the contemporary struggle of their Pashtun sisters in Afghanistan and Pakistan in the 2010s. Despite the hundred-year gap, comparing U.S. and Pashtun women's struggles for liberty may help the world to reconsider Pashtun women's position in an international context. Like American women in the initial stage of their struggle, Pashtun women are trying to rise despite fierce opposition from locals, despite voices calling for "tradition," another term, in this case, for the status quo or inequality. Like Louisa May Alcott and Kate Chopin, Pashtun female writers like Hasina Gul, are voicing their cause in literature. The youngest Nobel Laureate from Swat, Pakistan, Malala Yousafzai (named "after the Malalai of Maiwand, who inspired the Afghan army to defeat the British in the second Anglo-Afghan war in 1830"), is trying to lead Pashtun women toward their inalienable rights, like Jane Addams and Elizabeth Cady Stanton before her. Though there are fundamental disparities between the two societies, the women's struggle for equality may be seen as an ongoing global issue that transcends societal limits.

As an analysis of the U.S. women's movement from an Afghani-Pakistani perspective, this trans-historical article reviews the evolution of the women's rights movement in the US during late 19th-and early 20th-century, and the emergence of contemporary women's rights movement in Pashtun regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Stressing the gradual and incomplete nature of the American women's rights movement, this comparative analysis considers how emerging Pashtun women's activists might, like the American women, draw upon elements of their own culture to argue for improved status and greater autonomy. The experience would serve as an inspirational model for the contemporary suppressed Pashtun women stimulating their psychological confidence to stand for their inalienable rights. Furthermore, it would teach them the required techniques on woman question: how to tackle the issues that are going to come across, and how to successfully proceed towards their terminal objectives.

The question arises: why exclusively to rely on the US women's struggle as a roadmap/constitution? The sharp reply is: Though there are countries that granted rights to their women prior to the U.S., the U.S stands tall for the length and intensity of women's struggle. Being nourished in the melting pot of the modern world, the U.S women's struggle reflects the colors of all major global nationalities, cultures, religions, ethnicities,

liberals, and social movements, and offers comprehensive solutions to embryonic women's struggles across the globe. Formally starting from 1848, it continues thus far. In fact, such equivalent is hard to be found anywhere else in the contemporary world.

The constitution of the discussion ranges from personal to political rights. At first place, the analysis explores how the U.S women's struggle formed its ground. After surveying the very reasons, the U.S women's contemporary demands for equality are spotlighted. While refashioning these elements for Pashtun woman, the study is very careful about the fact: what forces were at work that time, and what are the emerging ones in Pashtun regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan at the hour. In addition, concerned scholarships, documentaries, social media, and (national as well as international) women's activists will serve as a medium to robustly tailor the ideals of the U.S women's struggle to the suppressed Pashtun women. Analyzing their struggle on the road of equality, the article categorically teaches that how each single step could be translated by the Pashtun women activists for the concerned disparities keeping in view limitations of time, culture, religion and ethnicity.

For a synopsis of the U.S. women's position by the 1920s the study relies on American historical scholarships. Keeping in mind the limits of documented data about contemporary women's positions in Swat, the study relies on: personal interviews with Malala[1], her father[2] as well as a few notable indigenous professors and authors; Prof. Dr. Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah's book, *Pukhtane Khaze au da Qam Khidmt* [*Pushtun Women and Service of the Nation*] (2012); Malala Yousafzai's book, *I am Malala: The Girl who Stood up for Education and was Shot by the Taliban* (2013); Ziauddin Yousafzai's[3] book, *Let Her Fly: A Father's Journey and the Fight for Equality* (2019); Professor Attau-ur-rahman Atta's literary survey, *Da Swat Zana Shaerane* [*Contemporary Poetesses from Swat*] (running for publication); and the official survey, *Development Profile of Swat District: Situation Analysis & Baseline Surveys for Poverty Reduction through Rural Development in KPK, FATA & Balochistan* by Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund (PPAF) (2015). The last one appears to be, so far, the only comprehensive and reliable social document about the valley. In addition, the study is infused with the author's personal insights into and experiences of the Pashtun culture and women's issues. He is a native of the tehsil

[1] Author's interview with Malala Yousafzai (The youngest Nobel Laureate from Swat, Pakistan): August 23, 2015.

[2] Author's interview with Ziauddin Yousafzai (The father of Malala Yousafzai, who is the youngest Nobel Laureate from Swat, Pakistan. He has also authored the book, *Let Her Fly: A Father's Journey and the Fight for Equality* ,
2019): September 09, 2019.

[3] Since both the authors' (Ziaddin Yousafzai and Malala Yousafzai) have last names "Yousafzai", the author uses their first names for citations to avoid ambiguity.

(division of a district) Matta, which was once the capital and stronghold of the Taliban regime in Swat between 2007 and 2009.[4] To thoroughly represent the valley, the author has informally interviewed men and women from each of seven tehsils–Barikot, Babuzai/Mingora, Kabal, Charbagh, Matta, Khwazakhaila, and Bahrain–regarding women's rights. For the authentication of data, interviewees have been chosen from diverse backgrounds: common people, professors/teachers, a member of the former ruling family, and a few local politicians. The identities of (some) the interviewees are kept secret because of cultural constraints for women and cultural controversies for men.[5]

The American Context

The struggle for women's equality in America formally began at the 1848 Seneca Fall Convention when "three hundred men and women rallied to the cause of equality for women [and] where Elizabeth Cady Stanton drafted The Seneca Fall Declaration outlining the new movement's ideology and politician strategies".[6] Women fought for many years for an assortment of social, political, economic, and sexual rights. But the significant changes occurred between 1890 and 1920. The help of voluntary associations, institutions, social movements, World War I, and the collective power of women, which had been produced throughout the late 19th-century, culminated in the solution of most of their problems[7] by the 1920s.[8]

By the 20th-century, American women had grown more organized about developing networks on local, state and national levels.[9] Susan Ware explains that in the 1890s, a "New Woman" appeared on the American scene in education, athletics, reform, and the job market. It seemed that majority of women were gaining a sense of equality for which they would fight

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[4] Malala Yousafzai, *I am Malala: The Girl who Stood up for Education and was Shot by the Taliban*. Ed. Christina Lamb (Ed.), (London: Little, Brown and Brown, 2013), 111

[5] Author's Interviews with the Locals (interviewees have been chosen from diverse backgrounds in Swat: common people, professors/teachers, a member of the former ruling family, and a few local politicians. The identities of (some) the interviewees are kept secret because of cultural constraints for women and cultural controversies for men), October, November, December, 2017.

[6] Martha Rampton, "Four Waves of Feminism" Pacific University Oregon, Retrieved November 15, 2018 from https://www.pacificu.edu/magazine/four-waves-feminism

[7] It is fair to say that while significant progress had been made, and that the lives of many American women had improved—that activists were not yet content, and certainly from the standpoint of later activists, the task was not complete—or there would not have been a later movement reborn in the 1960s. Of course, the extent to which more recent developments in the United States apply elsewhere and how so is an interesting question.

[8] Sara M. Evans, Born for Liberty: A History of Women in America (New York: Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1989), 145

[9] Nancy Woloch, *Women and the American Experience* (New York: Knopf, 1984), 292

onwards. The New Woman was the result of many changes that took place in American society, especially during the 19th-century. These changes were brought about by wars, waves of immigration, urbanization, industrialization, consumerism, education, the steel horse (railroads), racial and sexual terrorism that affected almost every walk of life in the American society, whose further improvement in the 20th-century would change the face of America in the world.[10] Nancy Rosenbloom explains that post World War I economic, political, and cultural changes, as well as military development, had implications for women, including the question of women's equality that remained in the public's eye in the shape of different waves of feminism throughout the 20th-century.[11] Sara Evans describes the collapse of Victorianism that had dominated American society until the early 20th-century:

> Labor unions, women's clubs, settlement houses all represented new public spaces for women, arenas in which they could experiment freely with new ideas and actions. Between 1900 and WWI the old Victorian Code which prescribed strict segregation of the sexes in separate spheres crumbled. The women's movement reached the apex of its political power achieving new laws for pure food, protecting legislation, regulating wages and hours for working women, and children prison and court reforms.[12]

The old ethos was broken and, in the light of their individuality, new models were formed for women's day-to-day lives. Over time, these models evolved into unanimous codes.[13] Young individuals began respecting these codes, breeding modern American life. Once they became intellectually and economically independent, women gradually gained political and social freedom.

In addition, America was struck with the fever of professionalism. The assembly-line concept of Henry Ford's car factory spread quickly throughout the country. Every activity was based on a systematic and planned procedure that revolutionized almost every walk of life. Even volunteer social work was made professional.[14] Ware attests, "In areas such

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[10] Susan Ware, *Modern American women: A Documentary History*, (New York: McGraw Hill Publisher, 2002),3

[11] Nancy J. Rosenbloom, *Women in American History since 1880*, (London: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), xiii

[12] Evans, *Born for Liberty*,160

[13] Even today, there are contentious issues. While on the one hand, women's right to divorce is unanimously agreed upon, women's right to an abortion is not. So it varies. Certainly a broad consensus was reached on some issues. But even the concept of equal pay for equal work, which everyone pays lip service to—and women have made gains—still does not exist in practice.

[14] Evans, Born for Liberty,161, 162

as fertility, wage-force participation, and political activity, their lives were, tentatively, beginning to prefigure patterns that resemble women's lives today".[15] This is not to say that women in the United States have genuine equality today. Clearly, women still are paid only two-thirds of what men make for comparable jobs; and clearly, there are ongoing issues of sexual harassment of women. What I wish to highlight, though, is that American women have come a long way in their determined and ongoing struggle for equal rights.

The Pashtun Context

Pashtuns are a dominant ethnicity in Afghanistan and one of the major ethnic groups in Pakistan, which is divided into major and minor tribes.[16] At the moment scattered in various countries, Pashtuns are also found in Iran and India. Though the Pashto language is mostly associated with Afghanistan, surprisingly, there are more Pashto speakers in Pakistan. Pashtun culture in Pakistan is a bit different than that of Afghanistan since it has been influenced by other cultures, most specifically by some Indian ways of life. Pashtun culture in Afghanistan, however, with its central Asian influences, is more conservative, especially its attitudes about women.[17]

On both sides of the border, Pashtuns mostly resolve their conflicts through *Jirga*, a tribal council of dignified elderly men, an integral component of Pashtun culture.[18] Pashtun culture in Pakistan, like in Afghanistan, is remarkably diverse in terms of its attitude toward women. It varies in terms of tribal and settled areas, each with its own clan and geographical characteristics. Owing to the considerable diversities within Pashtun culture, its true picture is hard to draw. Some areas are extremely underdeveloped like tribal belts in Pakistan and Afghanistan, whereas some communities, like Qandahar and Kohat, are on the road to modernization. Some, like Peshawar, fulfill the requirements of a modern urbanity. For simplification and authentication of this study, I focus on Swat as a case study for the representation of Pashtun culture, both in Pakistan and Afghanistan. First, Swat hosts Yousafzai tribe: being an enormous tribe, it colors the entire Pashtun culture in terms of its core variations. Secondly, Swat has both rural and urban settings such as the distant valleys and

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[15] Ware, *Modern American women*,1

[16] Malala, *I am Malala*, 32, 33

[17] Malala, *I am Malala*, 67; Syed Wiqar Ali Shah, *Pukhtane Khaze au da Qam khidmath* [Pastun Women and Service of the Nation], (Peshawar: Bacha Khan Research Center, 2012); Mujib Mahal, & Nadir, Zahra, ."No justice, 'no value' for women in a lawless Afghan province" (8 July 2017) Retrieved November 20, 2017 from https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/08/world/asia/afghanistan-women-honor-killings.html.

[18] Malala, *I am Malala*, 67

Mingora city. Having both rural and urban settings, Swat is the homeland of both the author and Malala, who was born and lived in Mingora, Swat, until she was shot by Talibans on October 9, 2012 for speaking in support of girls' education. At the moment, Yousafzai is an international activist living in Birmingham, England.[19]

Swat valley is located in the north of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province among the towering mountains. With district Chitral, the valley shares its northern border, while district Dir lies in the west, and Malakand Agency faces the district in the south. Districts Shangla and Buner enclose Swat from the East. The Headquarter is Saidu Sharif and the main city is Mingora. Divided into seven divisions (tehsils), the whole area of District Swat is 5337 Square Kilometer (sq. km) with a population of approximately 2,137,000 in 2014.[20] Topographically, Swat is a hilly region at the foothills of the Hindukush mountain range. In addition, the valley hosts the mighty Swat River, snow-capped mountains, lush green valley, forests, numerous orchards of various fruits.[21]Most of the people in Swat are Yousafzai Pashtuns as the last name of Malala indicates. There are some other minor languages, too, like Gujro and Kohistani, etc., but Pashto is the common language of communication, spoken by roughly 93% of the natives.[22]

Until Prince Miangual Jehanzeb removed Swat from its status as a princely state in 1969, the valley was peaceful and attracted tourists from the distant corners of the world for its natural beauty and rich history.[23]With the American attack on Afghanistan, the effects of the "War on Terror" in Afghanistan spread quickly across the border and severely affected the entire Pashtun belt in Pakistan, particularly Swat. The valley fell to the Talibans' regime and the government of Pakistan had to start a military operation against Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in 2009. [24]Although the militants were defeated and their holdings were recovered, terrorist activities are still plaguing the region in the form of targeted killings. Since then, the valley has been unable to restore itself to its former state.[25]

Swat is a region where social and radical diversity rules in every aspect of life, but even so, cultural ties and religious intensity primarily define the value of an individual, especially a female. Lack of authentic

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[19] Malala, *I am Malala*, 290

[20] Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund (PPAF), *Development Profile of Swat District: Situation Analysis & Baseline Surveys for Poverty Reduction through Rural Development in KPK, FATA & Balochistan, (*AASA Consultant: Karachi, 2015) Retreived September 16, 2018 from http://ppr.org.pk/PDF/District%20Profile%20Swat.pdf, 4, 6

[21] Malala, *I am Malala*,18

[22] Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund (PPAF), *Development Profile of Swat District*, 7

[23] Malala, *I am Malala* 25, 123

[24] Malala, *I am Malala* 137, 190

[25] Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund (PPAF), *Development Profile of Swat District*, 19

religious insight leads to romanticizing religion that often devolves into religious extremism. In most of the cases of terrorism in the name of religion, local culture influences interpretations of Islam in ways that imprison women in favor of cultural norms, which are brutally unfair, especially for women. Two entirely different ways of life exist for men and women. Where men enjoy freedom, women are constrained by many social and cultural laws that reduce their position to property to be owned.[26]Like their pre-women's rights sisters in the United States[27], women in Swat experience injustices that affect their freedom of movement, education, marriage consent, domestic responsibilities, jobs, divorce, physical and mental health, property ownership, and political participation.

2) U.S. Women by the 1920s

Education

College doors opened to women during the Civil War and by 1910 forty percent of college students were female. By the turn of the 20th-century, around 85,000 women were attending college—double the previous records. [28]In 1901, Hare M. Carey argued: knowing the theoretical art of home, college women were better at domestic chores. First the women's college was considered just an educational institution, but later it played a significant role in women's social, economic, and political evolution. The New Woman was actually developed in colleges where students learned about their potential and rights.[29]With the rising number of female students, there was demand for their services in jobs which could argue for opportunities for women so they could fill a preferred role. Even in stores and factories, work was not available for illiterate women. They needed someone with some basic knowledge of math and social dealings. Luckily in the 1870s and 1880s, college education had provided a pool of educated women to meet the professional demands in urban settings. Education was the core source of encouragement for bringing women into the modern scene on equal footing with men in various sectors. Some women rose to high positions in medicine, education, etc. that altered their former perception in the eyes of society and challenged most of the professional hierarchies.

Social Freedom

Like a commander of forces, Jane Addams led late 19th-century American women into a progressive era with promises of a new identity, a

[26] Malala, *I am Malala* , 13, 66-67, 90
[27] Women in the US did not gain rights in all of these areas simultaneously. It took them considerable time to reach the contemporary status.
[28] Woloch, *Women and the American Experience,* 268, 276
[29] Woloch, *Women and the American Experience,* 278, 279

larger-than-life fate compared to that of being a daughter, wife, or mother. The New Woman was powerful both within and beyond the home. The New Woman obliterated sex-stereotypes, modeling how women could be complete humans. Recognizing their potential and the possibility of a new identity, women assumed leadership roles in many organizations and forums. Sharing feminine goals, they found common ground to support each other. Though the new identity was more challenging, it had the satisfaction of equality. A woman was the same daughter, sister, or mother, but she gained authority, control, status, and influence.[30]

Domestic responsibilities, such as housecleaning and childrearing, were transformed into professional skills. Subjects like children's psychology, home economics, and household engineering could only be performed well by educated women. The National Congress of Mothers, established in 1897, surveyed the causes of domestic problems. Participants learned the required manners, responsibilities, as well as refinement and tolerance for others. [31]The United States society evolved into a consumerist hub and home was the center of it. Their world controlled home and home controlled their world. That was the orbit of their lives, explains Marion Talbot.[32]

Personal Freedom

As the 20th-century began, both men and women were seen traveling, working, and socializing almost equally. In cities, young women moved about without being supervised. Women spent a great deal on clothes for night dances. After long work hours, the young were hungry for socializing. Boatloads of money was spent on parties and night club dances. A tendency toward single life rose. Along with economic liberty, social and sexual equality was growing. Morality was replaced with science; ethos (societal norms) gave way to logos (factual entities).[33] These changes affected the lives of married women as much as single women, who started demanding sexual and social equality in matrimony. The phenomenon gave rise to a divorce rate for the first time in U.S society. William L.O Neill notes that with growing personal independence, the divorce rate skyrocketed to critical dimensions. Comparing the ratio to the 19th-century, the divorce rate almost tripled and kept on rising dramatically until the1930s. Historian Elaine Tyler May writes that most of the divorces were the result of husbands' domestic violence or failure to support the family[34].[35]

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[30] Woloch, *Women and the American Experience,* 270, 271

[31] Woloch, *Women and the American Experience,* 301.

[32] Woloch, *Women and the American Experience,* 295

[33] Evans, *Women and the American Experience,* 156, 160, 161, 164

[34] So women have freedom to escape abuse, but also freedom to simply leave (as does the husband). No-fault

The hegemony of heterosexuality was deeply explored, unlocking some secrets of sexual life. Contraception and volunteer motherhood became imperative factors. Women were now able to lead their lives without sacrificing their sexuality for children at the early stages of their lives. Ignoring conventional information related to domestic and sexual life, they concentrated on scientific discoveries about biological differences between men and women. The scientific approach towards life challenged many traditional ideas about sex and marriage. Scientific attitudes about home revolutionized the "home" with scientific management and professional skills.[36]Historian Daniel Scott Smith writes: "women acquired an increasing power over sex and reproduction within marriage and experienced a great increase of power and autonomy within the family**".**[37]As a result, birth rates plummeted both in urban and rural areas. Twenty-five percent of women who married between 1880 and 1910 produced only two children. Further, in the first decade of the 20th-century, they avoided giving birth in the first five years of marriage and built their lives intentionally, living ten years longer than women in the 19th-century. Historian Linda Gordon named it "volunteer motherhood," which later came to be known as "the right to body".[38]

Economic Independence

During the early 20th-century women were spreading across nearly every profession, standing side by side with men. World War I provided extensive and diverse job opportunities for women for the first time in U.S history, quadrupling women's numbers in jobs[39].[40]In 1870, 1.7 million women worked, but in forty years the number reached seven million.[41]By 1910, one out of five women (8 million) were working at jobs outside the home. According to the 1910 census, their number had tripled since the 1870s, having many jobs once held by men and even some jobs that men had not experienced previously.[42]

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divorce comes later, which increases freedom but also destabilizes families. This is a complicated legacy, and one

which conservatives who resist change fear.

[35] Woloch, *Women and the American Experience,* 273, 274

[36] Woloch, *Women and the American Experience,* 161-162

[37] Woloch, *Women and the American Experience,* 271

[38] Woloch, *Women and the American Experience,* 271

[39] Sending so many men to war opened the door (and WW2 would do it again). Of course the opportunities

diminished but did not vanish entirely when the men returned postwar.

[40] Woloch, *Women and the American Experience,* 227-248

[41] Ware, *Modern American women* 47

[42] Woloch, *Women and the American Experience,* 220.

Job Opportunities

Early in the 20th-century women gained limited economic freedom. They could easily join nursing, teaching, library work, or social work which men declined because they were able to find better opportunities with the expanding American economy.[43] In the beginning of the 20th-century, more women were employed in offices, stores, and schools, but their labor was cheap, both in private and government sectors. Between 1870 and 1900, the number of saleswomen multiplied by ten. Still the world of business was a new venture for them. Men who wanted to enter business were considered ambitious, while women with the same desire were thought to be clean and neat.[44] In clerical and sales work, women were rarely hired in the 1870s, but by 1900 their number rose to thirty-three percent and in the 1920s, women were in the majority.[45] Like sales work, nursing was also falling into the hands of women, reaching a peak by 1900, when nine out of ten nurses were women.[46] For women, numerous jobs opportunities were created in various sectors like writing, newspapers, magazines, social work, education, offices, hospitals, and factories.[47] Once marginalized, now women appeared at the heart of vocations in which they had never been seen before.[48]

Struggle for the Right to Vote

The Women's Suffrage movement lasted almost fifty years—the longest and harshest struggle of American history for an amendment which later proved a stable base for the coming waves of feminism. [49]William O'Neill points out that World War I was highly useful for the suffragist movement. It encouraged a huge number of women to help in volunteer work that grew into a force for the movement. The volunteer work impressed the government that, at that time, sympathized with women.[50] By the end of World War 1, Women's Suffrage was a colossal movement with membership in the millions.

Carrie Chapman Catt, who gained the presidential seat of the National American Women Suffrage Association (NAWSA) in 1915, pushed systematically for the 19th amendment. Evans says, "Her plan worked like a clock taking only four years instead of six, [which] Catt had predicted".[51] Her strategy earned the confidence of President Wilson, who

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[43] Woloch, *Women and the American Experience,* 283.
[44] Woloch, *Women and the American Experience,* 246-246
[45] Evans, *Born for Liberty,*134

[46] Woloch, *Women and the American Experience,* 224
[47] However, some of those (social work, nursing, secretarial work) became feminized and were shunned by men.
[48] Woloch, *Women and the American Experience,* 283-285
[49] Woloch, *Women and the American Experience,* 235
[50] Woloch, *Women and the American Experience,* 252
[51] Evans, *Born for Liberty,*170

recommended to the Senate to pass the amendment for women's suffrage. President Wilson also appeared at the NAWSA convention in September 1916, announcing his support for Women's Suffrage: "I have not come to ask you to be patient, because you have been, but I have come to congratulate you that here has been a force behind you that will beyond any peradventure be triumphant and for which you can afford a little while to wait".[52] He forwarded the request to the House of Representatives, which passed the Women Suffrage Amendment on the January 10, 1918. The Senate gave its approval in June 1919 and the bill was finally ratified by thirty-six states by August 26, 1920. [53]

By 1920, American women had the right to vote, but it was late in the global context. Many countries had already given women the right to vote: New Zealand (1893); Australia (1902); Finland (1906); Norway (1913); Denmark (1915); Canada (1917); Austria, Germany, Poland, Russia (1918) and Netherlands (1919). During the titanic struggle for women's voting rights, American society had evolved to such an extent that the right to vote in 1920 seemed a kind of degradation to American women.[54] Carrie Chapman Catt wrote in 1926: "It was a continuous seemingly, endless chain of activity. Young suffragists who helped forge the last links of the chain were not born when it began. Old feminists who forged the links were dead when it ended".[55] Historian William Chafe said that though the American women took too long to gain the right to vote, it had a significant impact on their lives. Now, women had a legal position from which to challenge other aspects of inequality. New laws were passed to protect women's rights in light of the new legislation. Congress passed the Shepherd Tower Act of 1921 to safeguard maternal education and child health care. In addition, both major parties opened their doors for women in their committees.[56]Evans explores how the social, political, and economic life of early 20th-century's American women had drastically transformed after attaining the right to vote:

> Women learnt to create institutions to demand that government accept some responsibility for community life whether in the form of pure drinking water or of libraries and schools. Many of the leaders of the suffrage movement believed that once women had the right to vote they would as individuals, express these female values through the electoral process and there would be no more need for collective organization. . . . From Suffragist to citizen, from housewife to house economist,

[52] Evans, *Born for Liberty*, 169
[53] Evans, *Born for Liberty*, 353
[54] Ware, *Modern American women*, 94
[55] Woloch, *Women and the American Experience*, 356
[56] Woloch, *Women and the American Experience*, 356

> from volunteer to social worker, from silence and euphemism to Freudian psychology, in each case modernity brought both gains and losses eroding the female community that had flourished in Victorian America.[57]

Settlements

Besides NAWSA, Jane Adams' Hull House also played a noteworthy role in the organization of American women. Like a big brother, says Jane Addams, the Hull House protected American women against problems of the day. It worked as a pressure group shielding women's social, economic, and political rights. At Hull House, under Jane's guidance, local mothers came to know about nutrition and household management. Hull House Women's Club extended its guidance throughout the neighborhood and out to the suburbs. By 1895, Hull House had inspired many college graduates who wanted to serve the cause as residents giving a new and stable source of active participation on behalf of women's issues.[58] Hull House grew into a community dominated by educated women who created their own terminology (e.g., "Head resident," "dear sister," "Lady Jane") and identity opposed to "the domestic claim." Later on, it produced figures like Julia Winthrop, the head of the federal Children's Bureau; Florence Kelley, the head of the national Consumers' League; and Alice Hamilton who founded the field of industrial medicine and taught at Harvard. All resided at Hull House from 1897 to 1907. Grace and Edith Abbot, two graduate sisters whose mother went to Rockford, also joined the house. Edith taught there, while Grace became the head of the Immigrants' Protective League and later took Julia Lathrop's position at Children's Bureau. By the 1920s, the alumnae of Hull House scattered all over the country with notable positions. Three years after founding Hull House, Jane Addams pronounced herself the grandmother of American Settlements. By the first decade of the 20th-century, settlement houses had become a notable profession and Jane was the leading figure. Jane Addams reached the height of women's political equality when she seconded Theodore Roosevelt for the Presidential nomination at the Progressive Party. She was hailed throughout the country for this courageous and famed stance.[59] In the early 20th-century, other women's settlements, inspired by Hull House, motivated many legislations such as The Children's Bureau in the Labor Department and the Women's Bureau. These two bureaus served children's and women's rights in the federal government. All these factors were important to strengthen and refine women's argument that they deserved equal rights.[60]

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[57] Evans, *Born for Liberty*, 172-173
[58] Woloch, *Women and the American Experience*, 262-263
[59] Woloch, *Women and the American Experience*, 264-266
[60] Woloch, *Women and the American Experience*, 301-303

Associations

There were many unions, but the prominent club movement was the Women's Christian Temperance Union (WCTU), formed in 1873 and led by Annie Witenmyer. WCTU rose to fame in 1879 when it was taken over by Frances Willard who, in the next two decades, turned the table on the union, making it one of the powerful sources of American women's rights. By 1890, WCTU had 160,000 members and enlarged its scope, dealing with all problems that were caused by men.[61] The American Federation of Labor (AFL) did not welcome women as their skills were not considered "professional" or "useful." But by the early 20th-century more waves of immigrants from southern and eastern Europe added new energy to the women's movement and they enrolled in many prominent federations and unions.[62] By 1892, when the General Federation Women Club (GFWC) came into being, there were more than 500 affiliated clubs and 100,000 members, and by World War I over a million. These associations and unions had a profound political impact for American women. These women were far stronger than their former sisters and had a clear awareness of their rights and duties. With the power of unity, they were able to pressure their employers, state officials, legislators, owners, industrialists, and business tycoons for their rights.[63]

3) The Contemporary Position of Pashtun Women

The Birth of a Pashtun Girl

The story of injustices commences with a Pashtun woman at the time of her birth, which is commonly taken as a bad omen for the family. A girl's gender haunts her with an inferior position at different stages of life. Contrarily, the birth of a boy enhances the significance of a family; and the event is considered a pride for the entire family/clan. Boys are preferred over girls for their masculine roles in family feuds, economy, property inheritance, and cultural acceptability.[64] Malala explains this situation, describing how her mother usually seemed more excited for her brother, Khushal, and favored him over her as the other women of the land do.[65] Research provides evidence that even the local literature has no place for women. In his dissertation, *Proverbs and Patriarchy: Analysis of Linguistic Sexism and Gender Relations Among the Pashtuns of Pakistan*, Noor Sanauddin explores extreme gender bias against women in Pashtun proverbs. For example, "A home that does not have a male child should be

[61] Woloch, *Women and the American Experience,* 287, 288
[62] Evans, *Born for Liberty,* 157, 158
[63] Evans, *Born for Liberty,* 290
[64] Shah, *Pukhtane Khaze au da Qam khidmath [Pastun Women and Service of the Nation],* 2012
[65] Malala, *I am Malala,* 20

demolished"; or "A girl's father is never at rest"; or "The earth and Pashtun woman do [should] not speak"; or "Keep women under your hand . . ."; or "Ruined is the man who listens to the advice of women"; or "A women goes seven foot ahead of the devil"[66] Malala begins her book with the story of her birth and how people, other than her father, reacted:

> When I was born, people in our village commiserated with my mother and nobody congratulated my father. . . . My father, Ziauddin, is different from Pashtun men. . . . He told people, "I know there is something different about this child." He even asked his friends to throw dried fruits, sweets and coins into my cradles, something we usually do for boys. . . . My parents had not held one [*Woma*][67] for me because they could not afford the goat and rice needed to feed the guests, and my grandfather would not help them out because I was not a boy. [68]

Apart from Malala, who replicated the same comments in her interview,[69] an interviewer explained: "We love daughters but when we look at their status in Pashtun culture, we desire for sons."[70]Professor Dr. Abaseen Yousafzai[71] and Ziaudin Yousafzai[72] also attest the aforementioned view.

Education

The issue of women's education is crucial because most of Pashtun women's problems stem from illiteracy. Pashtun women with a feminist awareness, which comes directly from education, could be in a better position to fight for their rights[73]. [74] Unfortunately, in Swat "literacy rates

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[66] Noor Sanauddin, *Proverbs and Patriarchy: Analysis of Linguistic Sexism and Gender Relations among the Pashtuns of Pakistan.* (2015) Retrieved August 10, 2019 from. http://theses.gla.ac.uk/6243/1/2015SanauddinPhD.pdf, 308, 309

[67] *Woma* means seven (07) in Pashtu. On the seventh day of the child's (mostly baby boy) birth, the family invites the relatives and celebrates the event with the sacrifice of a goat or sheep, which is mix-cooked with rice in a large cauldron.

[68] Malala, *I am Malala,*13-14, 58

[69] Author's Interview with Malala

[70] Author Interviews with the Locals.

[71] Author's Interview with Professor Dr. Abassen Yousafzai (Chair of Khyber Union Hall, Islamia College University Peshawar). July 16, 2019.

[72] Author' Interview with Ziauddin Yousafzai

[73] Pashtun culture/elders not only fear education for women but also deem it unnecessary because they have narrow domestic roles for women in their minds.

[74] Ziauddin Yousafzai, *Let Her Fly: A Father's Journey and the Fight for Equality,* (London: WH Allen, an imprint

are 50 percent for the overall population, with 73 percent for males and 27 percent for females during the year 2012-13." Around 38 percent of girls fail to register in schools. [75]A female interviewee said: "We need educated women to serve as doctors and lawyers because a woman can better understand a woman's problems in a place like Swat."[76] During her interview, Malala, who was shot for the very cause, repeatedly mentioned the grave concern of women's education in the valley.[77] Her father, Ziauddin Yousafzai categorically endorsed his daughter's stance in his interview.[78]

Lack of Awareness

The lack of Pashtun women's awareness of their plight and a sense of hopelessness that anything will change makes them vulnerable to their male masters. Being ignorant and uneducated, women have blindly accepted the cruel cultural laws, which run almost the opposite to those devised by religion[79]and state.[80] Even Malala sheds light on the issue by describing her mother's way of life, which was thoroughly shadowed by the local understanding of the role of women. Pashtun women fail to develop family planning; they produce many children; and they tend to decline modern medical techniques in favor of traditional ones.[81] Two local professors, including Prof. Dr. Abaseen Yousafzai[82], Prof. Dr. Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah[83], and Ziauddin Yousafzai[84], agree that only awareness, which is obtained through education, can liberate the Pashtun women from their miseries.

Marriage Consent

With some degree of softening in recent years, women's consent in marriage has been the most critical issue in Pashtun culture since the genesis of Pashtun society. Although both males and females have limited say in marriage, which is usually arranged by families, boys can reject the

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of Ebury Publishing, 2019

[75] Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund (PPAF), *Development Profile of Swat District,*10

[76] Author's Interviews with the Locals.

[77] Author's Interview with Malala Yousafzai

[78] Author's Interview with Ziauddin Yousafzai

[79] The Holy Quran: Sora Nesa

[80] The 1973-Constitution of Pakistan

[81] Malala, *I am Malala,* 53

[82] Author's Interview with the Prof. Dr. Abaseen Yousafzai

[83] Author's Interview/Discussion with Prof. Dr. Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah (Dean of Social Sciences, and Director of Area Study Center for Africa, North and South America Quaid-i-Azam University Islamabad). Being the direct mentor, the nature of this query was discussion and question based. It has taken place a number of times at a number of events.

[84] Auhtor's Interview with Ziauddin Yousafzai

arrangement.[85]Girls are only informed; they have no right to refuse. It is beyond thinking for a girl to have a say about her life partner. A woman's defiance is seen as an act of immorality;[86] and sometimes she is silenced with eternal sleep.[87] On behalf of her Pashtun sisters, Malala laments this code of Pashtun culture:

> I am very proud to be a Pashtun, but sometimes I think our code of conduct has a lot to answer for, particularly where the treatment of women is concerned. . . . There was a beautiful fifteen-year-old girl called Seema. Everyone knew she was in love with a boy. . . . In our society for a girl to flirt with any man brings shame on the family, though it's alright for the man. We were told she had committed suicide, but we later discovered her own family had poisoned her. . . When I complained these things to my father he had told me that life was harder for women in Afghanistan.[88]

Malala has drawn a true picture of Pashtun society, where people have zero tolerance for a woman's "infidelity (flirting)." If a family fails to put an infidel woman to death, the family is publicly shamed and their social status plummets. Such a transgression may be held against them for centuries. One interviewee explains it this way: "we know it is wrong but, at the moment, we cannot defy cultural norms like these as we have to live in this society."[89]

Economic Dependence

As in other Pashtun regions, women in Swat are economically dependent on men and bear phenomenal mental stress.[90]Like Charlotte Perkins Gilman, who depicted women being driven mad by male dominance, Malala sees that Pashtun women claim economic dependency at the price of liberty. This reduces their importance in men's eyes who usually take their rights for granted.[91] Unlike some educated women, a majority of the illiterate women who took part in the interviews are of the opinion that

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[85] Malala, *I am Malala,* 21
[86] Shah, *Pukhtane Khaze au da Qam khidmath [Pastun Women and Service of the Nation]*
[87] Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund (PPAF), *Development Profile of Swat District*
[88] Malala, *I am Malala,* 66-97
[89] Author's Interviews with the Locals.
[90] Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund (PPAF), *Development Profile of Swat District,* 25-26
[91] Malala, *I am Malala,* 116

their rightful place is home, whereas earning is the natural responsibility of men.[92]

Jobs Opportunities

There are limited job opportunities for women in Swat. They are allowed to work in homelike spheres that they find most often in education and health. In addition, a negligible number of women earn an income by tailoring or making handicrafts at home. Women of extremely poor families work as housemaids to support their families.[93] According to Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement (PSLM) 2012-13, "only 0.29 percent women are working as wage employees in the district".[94]

Property Ownership

Pashtun women are done the worst injustices in property inheritance. Both the law[95] and religion [96]assure a woman's inheritance, but the Pashtun culture strongly opposes it. A woman even fails to take her property with the help of law because she fears being ostracized by her own family. Pashtun women are even cheated of their *mahar*, a mandatory payment–usually a piece of property–paid by the groom to the bride.[97]A few women interviewees do not think that women should take their share in property, while some want their share but fear the consequences.[98]

Domestic Responsibilities

Like other Pashtun regions, the role of women in Swat begins and ends in the domestic sphere. At a very young age, girls are forced to learn all the technicalities of managing a house. They are advised to look after the younger babies in the family in order to train for their future domestic and maternal obligations. Confined to roles mandated by patriarchy, women are unfairly discriminated against in Swat.[99]Malala expresses her grief at the plight of Pashtun women caged in the domestic sphere, "I was a girl in a land where rifles are fired in celebration of a son, while daughters are hidden away behind a curtain, their role in life simply to prepare food and give birth to children." She exemplifies the phenomenon by describing her mother's way of life, which she thinks was not fair.[100] In the interview, Malala emphasized how education is necessary to raise women's awareness that

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[92] Author's Interviews with the Locals.
[93] Malala, *I am Malala,* 82
[94] Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund (PPAF), *Development Profile of Swat District,* 25
[95] The 1973-Constitution of Pakistan
[96] The Holy Quran: Sora Nesa
[97] Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund (PPAF), *Development Profile of Swat District,* 27
[98] Author's Interviews with the Locals.
[99] Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund (PPAF), *Development Profile of Swat District,* 25
[100] Malala, *I am Malala,* 13, 166, 305

there may be possibilities for them beyond the domestic sphere.[101] Apart from a few educated men, the majority of men and women interviewees are shocked when they are asked about the domestic responsibilities because they consider it the legal duty of women. One of the female interviewees puts it this way—"If we do not work at home, where else we are supposed to work then?"[102]

Domestic Say

"Women toil, while men decide." That's how one interviewee describes Pashtun gender roles in Swat.[103] The situation in educated families may be different, but on the larger scene, the society is patriarchal from the core.[104] Women may have limited say in some feminine issues such the management of households, but still a man's verdict is considered final.[105]Men mostly share their serious problems with other men because sharing personal problems with a woman is considered weakness on the part of Pashtun men.[106] Local interviewees and Malala agree that, in Pashtun culture, men dominate women's opinions.[107]

Domestic Violence

In Pashtun culture in Swat, domestic violence is the most frequent of any other crimes. Up to 70 percent of cases reported at the police stations are related to domestic violence triggered by honor issues.[108] In some cases, domestic violence is considered justified. Women who bear domestic violence silently are considered pious and well bred. Often a woman's own family advises her to swallow wordlessly whatever happens to her because it is the law of the land. Pashtuns normally have an extended family system in which a woman is under the jurisdiction of every male in the family.[109]Here the responses of the interviewees are mixed. A rural woman, whose daughter was recently shot by her son-in-law, says, "Domestic violence is the test that most of the Pashtun women have to stand as the price of their marriage."[110]

Divorce

Divorce is a social stain in Pashtun society; it plagues both the life of a male and a female. Having an upper hand, a man can manage to carve a

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[101] Author's Interview with Malala
[102] Author's Interviews with the Locals.
[103] Author's Interviews with the Locals.
[104] Sanauddin, *Proverbs and Patriarchy*
[105] Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund (PPAF), *Development Profile of Swat District,* 25
[106] Malala, *I am Malala 22*
[107] Author's Interviews with Malala and the Locals
[108] Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund (PPAF), *Development Profile of Swat District,* 24
[109] Shah, *Pukhtane Khaze au da Qam khidmath [Pastun Women and Service of the Nation]*
[110] Author's Interviews with the Locals.

role for himself in the society or remarry, but a female is doomed with the tag of divorcee, which is a taint against her character until the last breath of her life. Another elderly rural woman encapsulates the whole dilemma in a few words: "A Pashtun woman leaves her house twice, once when she gets married and second when she dies."[111]

Freedom of Movement

There may be variations in the degree of Pashtun women's freedom of movement, but the majority of women in Swat are confined in cultural shackles. Women and girls are not meant to go out. Consistent with *purdah*, the practice of female seclusion or covering, if a woman has to participate in some cultural activity or seek medical help or go shopping, she must wear an *abaya* (in Pashtu: *burqa*) that covers her from head to toe as well as be accompanied by a male of any age.[112]Envying the freedom of her brothers in Swat, Malala complains about these social constraints:

> While boys and men could roam freely about town, my mother and I could not go out without a male relative to accompany us, even if it was a five-year-old boy! This was the tradition. I had decided very early I would not be like that. My father always said, "Malala will be free as a bird."...But, as I watched my brothers running across the roof, flying their kites and skillfully flicking the strings back and forth to cut each other's down. I wondered how free a daughter could ever be.[113]

During her interview, Malala protested again the lack of female mobility in Swat.[114] A local politician says, "We will provide our ladies with freedom of movement. Unfortunately, neither the Pashtun traditions favor it nor the contemporary society has any tolerance for it which may result in some mishaps."[115]

Political Participation

For a Pashtun woman political participation is highly objectionable. The society does not allow it. The political realm is a masculine department, just as 'home' is a feminine one. Women have the right to vote, but they do not have permission to use that right. Neither do they have any awareness of it. Limited number of seats are reserved for women in the provincial and national assembly. In the majority of places, there is almost zero female turnout in elections. In March 2012, a women-led *jirga*, or tribal council, was established to boost women's awareness and political participation. It is

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[111] Author's Interview with the Locals.
[112] Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund (PPAF), *Development Profile of Swat District*, 25
[113] Malala, *I am Malala*, 26
[114] Author's Interview with Malala
[115] Author's interview with the Locals.

comprised of 25 members headed by Tabassum Adnan, with an additional 500 trained women activists.[116] Malala grieves over the lack of Pashtun women's participation in politics.[117] An elderly rural man was shocked when he was asked about women's participation in political activities and remarks ironically: "If women start participating in political activities, men will step in doing domestic chores."[118]

4) How the Early 20th-Century American Women's Struggle can Influence the Struggle of Contemporary Pashtun Women

Education

American women's independent status in the 1920s was the fruit of education whose seeds were sown generously after the Civil War. By 1910, forty percent of college students were female, and by the turn of the 20th-century, the number doubled.[119] Comparatively, women in Swat are lagging behind in education. The female literacy rate is only 27% in the overall 50% literacy of the valley.[120]Early marriage, as a rule of the land, shrinks the number of schoolgirls who go on to colleges and universities. Compared to boys, only a few girls make their way to higher education. In the arena of women's education, Pashtun culture may take direct inspiration from the American experience including other socially developed countries: like New Zealand, Denmark, Sweden, Turkey, etc. The education of girls and women will surely transform every angle of Pashtun society because most of the problems for women seem to be the product of a rigidly-imposed patriarchy enabled by illiteracy. Recently, the government, social media, and some foreign NGOs have shown interest in the cause. With the rising ratio of education for men, as the statistics indicate, some change can be seen in the attitude of some Pashtun men about the education of women. Malala and her father, Ziauddin also wish to transform the level of education, particularly for women, in the region with the help of the international community.[121]

Social Awareness

The status of U.S. women at the beginning of the 20th-century was made possible by enhanced awareness, which women won through their struggle for social, educational, economic, and political rights. Being educated and independent, they trusted scientific explanations instead of

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[116] Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund (PPAF), Development Profile of Swat District, 21-22, 26

[117] Author's Interview with Malala.

[118] Author's Interviews with the Locals.

[119] Woloch, *Women and the American Experience*, 276

[120] Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund (PPAF), *Development Profile of Swat District*, 10

[121] Author's Interviews with Malala and Ziauddin

traditional ways, and were able to develop their own decisions.[122]They introduced the concept of "volunteer motherhood" in the light of which they produced fewer children, with family planning improving their health and life span.[123]The picture in Swat is the polar opposite. Mostly illiterate, women in Pashtun regions lack awareness about their basic rights that turns out to be a major source of their exploitation because they have, in fact, rights of which they are ignorant. Once they know about their rights and duties, Pashtun women's domination and exploitation by men in many spheres will be mostly diluted. Some local NGOs like *LASOONA*, *HUJRA* and *KARAWAN* are active, but have yet to transform the degree of ignorance that exists among women (and men) in the valley.[124]In her interview, Malala explains how she intends to enlighten the Pashtun women with the gift of education, which will systematically bring awareness.[125]

Marriage Consent

Marriage is another integral component of society in which there is a glaring disparity between American society in the 1920s and Pashtun society in the 2010s. Having personal liberty, American women were generally in control of their personal lives regardless of societal pressure.[126]They remained at nearly equal footing with their husbands, both in domestic and marital issues, even in parting ways.[127]Unlike marriage for U.S women, marriage in Pashtun culture has been a very fraught issue for women. Unlike men, women are not allowed to openly express their desires in the selection of their life partners. If they ever do, it is taken for "infidelity" for which the cultural laws are unforgiving, even though the religion and the constitution grant them this right.[128]Once married, whatever the circumstances are, it becomes very hard for women to divorce. Although Islam and the constitution insure a woman's right to *Khula* (a woman's appeal for divorce), divorce remains a social stigma.[129] Therefore divorce is exercised by a negligible number of women**.** With a rising number of marital issues, growing awareness of female rights, and a surge both in men and women's education a degree of elasticity has been witnessed in women's consent in marriage.

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[122] Evans, *Born for Liberty*, 161-162
[123] Woloch, *Women and the American Experience*, 273
[124] Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund (PPAF), *Development Profile of Swat District,* 25, 31
[125] Author's interview with Malala
[126] Evans, *Born for Liberty*, 160-161
[127] Woloch, *Women and the American Experience*, 273
[128] Malala, *I am Malala*, 21, 66, 67
[129] The 1973-Constitution of Pakistan, The Holy Quran, and Hadits.

Economic Independence

In the 20th-century, credit for the liberation of U.S. women also goes to their economic independence. A woman economically dependent upon her husband cannot have full freedom. Women in Swat, however, are mostly dependent on men for their expenses. They have limited job opportunities in education and health, etc. In the same vein, they are cheated of their inheritance despite the fact that both religion and the law of the land guarantee it.[130]As Malala says, financial self-sufficiency could help lift women from misery to their due place in the Pashtun society.[131] Recently, women's entry into some jobs, like law and banking, and some cases of women's receipt of their inheritance may support the claim that Pashtun culture is beginning to transform.

Domestic Sphere

One of the biggest achievements of U.S. women in the 1920s was moving from the domestic into the public realm, transforming domestic duties and child raising into professional skills. The National Congress of Mothers in 1897 "traced the roots of crime and disease to 'inefficient homes,' and the settlement worker gained access to those homes," teaching the participants "cleanliness, orderliness, refinement, manners, culture, responsibility, and citizenship".[132]Both men and women were encouraged to share domestic responsibilities. In Swat, like other Pashtun regions in Pakistan and Afghanistan, the role of the majority of women is still traditional. Childrearing and domestic responsibilities are believed to be the natural duties of women. The patriarchal society limits roles for women, and those roles take place in the home.[133]In terms of gender equity relating to domestic responsibilities, so far there is no hope to be seen because the society is not at a stage to demand that men bear this burden with women. Mentioning this very fact in her book, Malala also implied in her interview that she yearns to weaken domestic clutches on women in Swat in favor of taking on leading roles in the society.[134] So far, Pashtun women are mostly deprived of that possibility.

Freedom of Movement

Unlike Pashtun women in the 2010s, U.S. women in the 1920s enjoyed freedom of movement. The traditional jurisdiction of women being

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[130] Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund (PPAF), *Development Profile of Swat District,* 25, 27

[131] Malala, *I am Malala,*116

[132] Woloch, *Women and the American Experience,* 301

[133] Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund (PPAF), *Development Profile of Swat District,* 25

[134] Malala, *I am Malala,* 52; author's interview with Malala.

relegated to home, the site of domesticity, had already been challenged.[135] Recognizing their potential with the help of a newly acquired identity, American women assumed starring roles and were able to roam without being supervised.[136]Secure freedom of moment is a dire need of Pashtun women who are, by and large, leading lives with strident cultural restrictions.[137] Malala, the most visible Pashtun activist with international support, is like a 20th-century Jane Addams, protesting against unjust Pashtun restrictions on women in her talks, her book, and her personal interview. Education and social media are contributing to the rising awareness of Pashtun women; and the result is that some of these gendered cultural constraints are beginning to soften.

Political Participation

Nobody knows better the worth of political rights than the American women who struggled for half a century to earn them. First, they fought for the right to vote. Then with this right, they fought battles for many other rights.[138] They had associations like NAWSA, clubs like WCTU, settlements like Hull House, and leaders like Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Carrie Chapman Catt, and Frances Willard who awakened the political consciousness of American women.[139]In contrast, Pashtun women have the legal right to vote already, but they do not have the right to use it. In addition, there is a shortage of inspiring leaders, clubs, associations, and settlements to educate them. There is only a women-led *jirga* that so far does not seem effective.[140]Musarat Ahmadzeb and Ayesha Syed are the current women Members of National Assembly on the reserved seats from Swat. Although Malala is trying her level best, unfortunately, due to some local propaganda that attempts to discredit her, Pahstun women in Swat have not been as responsive to her as the international community has been.[141]

5) Literary Voices

Although Pashtun women's voices are suppressed, there are still some brave women who have dared to write literature. A literary survey,

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[135] Plenty of people still thought women belonged in the home even as women challenged that. It was neither absolute suppression or absolute freedom.

[136] Evans, *Born for Liberty,* 161

[137] Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund (PPAF), Development Profile of Swat District, 25

[138] In this period women gained many rights before they gained the right to vote. It is also true that the right to vote led to other changes later.

[139] Woloch, *Women and the American Experience,* 355

[140] Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund (PPAF), *Development Profile of Swat District,* 21-22

[141] Malala, *I am Malala,* 298

"*Da Swat Zana Shaerane* [*Contemporary Poetesses from Swat*]" [142] by Attaurahman Atta, an Assistant Professor of Pashto Language at Jehanzeb Post Graduate College Swat and a PhD candidate at Pashtu Academy, the University of Peshawar, lists eight local poetesses among whom some openly speak about the cultural constraints of Pashtun women. Sana Latiff worries for her father's societal honor in her poetry and intends to sacrifice her personal desires and passions for it. Revealing the psychological oppression of Pashtun women, she lets her lover know in one of her poems that distance will safeguard both their lives and love. Likewise Maryam, who calls herself Farwa Yousafzai, speaks of her romantic idealism, while strongly opposing extremism. Afsana, who writes with a pen name, tells the story of her passion for writing. She was on the verge of being killed by her husband for writing poetry when she was saved by the intervention of her sons, even though her literary pieces were burnt in an oven. Sameena Qadir, who calls herself Meena, has written a collection of poems, *Spezale Jazbe* [*Pure Intentions*].[143] In her poem *"Bewasi"* [*Helplessness or Forlornness*], she critiques the devaluation of women, claiming, ironically, that she has no grudge against the Pashtun society for usurping her rights of education, movement, love, and marriage because she is a woman, which is a sin in itself. It could be argued that the entire collection reflects the suppression of Pashtun women. Asma Ikhlas, an undergraduate student of Pashtu Literature at Pahstu Department, Islamia College University Peshawar, is also a contemporary poetess from Swat, who, through her romantic poetry, is openly challenging the shackles of Pashtun patriarchy.

A Pashtun novelist from Mardan, Pakistan, Hasina Gul is the author of the novel, *Malka* (2011), which means "queen." Malka, the protagonist of the novel, loses trust in the institution of marriage because of her sister's abusive husband and failed marriage. She seems to develop lesbian ties with Khaista, her only friend with whom she remains in relationship until her death. After Khaista's death, Malka goes mad and soon dies.[144] These women writers, who are read locally, raise their voices against the oppression of Pashtun women just as Louisa May Alcott, Kate Chopin, and Zora Neale Hurston did a hundred years ago. Some of them simply identify; others critique; and still others offer alternative models of female-identified community. Khaled Hosseini in *Dear Zari: The Secret Lives of the Women of Afghanistan* (2012), and Aisha Ahmad and Roger Boase in *The Pastun Tales from the Pakistan-Afghan Frontier* (2008) piece together many such fictional stories that certify the suppression of Pashtun Women on both sides

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[142] Attaur-Rehaman Atta, *Da Swat Zanana Shaerane [Contemporary Poetesses from Swat],* running for publication at Pashtu Academy, The University of Peshawar KP.

[143] Sameena Qadir, *Spezale Jazbe [Pure Intensions],* (Peshawar: College Department KP, 2016).

[144] Hasina Gull, *Malka [Queen]*, (Mardan: Maraka Publication, 2011)

of the border— in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Due to illiteracy there are as yet few feminist activists like late Asma Jilani Jahangir (1952-2018), Sharmeen Obaid-Chinoy (1978-), and Reham Khan (1973-) in Pakistan, but in the Islamic diaspora there are many.[145] There are also some organizations, like The Global Women's Project, The Association for Women's Rights in Development (AWID), and UN Women, that are trying to help Pashtun women in their nascent struggle for equal rights both in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

6) Conclusion

There are many controversies and differences of opinion among the Pashtuns in Pakistan and Afghanistan regarding the true picture of their culture. I present a precise focus on women's issues in Swat. I have ignored some controversial topics like *swara* (a process through which *jirga* gives a girl to another family/clan to resolve a feud), the practice of which has nearly disappeared in Pashtun culture.[146]Of course, women's issues are entangled with every thread of the fabric of society, but I focus on a few strands of this fabric. This comprehensive analysis reviews substantial differences between the social, personal, economic, and political rights of U.S. women in the 1920s and Pashtun women in the 2010s. Except for the right to vote, almost nothing sounds similar between the U.S. and Pashtun women except the list of important issues. Surprisingly, the position of Pashtun women has grown more repressed though this is due to the rise of religious extremism in the late 20th-century (while American women benefited from social upheaval due to industrialization and war, the opposite has been the case for Pakistani Pushtun women). Pashtun women had more liberty in the 1950s.[147]Until Pashtun men like myself and Malala's father Ziauddin Yousafzai, are willing to join women to examine inequity, the pace of reform for Pashtun women will be slow. Education both for men and women seems to be the sole remedy for the problems of Pashtun women.

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[145] for obvious reasons, the majority of feminists seem to be from Iran or those who immigrated to the U.S. or Canada. Here is a brief list: Leila Ahmad (1940-) an Egyptian American writer on Islamic feminism and a professor of women's studies in religion at Harvard Divinity School; Shadi Sadr (1974-), an Iranian lawyer; Elalih Koulaei (1956-) an Iranian politician; Nourshir Amhadi Khorasani (1969-), an Iranian activist; Shahla Sherket (1956-) an Iranian journalist; Fatema Mernissa (1940-2015), from Morocco, an Islamic feminist; Irshad Manji (1968-), now a Canadian who has written *The Trouble with Islam Today* (2004) and *Allah, Liberty, and Love (*2010); Taslima Nasrin (1962-) a Bangladesh feminist activist; Nida Mahmoed (1990-) is described as a "Pakistan-based first feminist English poet"; and Amir Jamal, assistant professor in social work at St. Thomas University in Canada.

[146] Malala, *I am Malala*, 67

[147] Khurshid Khan, "Plight of Women in Swat" *DAWN* (*DAWN - Editorial; December 31, 2008). Retrieved January 12, 2009 from https://www.dawn.com/news/1071861*.

The story of the U.S. women's struggle could inspire their Pashtun sisters, who are beginning their battle for self-determination and rights. One of the prime activists, Malala Yousafzai, targets women's rights as part of a revolt against female inequality in Pashtun society. In the beginning of her book, she vows: "To all the girls who have faced injustice and been silenced. Together we will be heard".[148]In this way, activists like Malala and writers like Sana Latiff, Farwa Yousafzai, Sameena Qadir, Asma Ikhlas, and Hasina Gul have the potential to introduce multifaceted scenarios of women's struggle from across the world, in particular from the U.S., to spark a steady revolution for the rightful place of Pashtun women in our society. Women's issues are global concerns across time and distance and these are interlinked struggles.

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